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NOTES 
 The title of this thesis is inspired by Jasmin and Stars: Reading More than Lolita 
by Fatemeh Keshavarz (2007). 
 Unless otherwise indicated, the translations from Arabic and Farsi works are of the 
author.  
 The system of transliteration used in this thesis is the system which is the most 
agreeable with Encyclopaedia Iranica. However, other forms of transliteration have 
been used in this thesis. These may be different from those of the author, but are 
retained in order to keep the direct quotations intact. 
 Persepolis is a Greek name which literally means ‘city of Persians’. This city is 
located in the south-West of present-day Iran, in Fars Province. Persepolis is also 
known as Takht-e Jamshid and used to be the capital of the Achaemenid Empire, 
where Darius the Great was on the throne (Mark, 2009). Persepolis has been the 
sign of Iranian culture and heritage for thousands of years. “Although it is in ruins 
today, Persepolis remains a city central to Persian identity: it recalls a time when 
Iran was a powerful empire and when it was pre-Islamic. In 1971, Reza Shah 
Pahlavi used Persepolis to stage the celebration of the 2,500 year of Iran’s monarchy 
[…]. Since 1979, however, the Islamic Republic of Iran has tried to diminish 
Persepolis’ importance as part of a larger policy against Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage” 
(Leservot, 2011, p. 128).  
 Satrapi was born in 1969 and is currently living in France. The author has explored 
the option to interview Satrapi carefully. Since the book, the author and the film are 
presently banned in Iran, direct contact with Satrapi would affect the author 
detrimentally in terms of a future career life in Iran. A member of the Iranian 
government has informally stated that in case of an interview, new sets of 
declarations might appear that have to be recorded and reflected in the thesis as they 
are. The Islamic Republic of Iran would not appreciate such new material.   
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis reclaims the analysis of Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis. It is mindful of 
analysis of the stereotypical, and partial tendencies of orientalist representations of Satrapi’s 
work by both Iranian officials and “Western” media and readership. Themes are detected from 
this analysis and pertain to the message and intention of the author to create her work. The 
intentio lectoris1 (i.e. what audiences believe or led to believe) proposed that orientalist 
paradigms present the meaning of the work or Satrapi’s agenda, i.e. the intentio auctoris. 
Persepolis has been enthusiastically received all around the world, except in Iran. It has been 
described and interpreted as the critique of a courageous girl against the foundations of the 
Iranian Islamic Republic. Notwithstanding the success, the graphic novel and the animated 
movie derived from it in 2007 have been banned by the Iranian government, and subsequently 
Marjane Satrapi has been refused entry into the country. The polarised reception of Satrapi’s 
work in Iran and worldwide, is contextualised within (neo) orientalist critique. I detect in these 
receptions both potentials and problems. Reclaiming aspects of Persepolis’ analysis that have 
been excluded from and therefore devalued by external agencies is affirmed as a necessary 
and important contribution. However, I note that the overwhelming reluctance amongst 
“Western” media and news reporters to speak of Satrapi’s dual and neutral position, or to grasp 
at specificity her intentio auctoris, prevents us from a thorough discussion of their analysis. 
Satrapi’s work is ultimately left in the hands of clichés. I attempt to analyse Persepolis in such 
a way that it not only affirms rationality, fluidity, and duality, but also offers new and 
beneficial ways to argue Satrapi’s position and intention. My thesis is thus partly rooted in a 
feminist standpoint perspective to give voice to Satrapi’s agenda. What is more, it converses 
with similar restrictive regulations and contextualises them within an analysis of selected post-
revolutionary autobiographical literature. My ultimate goal is to analyse the Iranian position 
towards Persepolis by making sense of the theological and political thought of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Revolution, and the concept of velayat-e faqih 
(guardianship of the jurists) and the national and international responses to it in a way in which 
to take and transform the representation of Persepolis and Iranian culture consequently. This 
is done by explaining the current Iranian situation and Iranian responses to internal and 
external threats. Theological analyses and the explication of some of the historical 
complexities affecting modern Iran (especially after the revolution) would be beneficial along 
the way. 
                                               
1 This distinction has been developed by Italian semiotician Umberto Eco (1994) to disengage literary 
critique from the dogmatism and fallacy of strict philologists and deconstructuralists.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Brief outline 
This thesis sets out to undertake an analysis of Marjane Satrapi’s graphic novel 
Persepolis (2003),2 based on the concept of intentio auctoris (i.e. the rationale behind Satrapi’s 
representation of Iran) and the representations and receptions of it i.e. intentio lectoris, 
considering the discrepancy resulting from the interaction between the two, by placing it in 
the context of selected post-revolutionary memoirs by diaspora Iranians. Marjane Satrapi and 
her intentio auctoris have been silenced, or manipulated, by intentio lectoris, in this case a 
convergence of agencies such as the publishing market, the cinematographic industry, show 
business, media, the ideologies resulting from the current geopolitical situation and, last but 
not least, various Iranian theological and political positions.3 Persepolis has achieved great 
popularity worldwide, except in Iran. The initial research question is an analysis of the 
polarised reception of Satrapi’s work in Iran and worldwide. This provides an opportunity to 
contribute to scholarly discourses on Iranian politics, history and culture pre- and post-Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 in Iran. The argument is set against the essentialist views and their global 
advertisement to restructure them in a more nuanced and detailed framework to discuss the 
accusation of Islam setizi (hostility towards Islam) set against Persepolis and its epigones, as 
well as other post-revolutionary autobiographies. It emerges that Persepolis is at the centre of 
a tapestry informed by diverse, and often discordant views and agendas. A paradox emerges 
when one analyses intentio auctoris and the meaning her work has assumed for international 
audiences, or intentio lectoris.  
Analysis of intentio auctoris and intentio lectoris  
Satrapi’s graphic novel is an autobiography. Persepolis – a personal political and 
historical account – summarises in quick, intelligent flashes a woman’s experience of growth 
during and after the Iranian Islamic Revolution (1979). Satrapi introduces the reader to the 
collapse of the world of her childhood, and the dramatic changes that followed the downfall 
of the Pahlavi4 regime and the affirmation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Persepolis engages 
                                               
2 The focus of this research is primarily Marjane Satrapi’s graphic novel Persepolis (2003) and the 
homonymous animated movie presented, and celebrated at the 2007 Cannes Film Festival. 
3 Davis (2005) believes that full understanding of a book like Persepolis is very much dependent on the 
cultural and political contexts in which the story happened. “Indeed, to engage these narratives 
effectively, we must move beyond an analytical model of merely reading the surface of texts for 
potential meanings and attend to the cultural and generic codes addressed by the authors to unravel what 
the texts execute within the contexts of larger questions of cultural and political mobilization” (p. 265).  
4 “The Qajar dynasty was overthrown in 1921 in a military takeover led by a soldier named Reza Khan. 
Reza Khan proclaimed himself shah, shortly thereafter in 1925 … the reign of Reza Shah lasted until 
August 1941…Reza Shah would be forced to abdicate in favour of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi” 
(Schroeder, 2010, p. 26). 
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with the author’s hold on reality and her questioning of the events around her. By 
acknowledging her losses, Satrapi looks at the Islamic culture of Iran as the source of most of 
her troubles. The story, which is set in Tehran, changes location when a teenage Marjane is 
sent to Vienna to continue her education. Eventually she returns to Tehran, depressed and 
disillusioned, where she studies at the university, gets married and, after around three years, 
gets divorced. In Iran, with other fellow students, she is forced to accept the rules of the Islamic 
revolutionary government. Practical and conceptual rules and regulations are set against life 
before the revolution and outside Iran by means of ironic, nostalgic and intimate vignettes.  
A graphic novelist, director, illustrator and author presently living in France, Marjane 
Satrapi has since confirmed her standing as a novelist with The Sigh (2004),5 Embroideries 
(2005),6 Monsters are Afraid of the Moon (2006)7 and Chicken with Plums (2006).8 Following 
the success of Persepolis,9 the graphic novel has been adapted into an animated movie directed 
by French comic artist Vincent Paronnaud and Marjane Satrapi. The film won the Jury Prize 
at the 2007 Cannes Film Festival and was nominated for the Academy Award for Best 
Animated Feature in the USA. Persepolis is an outspoken political work, especially in its 
second part (Satrapi in Dave, 2006). The roots of its success, it may be argued, lie precisely in 
its religious, social and political polemics - a missing factor in Satrapi’s subsequent works. An 
important one is it having been set at the time of the making of revolutionary Iran.10  
 Persepolis has been written from a personal point of view and is based upon the 
subjective opinions and experiences of its author. Notwithstanding Satrapi’s declarations,11 
                                               
5 The Sigh (2004) is an illustrated novel by Satrapi. It is a fairy tale about a rich merchant who has three 
daughters. He brings them gifts from the market. One of the girls asks for a blue seed. The merchant 
cannot find the seed and the girl sighs. A creature, a Sigh, takes the seed for the merchant, and the price 
of this is to take the girl to mysterious places. The book does not completely follow the standards of a 
graphic novel and is more like a storybook for children. 
6 The Embroideries (2005) by Satrapi is for adults and is about the sex lives of women in Iran. Gossips, 
arranged marriages, love marriage or the virginity of girls before marriage in Iranian culture are the 
topics of debate for Satrapi’s mother, grandmother, auntie and neighbours.  
7 Monsters are Afraid of the Moon (2006) is a children’s story by Satrapi. As the main character Marie 
goes to bed each night, she has a visit from three monsters. They all appear in the dark, so she cuts the 
moon of the sky and puts it on her bed. When the moon is, there, there are no monsters - but how will 
the rest of the village manage without a moon?  
8 Chicken with Plums (2006) is another graphic novel by Satrapi, and was adapted into a film in 2011. 
It is a story based on Satrapi’s family history in Iran, and is set in Tehran in 1958. Naser Ali Khan, the 
most renowned musician of his day, loses all his hope and taste for life after breaking his beloved violin. 
It is a universal story of music and love.  
9 None of Satrapi’s works are as famous as Persepolis. Furthermore, the themes of religion and politics 
are more prevalent in Persepolis. There are no official documents from the Iranian government against 
Satrapi’s other works.  
10 In an interview with Weiss (n. d.), Satrapi confirmed the importance of Iran’s contemporary history. 
Yet her intention was to tell her story in a form appealing to most and not requiring previous knowledge 
– namely, the form of the graphic novel. 
11 In one of her interviews, Satrapi declared: “the image that I have of Iran today is mixed so much with 
my melancholy and my nostalgia that I can’t have a fair point of view” (Satrapi in Walt, 2008). 
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and regardless of its personal, intimist nature, her work continues to inform discourses on Iran 
and Islamic culture globally and been presented in most media coverage as a “true rendition” 
of Iran’s recent ‘history’.12 Furthermore, Persepolis has been used as a didactic tool in many 
educational institutions around the world especially at a scholarly level (at both undergraduate 
and postgraduate levels).13 The New York Times reports that: “Persepolis is taught in 118 
colleges in the United States, including West Point, according to Pantheon, its publisher — 
and taken part in a larger conversation about the book’s global resonances” (Hohenadel in The 
New York Times, 2007). According to Chambers, “It is misleading to identify individuals as 
being somehow emblematic of the history of a whole nation” (Chambers, 2013, p. 5). In this 
regard, Persepolis should not have been presented in educational contexts or media as 
representative of the whole Iranian society. A critical reading of what has not been represented, 
or what has been presented as ‘truth’ (and accepted as such) proves extremely useful in the 
analysis of Persepolis as a ‘true rendition’ and a ‘personal story’. 
The first level of inquiry is one built on the analysis of Persepolis in general. This will 
serve to present the text, the perception of the problem it delivers, and its style, i.e. the way 
Satrapi has chosen to talk about her country and her culture. Needless to say that, Satrapi’s 
book is not a history of Iran, but an Iranian story. Satrapi has long been concerned about 
stereotyped propaganda against Iran. In one of her interviews, she was asked by a journalist 
about the reason for writing her book. “Because you didn’t make good your job!” (Tempesta, 
2005). She, also added in an interview with Asia Society (n.d.) that: “for me there were so 
many misunderstandings, and so many mistakes concerning my country that I wanted to tell 
the story in a way that people would understand it better”. According to Satrapi, Persepolis 
“was really a shout, like, please, come on, I will tell you how it was!” (Satrapi in Shaikh, n.d.). 
She informs us that she chose the name Persepolis to draw the world’s attention on Iran beyond 
the borders of the Islamic Republic,14 which along with ‘fundamentalism’15 and “terrorism” is 
                                               
12 Mondello (2007) describes the film directed by Satrapi as a “nuanced view of social issues,” while 
Satrapi notes that Persepolis is just her partial and personal account. See also Howell who states that 
Persepolis represents the whole history of Middle East (2008). Similar views are observable from 
Charity (2008) and Travers (2007). Calhoun (2007) believes that “Persepolis is realism seen through 
special eyes”. According to LaSalle, although Persepolis is personal, history and culture of Iran remain 
as the core argument. This put Satrapi’s work beyond the borders of an autobiography (LaSalle, 2008).  
13 From author’s personal experience at the University of Manchester where Persepolis has been used 
as a learning tool in discussions of analysis of the Iranian culture and history at the postgraduate level.   
14 “By naming her memoir with the Western name for this pre-Islamic city central to Iranian identity, 
[…] to the current Islamic regime, Satrapi symbolically identifies her work as Western in name only, 
but deeply, truly Persian, a political gesture aimed at an Islamic regime which refuses Iran’s diversity 
of opinions and identities” (Leservot, 2011, p. 128).  
15 The term ‘fundamentalism’ can be found in a number of sources as well as in media. It is not confined 
to Islam. Fundamentalism may be defined in political contexts. The notion of activism is closely related 
to fundamentalism in a way which might justify the militant aspect of the term. Generally, 
fundamentalism carries a sort of intolerance and denial towards other beliefs. In Burrell’s words: 
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the focal point of attention of world media (Satrapi in Farahmandi, n.d.). The role of media, it 
so appears, is a pivotal one in informing and disseminating stereotypical and propagandistic 
accounts on Iran. This, I concur with Satrapi, should neither be ignored nor underestimated. 
From its beginnings as a graphic novel written in French by an Iranian leftist young girl in 
2002, Persepolis has become a global bestseller translated in several languages, and advertised 
as a denouncement by an oppressed Iranian girl struggling against the tyranny of the Iranian 
Revolution and the Islamic Republic. To this, one should add Satrapi’s loss of control of her 
work, which is particularly notable following its success at the 2007 Cannes Film Festival to 
Random House Group (one of the largest book publishing houses) and Sony Pictures Classics 
who define the meaning of Persepolis globally. This then depends exclusively on the capitalist 
agenda of the global market. It can be argued that in such context, Persepolis loses its poetry 
and becomes the Bildungsroman of a young girl who struggles with a tyrannical, non-
democratic and gender-oppressive regime.16 Advertised as such, the dramatic experiences of 
Satrapi are passed onto millions and, like other graphic novels set in Afghanistan or Bosnia, 
they align with a campaign against rouge countries in the name of, amongst the other things, 
women oppressed by mollahs (Iranian clergies).  
Looking through the critical lenses of a personal memoir and criticising governmental 
policies, as it is argued by Iranian officials, Persepolis has reinforced stereotypical and highly 
politicised propaganda against Iran. The film adaption “turned into a political event at Cannes 
2007” and “the fact that France decided to enter this particular film for the Oscars [mostly] 
accentuates the political side of the film” (Shalmani, 2008). The Iranian government, including 
members of its clergy, condemned both the book and the animated film in March 2007. Mahdi 
Kalhor, Presidential Advisor on Media Affairs, declared that “Persepolis is Islamophobic” 
(Barzegar, 2012, p. 22).17 In an interview with Fars News Agency, Kalhor stated that: 
                                               
“Fundamentalism is clearly more likely to produce an atmosphere of confrontation rather than 
cooperation; but it need not inevitably do so” (1989, p. 5). In this thesis, I sometimes quote the term 
“fundamentalism” directly from different contexts which discuss the abuse of power by Islamic 
government agents in Iran. This, however, might not make sense in defining the Iranian political system. 
‘Foundationalism’ as a view “that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of 
non-inferential knowledge or justified belief” could be replaced with ‘fundamentalism’ in the case of 
Iran (Fumerton, 2010). Foundationalism explains the structure of Khomeini’s political thought which 
is “dependent on some other beliefs that are known or justifiably believed” (Poston, n.d.), i.e. the 
deputyship of a jurist which is derived from the right of velayat for the infallible Imams.   
16 The term “regime” is used throughout this thesis to refer to the Iranian Islamic Republic system of 
government. This is due to the fact that some authors and post-revolutionary memoirists refer to the 
post-Khomeini government as totalitarian, fanatic and sometimes politically corrupt that impose Islamic 
rules on people and apply them at social level.  
17 The concept of Islamophobia is a vast one, and “fails to distinguish between race and religion.”(Cf. 
Sayyid. S., & Vakil A. K., 2010, pp. 10-35). “[It] could reasonably be applied to any setting in which 
people hate Muslims, or fear Islam, but the word is most frequently invoked, and has its richest 
connotations, when it is used to describe a sentiment that flourishes in contemporary Europe and North 
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Cannes’ attention to Persepolis is in line with the fight against Islam by the 
French: Islam setizi. The battle against Islam in Western art and media started 
in France. Producing the anti-Iranian film, Persepolis, and it being awarded a 
prize at the Cannes Film Festival is in line with battling against Islam. From the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onwards, challenging the religion and faith 
started in France. It first started with Christianity and after a short time the 
attention was given to Islam. Voltaire’s prejudiced description and attacks 
against Prophet Muhammad is of this kind. This challenge has been followed in 
a new way by A Journey to Persia by Jean Chardin. The French wickedness, 
today, is of the similar nature (Kalhor in Fars News Agency, 2007).  
Kalhor added that the film Persepolis, just like other pop culture products (e.g. the 2007 
movie 300 by Zack Snyder), “is aimed at demolishing the Iranian culture”, and will not be the 
last anti-Iranian movie (Kalhor in Fars News Agency, 2007). Feelings were exacerbated when 
Satrapi’s film, Persepolis, was awarded the Jury Prize.18 “Ali Akbar Velayati, former foreign 
minister and adviser to the supreme leader,19 Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei, said the French-
produced film is another example of US attempts to ‘encourage forces opposed to the 
authorities in any way possible’” (Mfpietro, 2012). It so appears that the situation is radically 
different in Iran. Persepolis is banned and, since 2007, Satrapi has not been allowed entry to 
the country on account of Islam setizi.  
Reactions to the reception of Persepolis in Iran can be placed into three broad groups. 
The first group includes the Iranian wealthy, educated and “Westernised” bourgeoisie. This 
broadly corresponds to Satrapi’s background, as well as that of most post-revolutionary 
writers. Their secular (not necessarily nationalistic) ideas have divergent directions from the 
school of Khomeini. Their perception of Persepolis is very close to that of audiences in 
“Western” Europe and the United States primarily, and their views on the Shi’a Islamic 
Republic more or less match that offered by contemporary “Western” media. The main 
argument against the current Iranian government and leadership involves accusations of 
                                               
America” (Shryock, 2010, p. 2). “Islamophobia rose markedly after the events of September 11th” 
(Driel, 2004, p. 164), while Islam setizi is a special term coined by Iranian officials.  
18 Ali Reza Rezadad, the managing director of Farabi Cinematic Affairs, complained to the French 
ambassador in Iran, Mr Vincent Grimoire: “The Cannes Festival has chosen Persepolis, in a false act, 
as the candidate for the Jury Prize. Persepolis is an unrealistic and faulty representation of the values of 
the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The Cannes Festival, with this action, has indeed ignored other valuable 
Iranian films and clearly supported imperialistic and hegemonic policies. This is absolutely against their 
freedom of speech and free thinking mottos. Not choosing other valuable Iranian films can be remitted, 
but is such an anti-political and anti-cultural action tolerable?” (Rezadad in Fars News Agency, 2007). 
Masoud Dehnamaki, the celebrated Iranian film director, also publicly announced that: “Satrapi is 
indeed the West’s new anti-cultural project against Iran and acclaiming Persepolis in Cannes shows that 
the Western anti-cultural action against Iran is pre-systematised” (2007). 
19 “In the absence of a true Imamate, leadership of the state is passed to a single executive, the vali-e 
faqih, or Supreme Leader. […] According to the constitution, the Supreme Leader is responsible for 
‘general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran’ which include all aspects of domestic and foreign 
policies. […] Since the revolution, there have been only two Supreme Leaders of the Islamic Republic: 
Ayatollah Khomeini held this office until his death in 1989, and his successor, Ali Khamenei, was 
appointed to the position by the Assembly of Experts shortly afterwards” (Alexander and Hoenig, 2008, 
p. 13).  
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corruption and disregard for democratic procedures and human rights. Persepolis, with its 
outspoken denouncements of dictatorial methods and various forms of oppression, fits this 
frame. Other examples are filtered inside Iran by means of new media (chiefly, the internet). 
This group (Iranian dissidents, artists and intellectuals living outside Iran) according to 
Dabashi stayed out of their homeland and “speak vehemently against the state repression in 
Iran” (Dabashi, 2013).  
The second group is one vociferously in favour of secular nationalism. Just like Satrapi, 
they advocate the separation of religion and politics. Accordingly, Khomeini’s interpretation 
of the principle of velayat-e faqih is a controversial issue which eventually must be rejected. 
They mostly hold anti-imperialist ideals. They might not have strong religious ties with their 
country but “the overwhelming majority of them opted for a full recognition of the dignified 
limits of what they could say or do from abroad and never joined the bandwagon of [those] 
plotting against their own homeland” (Dabashi, 2013). This group believes that Satrapi has 
provoked orientalist and new colonialist formulations while, at the same time, worldwide 
popularity and economic gain have forced her to sacrifice her ethical responsibilities towards 
her country. To the second nationalist anti-imperialist group belongs a sub-group that can be 
classified as religious intellectuals. This group “opted for a life in exile and began authoring a 
massive body of literature that cast a categorical shadow of illegitimacy over the entire course 
of the Islamic Republic” (Dabashi, 2013). This group, including a number of Shi’a olama, 
believes in religion and politics as two separate domains. What is important to them is Iran 
and Islamic culture beyond Khomeini’s doctrine. From within this group of voices, Satrapi has 
been approved for representing the shortcomings of the Iranian Revolution, and has been 
criticised for her limited and one-dimensional representation of Iranian Islamic culture.  
In the third group we find those whose ideals have been shaped by religious doctrine 
and reinforced by the Islamic Revolution. Just like the Iranian government, they keep 
Khomeini’s standards and would rate Satrapi and her work as Islam setiz (Farsi. ‘Hostile 
towards Islam’) and anti-Iranian (in terms of revolutionary values). For instance, Mohammad 
Ghorbani (2010), an Iranian lecturer and blogger, states that Persepolis is carefully insinuating 
negative propaganda against Iran. He believes the book represents Iranian society as the 
hopeless and suffocating effect of the revolution. According to Ghorbani, Persepolis is against 
Islamic values, notably those surrounding modesty such as the hejab. The veil is represented 
in Persepolis as a sign of oppression against women’s freedom, and is introduced as a 
limitation. Persepolis thus reinforces stereotypical views of Islam in general, and is turned into 
a weapon produced by an Iranian against Iran. In short, the reception of Satrapi’s work and 
other post-revolutionary autobiographical narratives is contextualised within anti-Iranian 
critique among most of revolutionary Iranians. According to Iranian officials, the trauma she 
  
7 
 
suffered, is imposed on all Iranians, particularly Iranian women, and in so doing, it silences 
those whose visions diverge from Satrapi’s, as well as the political and social system which 
Iran has decided to adopt by means of a revolution.20 
The informal tone and the form of autobiography have made Persepolis and other post-
revolutionary memoirs accessible works. Blending personal experiences with social 
commentary, they object to and criticise the ‘totalitarianism’ of the Iranian government with 
the authority of their global success, and their much-advertised insider privileged position. The 
majority of memoirs I examine in this thesis have been intended to address a particular type 
of audience, i.e. non-Iranians, and, often, non-Muslims. As best-selling memoirs, these 
narratives have enjoyed immediate and enduring success.21 Alternatively, they have emerged 
in the aftermath of international prizes, thus contributing to the enhancement of the fame of 
their authors.22 This is confirmed by the decision of the Iranian government to ban Persepolis, 
a policy implemented after the release and success of the movie, and not the graphic novel. As 
it turned out, the Iranian government’s banishment of the book has appeared to become public 
four years later than the publication date. Based on the reports of Fars News Agency, the 
condemnation of Islam setizi has only appeared after the film’s successful victory in Cannes 
Film Festival in France.23 Hossein Derakhshan has noted this in his blog. He analyses Satrapi’s 
representations of her country and personal experiences, as issues of political significance that 
give a new meaning to her graphic narrative (Derakhshan, 2007). Yet, the new political 
meaning is not necessarily created by the book only. The commercial and economic system 
                                               
20 It is worth noting that most issues are neither sufficiently problematized nor contextualised. Policies 
on the hejab, for instance, are straightforwardly presented as oppressive. The average “Western” 
readership is generally inclined to agree with such a perspective. However, in order to inform a fair 
debate on the hejab, a number of historical and social details should be given (e.g. kashf-e hejab - the 
compulsory “removing of the veil” during the reign of the Shah, the political meaning of the hejab in 
pre- and post-revolutionary Iran, and the philosophy of the hejab in Islam). It can be appreciated that a 
memoir is not a work of scholarship. However, one may wonder why Iranian scholars, as well as various 
intellectual figures, did not hesitate to present it as a non-realistic narrative on Iran and Shi’a Islam. 
21 Reading Lolita in Tehran remained in The New York Times bestseller list for more than 117 weeks 
and has been translated into thirty-two languages. It won several major literary awards (Mahmood, 
2011, p. 80). 
22 In 2003, Shirin Ebadi became the first Iranian woman to win the Nobel Peace Prize. She published 
Iran Awakening in 2007. Persepolis too has won many prizes. The most important is the Cannes Film 
Festival Jury Prize in 2007, awarded for ‘best animated movie’ after the book’s adaptation into an 
animated movie under the joint direction of Satrapi herself and Vincent Parannaud. Betty Mahmoody, 
author of Not without My Daughter (1987), received an honorary degree from Alma College in 
Michigan and the Outstanding Woman of the Year Award in 1990 from Oakland University (Paige, 
2008). 
23 The harsh and severe position of Iranian officials four years after the publication of Persepolis is more 
comprehensible through an understanding of the role of the “world’s media-wife” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 
xvii). It seems that the popularity of Satrapi’s work has been intensified through the media, especially 
after its adaptation into an animated movie. The Cannes Jury Prize and the media manoeuvre appeared 
to be of central importance to the Iranian government, rather than Persepolis itself. 
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behind the publication of a successful book, and the broadcasting of the film have both 
contributed to the affirmation of a different political meaning.  
Satrapi declared that her work is a ‘love letter’ to her family and to her country.24 This 
view reflects her feelings towards Iran. In Persepolis, she unambiguously makes the point that 
she is Iranian, and proud of it (Satrapi, 2003, p. 197). Moreover she has said that Persepolis 
(the movie) “is about peace and love” (Satrapi in Abramowitz, 2007). It is also notable that 
“after winning the jury prize, in a shared award with Mexican director Carlos Reygadas’ ‘Silent 
Light,’ Satrapi, who co-helmed with Vincent Paronnaud, dedicated her prize ‘to all Iranians’” 
(Jaafar, 2007). The intentio auctoris is a feature that distinguishes Satrapi’s work from those 
of other memoir-writers, whose autobiographies are uncompromising in their representations 
of revolutionary Iran. For example, Nafisi (2003) and Mahmoody (1987) openly and directly 
criticise Iran and the imposition of Islamic laws25. 
From a close reading of Persepolis and similar autobiographical narratives,26 it emerges 
that dissident artists and intellectuals give voice to some Iranians’ concerns about matters of 
governmental policies that limit their individual freedom. The notion of individual freedom, 
we are given to believe, is embedded in a democratic system.27 Hans Kelsen believes the 
individual rights as freedom of choice ought to be protected by law (Habermas, 1996, p. 86). 
Individual freedom has gradually become associated with the doctrine that freedom of choice 
should be applied to matters as diverse as religion and politics (Held, 2013, p. 14). According 
to Rahimi, the Islamic Republic “marked an attempt to create a new order [law] based on a 
new vision of political spirituality” (2012, p. 56) to protect the conditions of social and political 
                                               
24 “I can live fifty years in France and my affection will always be with Iran. I always say that if I were 
a man I might say that Iran is my mother and France is my wife. My mother, whether she’s crazy or not, 
I would die for her, no matter what - she is my mother. She is me and I am her. My wife I can cheat on 
with another woman, I can leave her, I can also love her and make her children, I can do all of that but 
it’s not like with my mother. But nowhere is my home any more. I will never have any home any more” 
(Satrapi in Tully, 2004).  
25 Needless to say that the fact that the other authors don’t explicitly label their works as expressions of 
“love” does not make them more hostile to Iran. In particular, Ebadi falls in the second group of secular 
nationalists with strong anti-imperialist tendencies. Ebadi’s case is thus different from that of Nafisi or 
Mahmoody here. 
26 Works like Not without My Daughter (1987) by Betty Mahmoody, Reading Lolita in Tehran (2003) 
by Azar Nafisi, Iran Awakening (2007) by Shirin Ebadi, Persepolis 2.0 (2009) by Payman & Sina and 
Zahra’s Paradise (2011) by Amir and Khalil are very popular. They are believed to be matter-of-fact 
in their representation of Iran in that they bear witness to several facts of Iran’s history, culture and 
socio-political (Shi’a) system. Along with Satrapi’s Persepolis, the main object of investigation in the 
present study, I will examine a series of narratives that share structural and semantic similarities with 
Satrapi’s acclaimed graphic novel and have therefore informed popular representations of Iran in 
contemporary culture. The reputation of all these works, and of their authors, seems to depend on their 
sense of battling Iran, the Iranian government and Iran’s socio-political system.  
27 Lefort believes that despite all the vices, democracy is still “the only desirable form of society, 
because it preserves the double idea of political freedom and the freedom of individual” (1988, p. 181).  
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life after the revolution. This intensifies the tension between “the claims of individuality on 
one hand, and the power requisite for the state to ensure peaceful and commodious living on 
the other” (Held, 2013, p. 15). Satrapi presents herself from the very beginning as an 
individualist, who challenges the rules and regulations implemented on the community of 
believers (Farsi. omat-e Islami)28 by the government. Promoting individual liberty, which falls 
in line with Satrapi’s concerns, is the main problem of residing in a political system which 
maintains the order, “by ensuring the protection of the security of all” (Lefort, 1988, p. 172). 
In such a system, as Tocqueville notes, “individuals seem of less and society of greater 
importance; or rather, every citizen, being assimilated to all the rest, is lost amongst the crowd 
and nothing stands conspicuous but the great and imposing image of the people at large” 
(Tocqueville as cited in Lefort, 1988, p. 177). Satrapi’s critical position towards the hejab, and 
designing her own hejab style is a confirmation of her orientation towards individual 
uniqueness vis-a vis the assimilated image of community at large.  
Methodology 
Methods of investigation in this thesis are primarily informed by the theoretical and 
conceptual issues in the study of religion and history. The very concept of religion or history 
includes other intellectual and epistemological developments. Feminism, Orientalism29 and 
Occidentalism are examples of such developments. Based on the complex nature of most of 
the events discussed in this thesis, relying on one method only will not achieve strong results. 
As the result, a multi-methodological approach is required to a substantial commitment to the 
issues of research. For a relatively well-established order in presenting the various methods of 
this research, each of the methods will be separately defined. It is understood that some of the 
methods used in this thesis (e.g. orientalism) are more helpful than others to analyse data. 
However, not all issues in this research can be analysed through the lens of orientalism. 
Occidentalism and standpoint theory (as the subject of critique is autobiography) could yield 
a more solid and successful work.  
Orientalism   
The term ‘orientalism’ – unambiguously associated with the 1978 study of Edward Said 
– has long been used by many critics in the field of cultural studies and post-colonial theory. 
                                               
28 According to Geaves, Gabriel, Haddad, and Smith (2004), the concept of ummah can be used at 
different levels: “the village, the town, the nation and the world. In all these concentric levels the group 
is more important than the individual. […] thus individual and factional interests gave way to the 
interests of the community as a whole” (p. 15).  
29 Throughout this thesis, I will refer to the critical discourse made popular by Edward Said as 
‘orientalism’. Conversely, the spelling Orientalism or Occidentalism (with capital ‘O’), indicates Said’s 
1978 work.  
  
10 
 
Orientalism, according to Said (1978), is “a rationalization of colonial rule” and a form of 
“knowledge reinforced by the colonial encounter” (p. 39). The structure of orientalism is based 
on the difference between the “West”30 or the Occident as familiar or ‘us’ and the “East” or 
the Orient as unfamiliar or ‘them’. Orientalising the Orient becomes possible through its 
difference from the “West” (p. 3). “The Orient was seen as essentially ancient, exotic and 
absurd, the land of despots and mystics, populated by a backward population of supine men 
and subordinated and silent women” (Afshar, 2008, p. 412). Assuming the binary oppositions 
between the Orient and the Occident leads to considering the “East” as “brain-dead, narrow 
minded, incapable of thinking, hypocritical, desperately tribal […], literalist, rigid, intolerant, 
totalitarian, anti-Semitic, and hateful of women and homosexuals” (Mahmood, 2011, p. 83). 
The Occident, on the other hand is praised unstintingly through its long history for rationality, 
knowledge, discovery and open-mindedness (Mahmood, 2011, p. 83). The most important 
characteristic of this mode of thinking is regarding women as victims of patriarchy and 
religious fundamentalism. This means that “Eastern” women need their “Western” sisters or 
politicians to rescue them (Bahramitash, 2005, p. 222). Another equally significant feature of 
orientalism in Bahramitash’s words is assuming all Muslim women as similar who suffer from 
the same condition (2005, p. 222).  
Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can be best understood in line with the idea of 
the superiority of the “West”. Gramsci argues that the hegemonic knowledge is a set of 
thoughts that represents the interests of a dominant group or class (Gramsci as cited in 
Bahramitash, 2005, p. 222). This dominant group, according to him, mostly consists of 
intellectuals, elites and members of upper-middle class, who have the knowledge to control 
and dominate the structure of civil society. Foucault’s notion of ‘true discourse’ is 
complementing Gramsci’s discourse. When knowledge is supported by dominant power, it 
becomes the true discourse, neither through force and coercion nor through consent, but 
through methods “which infiltrate minds and bodies, cultural practices which cultivate 
behaviours and beliefs, tastes, desires, and needs as seemingly naturally occurring qualities 
and properties embodied in the psychic and physical reality” (Smart, 1994, p. 210). Hegemonic 
discourses are assumed not only in terms of faith and culture but also in terms of intellectuality. 
                                               
30 The terms “West”, “Western”, “Westerners”, “East”, “Eastern”, “European” and “Islam” are repeated 
throughout this thesis. According to Edward Said (1997, p. 7): “labels purporting to name very large 
and complex realities are notoriously vague and at the same time unavoidable”. Therefore: “they are 
not merely loose descriptions, but words which come laden with heavy historical and ideological 
baggage … they are still often used to underpin pejorative or flattering stereotypes and … they mask 
the real heterogeneity and variabilities of all the entities which they purport to denote” (Flood, Huchings, 
Miazhevich & Nickels, 2012, p. 3).  
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On this basis, the “East” will be automatically categorized as “a subject race” (Said, 1995, p. 
206) that needs the “West” to be developed and intellectually represented.  
It is argued that the biased representation of Iran and Islam amongst non-Iranians in the 
“West” is a contemporary form of the old orientalist discourse, where Iran and Islam are the 
subjects. According to Keshavarz, neo orientalism “replicates the totalizing – and silencing – 
tendencies of the old Orientalists by virtues of erasing, through unnuanced narration, the 
complexity and richness in the local culture” (Keshavarz, 2007, p. 3). Persepolis has been read 
by intentio lectoris (either by Iranian officials or media, feminist circles and academics) as 
contemporary incarnations of this specific mode of thinking, in that it is called a “New 
Orientalist narrative” (Keshavarz, 2007, p. 2).31 Based on the official Iranian announcement, 
Persepolis seems to fit this pattern. The success of Persepolis, Iranian officials believe, 
depends in large measure on the way in which the author plays with similar misunderstandings. 
When Satrapi points at images of the hejab as brutally imposed on women, including young 
pupils in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, the general reader is lured into an unfamiliar 
universe inevitably stigmatised by stereotypes. In so doing, Satrapi seems to promote a 
stereotypical rendition of Islam and Iran - an operation that is in similar ways a perpetuation 
of Said’s Orientalism. Persepolis is discussed as offering personal testimonies against Islamic 
regulations in Iran, while condemning Iranian Islamic policies and advocating the rights of 
individuals. And, most importantly, it is argued that Persepolis looks at the shari’ah as the 
symbol of the limitations imposed on her individual freedom.  
The common terrain from which most of these autobiographical narratives move is the 
suffering of women at the hands of Islam. The genre of autobiography has played a pivotal 
role in securing a simple argument: “women are the most abject victims of the ideology of 
Islamic fundamentalism” (Mahmood, 2011, p. 79). Mistreatment of women, gender inequality, 
misogynist practices, domestic violence and political victimology are recurring themes in such 
works. The solution to these problems lies in liberating the Muslim woman from oppressive 
patriarchal culture with a call on democracy, reforming Islam, secular politics and empowering 
her with a more female friendly exegesis of the Qur’an. ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ has 
concerned many imperial powers, European feminists, politicians and media pundits to 
diagnose the problem and propose solutions in “restructuring large swaths of the Muslim 
population, if not the religion itself” (Mahmood, 2011, p. 78). This legitimises the extension 
of colonial rule and justifies the geopolitical domination in the name of War on Terror in the 
Middle East. Since the events of 9/11, “US President George W. Bush has frequently 
campaigned to save the ‘civilized world from evil’” (Bahramitash, 2005, p. 221). According 
                                               
31 The term new or neo orientalism, especially in this research, is derived from Keshavarz’s Jasmin and 
Star (2007). 
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to Bahramitash, the military action in Afghanistan was supported by a feminist cause i.e. to 
rescue the oppressed Afghan women. In the case of Iran, Hersch believes that the post-
revolutionary autobiographical narratives such as Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in Tehran paved the 
way to the politics of the White House, and confirmed the Iranian position as a member of the 
“axis of evil and neoconservative plans to attack Iran were made public” (Hersch, 2006). 
Mahmood also argues that the personal testimonies of the victimised autobiographers against 
the Islamic policies -in particular the veil- played a key role in securing the public opinion 
against the veil, and the “passage of the controversial law banning the display of the veil (and 
another ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols) in public schools” in France (2001, p. 81). The first 
person account of an Iranian dissident Chahdorrt Djavann about the veil,32 Mahmood 
continues, “reportedly moved the presiding officials to tears” (2001, p. 81). Consequently, 
representations by Satrapi and others memoirists can be argued to have provided the 
background for a demonised depiction of Islam by media, especially after the 9/11 event. 
According to Mahmood, this genre of literature received international media attention with the 
“theme of abhorrence of everything Muslim and sheer exaltation of all things Western” (2011, 
p. 86). Mahmood believes that the arguments of these authors read like a legitimate voice to 
put Islam and the “West” in confrontation (Mahmood, 2011, p. 79). In other words, the native 
testimonials legitimize Islamophobia and Iranophobia, giving credibility to the stereotypes and 
prejudices sweeping the world today. 
 It is argued that Persepolis along with other post-revolutionary memoirs with their 
sense of victimising women have reinforced the essentialist notions of Islam. This contributes 
to re-inscribe the separation of Islam from politics that has become the bedrock for secular and 
neoconservative politics. As Mohanty put it, authors like Satrapi and other autobiographers 
are very likely as “First World” women, to share their experiences of their fellow country 
women, who are unmistakably associated to a stereotypical portrayal of the “Third World” 
(Mohanty, 2007, p. 17). Mohanty argues that the category of “Third World” woman is the 
colonial production of liberal feminism. In her critique of liberal feminism, Mohanty claims 
that the superiority of the “West” is a shared vocabulary for many feminists which corresponds 
to produce a universal image. This image “defines Third World women as subjects outside 
social terrains […], legal, economic, religious, and familial structures are treated as 
phenomena to be judged by Western standards” (2003, p. 40). Also, “Third World” women 
are automatically defined as “religious (read: not progressive), family-oriented (read: 
traditional), legally unsophisticated (read: they are still not conscious of their rights), illiterate 
(read: ignorant), domestic (read: backward), and sometimes revolutionary (read: their country 
                                               
32 “I wore the veil for ten years. It was the veil or death. I know what I am talking about” see Bas les 
voile (2003). 
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is in a state of war; they must fight!)” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 40). Based on Mohanty’s polemical 
argument, Satrapi and other memoirists, who are understood by their self-valorisation as 
members of upper middle class educated in America, and the “West “Europe demonstrate the 
situation and experience of their fellow country women “as tied closely to their class position” 
(Bahramitash, 2005, p. 232). Their identity shows a kind of social superiority. As members of 
Iranian elites, these authors experience the Iranian revolution differently in terms of their social 
class. For example, the imposition of the hejab in post-revolutionary Iran definitely restricted 
their individual freedom, while for the majority of Iranian women in working class with low 
income, the hejab was an opportunity to appear in public from which they have been 
previously excluded. Mohanty’s path-breaking argument is relevant here: the representation 
of “Third World” women as a homogenous group is remarkably problematic, as this might 
end up with the exclusion of the majority of Iranian women from the homogenous picture 
Satrapi and other memoirists represented, i.e. victims of the state policies in Iran. The elites’ 
experiences, thus, could not be generalised to all Iranian women.  
 The scholars discussed above warn us to read Satrapi and other’s description of Iran 
with much more care and scepticism, for their lack of understanding of the situation of the 
overwhelming majority of Iranian women. These authors’ point of views are considered as 
‘outsiders’ which hardly explain the experience of their fellow citizens. Authors of post-
revolutionary memoirs, like Satrapi, Shirin Ebadi and Azar Nafisi, are all “Western” educated 
Iranian women from wealthy upper or middle class backgrounds, with the themes mostly 
revolving around “the cosmopolitan elite privileged under the regime of Shah and disinherited 
by the revolution” (Whitlock, 2008, p. 10). They professionally choose their readership and 
their style which is also engaging with middle-class readers (Whitlock, 2008, p. 16). As argued 
by Nash, authors of this class might have racial connections with Muslim women, however, 
“they construct Islam and Muslims - whether traditionalist or revivalist - by employing 
recycled Orientalist tropes cast in the insider’s voice” (2012, p. 26). A prominent feature of 
orientalism is the tendency to differentiate between “us” and “them”. Their autobiographies 
limit the probability of integration with Iranian women and themselves, and “cannot avoid the 
challenge of situating” themselves in a hegemonic framework (Mohanty, 2007, p. 20). This 
can be traced in their background as “Western” educated, upper middle-class elites, who are 
in minority in comparison with the majority of Iranian women who belong to the working 
class and are socially conservative and religious. It is argued that, their representations retain 
the superiority of “Western” and “Eurocentric” over Oriental women. Satrapi’s wealthy 
background and royal heritage33 has probably sharpened her distance from the rest of the 
                                               
33 She is a member of the former royal family. Her grandfather was a prince of the Qajar dynasty before 
the rise of the Pahlavis (Cf. Satrapi, 2003, p. 22). 
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society (Satrapi, 2003, p. 6). Accordingly, her account of her country is her personal viewpoint 
and can be different from the majority of the society. As Harding argues, “knowledge is 
supposed to be based on experiences, and so different experiences should enable different 
perceptions of ourselves and our environment” (2004, p. 7). For example, while Satrapi’s 
concern is the imposition of the hejab at the public level in post-revolutionary Iran, many other 
Iranians were not concerned about it as they used to wear it before the revolution. In other 
words, in discourses of oppression and patriarchy, especially in the post-revolutionary 
autobiographical accounts, there is the danger of associating Iran with the orientalist 
discussions that can lead to devaluing of being Iranian as “non-Western” ways of being 
(Seedat, 2013, p. 29).  
Following the revolution, Dabashi argues, representation of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
as “an atrocious record of stifling, silencing, and outright murdering secular intellectuals, 
while systematically and legally creating a state of gender apartheid” in line with “acts of 
propaganda and disinformation” has been promoted as “elements of truth” in the accounts of 
“native informers and insiders” (Dabashi, 2006, p. 5). However, according to Iranian scholars 
like Marandi and Pirnajmuddin (2009),  
In the eyes of many Iranian intellectuals, such writers are often viewed as 
examples of the Iranian intellectual comprador class or members of the 
gharbzadeh (a term made current by Jalal Ale-Ahmad, the Iranian critic and 
intellectual, that can be rendered in English as Westernised, West-struck, or 
Westomaniac), rather than as intellectuals (p. 23). 
Axworthy (2013) believes that, Ale-Ahmad’s coinage was not meant to challenge 
“Western” culture and values, but to criticise the way “Western”-based ideals had been 
promoted by some Iranians who locate themselves outside Iranian mainstream culture, and are 
seen by many as either non-Muslim or non-Iranian (p. 60). The spirit of intolerance towards 
such writers and intellectuals among many Iranians is one fostered by the belief that Satrapi, 
and others have purposely misrepresented or disrepresented their indigenous culture, and have 
promoted “Western” values and standards that are at odds with Iran and (Shi’a) Islam. The 
function of these intellectuals was not to expose the atrocities but rather “to take the element 
of truth and package it in a manner that serves the belligerent empire best: in the disguise of a 
legitimate critic of localised tyranny facilitating the operation of a far more insidious global 
domination” (Dabashi, 2006, pp. 5-6).  
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The orientalist analysis in this research is informed by the works of Said (1978, 1997), 
Keshavarz (2007),34 Dabashi (2006, 2013),35 Marandi (2009, 2011),36 Bahramitash (2005a, 
2005b),37 Nash (2012, 2013),38 Mahmood (2011),39 Barzegar (2012)40 and other scholars who 
have contributed to the critique of “Western” hegemonic discourses. 
 Focusing specifically on Persepolis, the most successful of the post-revolutionary 
narratives addressed herein, it is clear that Satrapi’s personal and political perspective (with 
its focus on the Islamic aspects of the Iranian revolution, the war with Iraq and the hejab as 
gender-exploitation) is conveniently exploited at a global level. There is also a counter-
argument to the neo orientalist interpretation of Satrapi’s work. Quite opposite to the orientalist 
representations of Persepolis, Hillary Chute states that: “Persepolis is able of destabilizing 
tropes of ‘East’ and ‘West’ [. . .] rather than reinforcing them” (Chute, as cited in Madella, 
2012, p. 2). Chute believes that the child language of Persepolis is a prominent factor in 
“subsuming the ‘exotic other’ into the ‘us’, erasing the ethnic, cultural, and class specificity of 
the book’s narrative”; Cawley admires Persepolis in the same way as Chute does. She says 
Satrapi’s public declarations, based on her aim of writing Persepolis for a “Western” audience, 
“can be read as an active postcolonial critique of Western representations of Iran and of people, 
particularly women, in Islamic countries in general” (Cawley, n.d.). In Chute’s words, 
                                               
34 Fatemeh Keshavarz is professor of Persian Comparative Literature and chair of the Department of 
Near Eastern Languages and Literatures at Washington University. In her Jasmin and Stars (2007), she 
“challenges popular perceptions of Iran as a society bereft of vitality and joy. Her fresh perspective on 
present-day Iran provides a rare insight into this rich culture alive with artistic expression but virtually 
unknown to most Americans” (UNC Press, 2014). The book is aimed as a critique of the new orientalist 
portrait of Iran in Reading Lolita in Tehran (2003) by Azar Nafisi.  
35 Hamid Dabashi is currently Professor of Iranian Studies and Comparative Literature at Columbia 
University. In this thesis, I have referred to his “Native informers and the making of the American 
empire” (2006) and “What happened to the Green Movement in Iran? The pro-democracy movement 
has receded from public space, but it remains a model for non-violent civil rights movements” (2013).  
36 Sayed Mohammad Marandi is an Iranian academic and political activist who is currently lecturing in 
the Faculty of World Studies at the University of Tehran. “Constructing an axis of evil: Iranian Memoirs 
in the ‘Land of the Free’” (2009a), “Reading Azar Nafisi in Tehran” (2008), “Western media 
representations, Iran, and Orientalist stereotypes” (2009b), “A Comparative reading of the Crusades and 
America’s Post 9/11 literature: Terrorist and the Falling Man - two American novels” (2011) are some 
of his papers that have been referenced in this research.  
37 Roksana Bahramitash is Visiting Scholar at the University of Montreal, Canada. She is the author of 
“Not just any dress: Narratives of memory, body, identity” (2005a), and “The war on terror, feminist 
Orientalism and Orientalist feminism: case studies of two North American bestsellers” (2005b), both of 
which have been used in this research.  
38 Geoffrey P. Nash is Senior Lecturer in English Studies at the University of Sunderland. His Writing 
Muslim Identity (2012) has been referenced extensively in this research. Some of his other works such 
as “New orientalism for old: articulations of the East in Raymond Schwab, Edward Said and two 
nineteenth-century French orientalists” (2013) has also been consulted.  
39 Saba Mahmood is Associate Professor in Social Cultural Anthropology at the University of Berkeley. 
Her “Feminism, sexuality, and the return of religion” (2011) was a good source of discussion in this 
research.  
40 Leila Barzegar is an Iranian critic whose master thesis “Persepolis & Orientalism: A critique of the 
reception history of Satrapi’s memoir” (2012) was the only orientalist critique of Satrapi’s work.  
  
16 
 
Persepolis challenges dominant stereotypes and historical narratives (2008, p. 94). Madella 
believes that, 
Persepolis shows a critical view of the life in both places the East and the West, 
without making one being the saviour while the other the devil, and one way 
she does so is by telling her story, and as a diasporic she also questions spaces 
like home and exile (2012, p. 12). 
As mentioned above, in a number of cases Satrapi declares that Persepolis is “a 
universal story. The background is Iran, but it is about everybody: family, love, exile, 
adolescence” (Satrapi in Johnston, 2007). This is because she believes “if America could make 
war in Iraq, it was because public opinion was so scared of Iraqis. They had been dehumanised. 
From the second you can identify with people, that’s much harder [making a war]” (Satrapi in 
Johnston, 2007). Satrapi frequently emphasises the humanistic message of Persepolis: “the 
human being anywhere is the same and they have the right to live because they have dreams, 
they have love, they have parents and kids, and the life of all of us is worth something” (Satrapi 
in Movieweb, 2010). Satrapi’s views and values are only a picture of Iran not the picture of 
Iran. Based on this and Satrapi’s intentio auctoris in writing Persepolis, and also in order to 
keep the balance between the accusations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and their critique of 
orientalist discourses in Persepolis, this thesis renders a dynamic interactions between the 
Iranian government and Persepolis by investigating the elements of both Orientalism and 
Occidentalism that impact on, and reshape the views around both. It is therefore of interest to 
consider a number of opposing literatures such as the Middle Eastern with “European” 
feminism, “Western” liberal with religious democracy and factual or fictionalised aspects of 
autobiographies. 
Occidentalism 
Edward Said strongly interrogated intellectual and artistic representations of otherness 
in “European” thought. In such a way, he shifted the focus on “literary and cultural criticism 
from textuality to historicity, and from aesthetic to the political” (Behdad, 2010, p. 709). Said’s 
political theory of Orientalism has attracted many critics, challenging its “high humanism” 
(Behdad, 2010, p. 709). Ibn Warraq in his Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said’s 
Orientalism wrote that the discussions of orientalism41 “seeks to convince not by arguments 
or historical analysis, but by spraying charges of racism, imperialism, and Eurocentrism from 
a moral high ground” (2007, p. 18). This moral high ground, Warraq believes, is the essential 
tactic of Said in justifying and defending his points and distorting the views of many eminent 
scholars. Occidentalism was first defined in 1995 by James Carrier as “essentializing 
                                               
41 In Warraq’s opinion “Orientalism is also more generally ‘a style of though based upon an ontological 
and epistemological distinction made between the Orient and (most of the time) Occident’” (2007, p. 
19). 
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simplifications of the West that can potentially be involuntary” (Leservot, 2001, p. 118). It is 
argued by Hasan Hanafi that Occidentalism developed by the Orient and in the Orient as a 
way to revive the “non-Western” identity, and to study the “West” from “non-Western” point 
of view. Hanafi expresses that “Occidentalism is a discipline formed in Third World countries 
in order to complete the process of decolonization (especially cultural decolonization) and is 
based on military and economic issues” (as cited in Zabardast, 2015, p. 216). In Hanafi’s 
words, if orientalism is the centre, Occidentalism is the periphery. Elsherif argues, while in 
orientalism, the Orient is viewed from the Occident’s point, “Occidentalism seeks to undo the 
historical double complex controlling the I and the Other, the dialectical relation between the 
inferiority complex of the I and the megalomania of the Other” (Elsherif, 2015, p. 623). 
Regarding Satrapi’s intentio auctoris in writing Persepolis i.e. helping the “Western readers 
see Iranians as simply humans rather than vilified exotic others”, according to Leservot, the 
graphic novel actually hides orientalism and highlights Occidentalism (2011, p. 115). This 
means that Satrapi’s novel intends to counter orientalist narratives and could be seen as an 
example of Occidentalist discourses at least at the level of the intentioo auctoris.  
Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, discourses on the “West” were quite various 
among Iranians. The history of Iran’s relationship with the “West” has “sufficient proof not 
only that various Occidentalism do exist [in Iran], but also that this phenomenon is not always 
born of an uneven (post)colonial relationship favouring the West” (Leservot, 2011, p. 118). 
As Leservot put it, Iranians can be divided into three different categories regarding their views 
towards the “West”. The first group is the remnants of the previous Pahlavi regime who are 
almost all “pro-Western” and non-Islamic. The second group, which is formed as an anti-Shah 
was the new Islamic revolutionary followers, who are totally “anti-Western” and the third 
group in between is the nineteenth and twentieth century’s Persian intellectuals who “actively 
encouraged the “Westernization” of Persia.42 However, they always did so selectively, 
ensuring both that the Persian culture never became a copy of the “West and that ‘there never 
developed any systematic anti-Westernism in Iran’” (Boroujerdi as cited in Leservot, 2011, p. 
119). This third group fits Satrapi and other autobiographers’ background. Their 
Occidentalism, as argued by Leservot, is never due to the colonial or imperial presence of the 
“West” in Iran; rather “as fundamentalist Islam became the new norm in the eighties in Iran, 
the Iranian elite and middle-class turned to Western culture for some relief” (Leservot, 2011, 
                                               
42 In 1935, the Iranian officials requested other countries to call the country “Iran” instead of “Persia”. 
Iran and Persia are two manifestations of the same entity. For a detailed analysis “on the conceptual and 
political problems with using ‘Persian’ to denote a particular ethnic group or type of nationalism”, see 
Rasmus Christian Elling (2013), Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini 
(Christian Elling, 2012, p. 95). 
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p. 123). They tried to show “how Westernized Iranians are” and have interacted with the 
“Western” culture as an alternative to the imposed Islamic culture of Iran.  
Satrapi’s nuanced look at the “Western” culture before and after the Islamic Revolution 
is considerable. The way she talks about “West” before the revolution is very different from 
her views after the revolution. In an illustration about world politics, she does not see 
“Western” power as the only dominant and superior. The Arab, Mongolian, Turks and the 
Persian Empire are all introduced and discussed at almost the same level as other powers. The 
“East” is not just passive and victimised rather a mostly powerful agent. She briefly mentions 
this in her autobiography: “2500 years of tyranny and submission as my father said. First our 
own emperors. Then the Arab invasion from the West. Followed by the Mongolian invasion 
from the East. And finally, modern Imperialism” (Satrapi, 2003, p. 11). She also asserts that it 
was the revolution that awakened people (Satrapi, 2003, p. 11). Yet, colonialism and invasions 
were not just perpetrated by the “West” but also by Arabs, Turks and Mongols. In fact, 
Satrapi’s interaction with “West” before the revolution is not just passively following 
“Western” objects and culture. It is more of an active engagement with “Western” ideology 
and lifestyle. Where she criticized Marx and Descartes’ philosophy, she is also aware of the 
Gandhi’s opposition to the British Empire and the Ataturk’s blind imitations of the “West”.43  
Satrapi’s Occidentalism only disappears after the 1979 revolution when Iran undergoes 
a serious domestic and political changes. “As the revolutionary government upholds stricter 
and stricter Islamic rules, Western culture that circulates in Satrapi’s Iran becomes more and 
more cliché, and more and more appealing as a tool to resist the Islamic regime” (Leservot, 
2011, p. 122). This sudden shift within Iran has changed the world’s view towards Iran and 
Iranians. Satrapi’s views towards her own country after the revolution put her in a position to 
embrace “Westernisation” more seriously than before. The more pressure she feels from the 
Islamic application of the rules by the state, the more she embraces “Westernisation”. Satrapi’s 
“Westernisation” is one of discouragement of Islamic policies of Iran, something mostly 
followed by “uneducated” in her words. Being raised with such attitudes and considering them 
as normal is more due to the Islamic revolutionary government than it is truly a product of the 
“Western” hegemony. Regarding the history of Iran’s relationship with the “West” and the 
Occidental orientation of the Iranian government, everything out of the context of Islam would 
be necessarily considered a sign of “Westernisation”. For example, wearing make-up in public 
                                               
43 By revealing her readings, Satrapi promotes her childhood character as a member of a wealthy, 
educated, liberal-democrat-yet-flirting-with-Marxism elite: “I knew everything about the children of 
Palestine. About Fidel Castro. About the young Vietnamese killed by the Americans. About the 
revolutionaries of my country…But my favourite was a comic book entitled ‘Dialectic Materialism.’ In 
my book you could see Marx and Descartes” (Satrapi, 2003, p. 12). Satrapi’s father used to teach her 
about Gandhi in India, Atatürk in Turkey, the Bolsheviks, the dynasties before the Shah and the great 
Cyrus (Satrapi, 2003, p. 33).  
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or showing a few strands of hair can be attributed to the “Western” cultural hegemony. By 
illustration of the Iranian girls as American models, actresses and heroines, Satrapi shows that 
changing attitudes or socio-cultural dynamic within Iranian society to adopt “Western” fashion 
is conceived and done to counter the imposition of Islamic values on society. This seems to be 
the only way for most Iranian women to oppose the compulsory dress code applied by the 
Islamic government. She is thus surprised to encounter her friends’ rejection of Iranian culture. 
Although they have to abide by the rules of the hejab, “they all look like the heroines of 
American TV series, ready to get married at the drop of a hat, if the opportunity presented 
itself” (Satrapi, 2003, p. 259). Additionally, in an article of The Guardian newspaper, Satrapi 
reveals that: 
Year by year, in Iran, women show a centimetre more hair, a centimetre less 
scarf. In my family I am the only brown-haired one now, because everyone, 
under their scarf, is blonde, they have bleached their hair. They have this bright 
pink lipstick, and prop their breasts up as high as they can (Satrapi in Addley, 
2003). 
Although Satrapi tries to show the opposition to the rules being applied by the Islamic 
government through showing Iranian women opposing the state policies on the hejab by dying 
their hair and wearing makeup, she finds this form of resistance (bleaching hair) a bit 
superficial. In fact, the second part of Persepolis points at a more nuanced reading of gender 
and veil issues. Satrapi’s Iranian friends and college classmates are able to go beyond the limits 
dictated by the law (Satrapi, 2003, p. 293). While her childhood and adolescence is dominated 
by descriptions of the veil as the epitome of governmental bullish rules and religious zealots, 
her return to Tehran opens up a different vista. After four years, she came back home 
disappointed by the freedom she experienced in “Europe”. This freedom, she eventually 
acknowledges once back in Iran, is just consumerism and lack of ideology. A similar scenario 
is true about young Iranian women who are fascinated by the transgressive element of 
“Western” culture. They are portrayed as intelligent, emancipated and critical thinkers. In fact, 
there is a change of perspective. This represents the different phases of the revolution with a 
very strict implementation of Islamic norms in the first decade after the revolution and then 
more pragmatic approaches after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Far from the traditional 
orientalist picture of “West”, the “West” in Persepolis is “reconstructed by Iranians not to 
respond to the West but to deal with their own (domestic) political issues” (Leservot, 2011, p. 
126).  
Persepolis works to educate its “Western” readers. As McIntash argues, “identity is the 
fulcrum of Persepolis” (McIntosh, 2013, p. 7). The intentio auctoris is to clear the 
misconceptions around the Iranian identity in the “West”. The purpose and the identity are 
thus overlapping in Persepolis. “Satrapi articulately works to show her own perception of Iran, 
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and display the idea that people should refrain from defining the identity of a multi-
dimensional entity such as a nation by a single institution such as a government” (McIntosh, 
2013, p. 7). Effectively, Satrapi’s attempt is differentiating between the Iranian identity and 
the Iranian government. She tries to highlight the contrasts between the personal and public 
spheres of life in Iran as the public sphere is under harsh control of the government. As a child, 
little Marji cannot discern between religion and the tyranny of the government. She keeps 
rejecting to see and talk to God as she knows God as the main source of her traumas (Satrapi, 
2003, p. 70), i.e. the execution of her beloved uncle. Later on, mostly in her adulthood, she 
only realises that she is actually “against fundamentalism [foundationalism in the case of 
Iran]…not against any religion, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity etc. It is the use of an ideology 
to kill people that [she is] against” (Satrapi in Hattenstone, 2008).44 As the result, Satrapi’s 
concern over being a free agent in Iran originates from her views on the separation of religion 
and state. 
Satrapi, like many others, makes a point that religion is a personal matter and should 
not be mixed with politics or applied in society at large.45 In her views, Islam per se is not 
“fundamentalist”, rather it is the bigots and fanatics –in any religion46- that abuse the power of 
Islam to legitimise their policies. This point is confirmed by Llewellyn and Trzebiatowska in 
that “religion in itself is not a force that can liberate, or dominate at a whim but like any other 
social phenomenon, is dependent on the relations of power in a particular time and place” 
(2013, p. 253). Here, Satrapi’s purpose, once more, becomes entwined with her identity. 
Essentially, she has two main purposes. First is separating the identity of the “nation from that 
of the government and religion from the extremists” (McIntosh, 2013, p. 5). Her second 
purpose is even more nuanced. As mentioned earlier, Satrapi tries to define “the profound 
heterogeneity of peoples” in Iran (Moghissi, 1999, p. 5). Not everyone who is living under the 
Islamic laws shares the same ideology and culture. This becomes clear in the case of veiling 
in Iran. The hejab can be both interpreted as an empowering tool, sign of resistance or political 
                                               
44 Beside what has discussed so far regarding Satrapi’s religious orientation, it is interesting to know 
that she is not a religious person. She declared this in one of her interviews: “ten or fifteen years ago if 
you said you didn’t believe in God, no one paid any attention. Now it’s a political statement somehow 
to be atheist or agnostic. When people ask me what is my religion, I say I don’t have any. And some 
people are shocked. They don’t understand. I say I don’t need it. I respect humanity. That’s my religion” 
(Satrapi as cited in Mind Candy, 2013).  
45 In an interview with Hattenstone (2008) in The Guardian, she said: “religion is a very personal affair. 
It’s between someone and what he considers the god, or the supreme spirit or whatever, and it’s very 
good while it remains personal. The second it becomes public, it’s no good. And that’s why I don’t 
make it public either” (Satrapi in Hattenstone, 2008). 
46 Satrapi is “using her time within Europe to draw nuanced insights into the culture that so readily 
stereotypes her own heritage by drawing parallels between East and West. She notes, after an encounter 
with a particularly draconian Nun, that every religion fosters ‘the same extremists’ (Satrapi, 2008, 
p.180), whilst proceeding to compare the similarities between European fascism and Iran’s 
fundamentalism (Satrapi, 2008, p. 229)” (McIntosh, 2013, p. 5).  
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independence in confrontation with “Western” hegemony.47 While “under the rule of 
fundamentalists in the Middle East and North Africa, women who are persecuted, jailed and 
whipped for their non-compliance with the hejab, find the dress code anything but 
empowering” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 5). Central to Satrapi’s argument is focusing on the 
heterogeneity of the Muslim population as the mostly neglected area of orientalist discussions. 
This is confirmed by Moghissi in Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism.  
Talking out of context about ‘Muslim’ cultural practices also obscures the 
profound heterogeneity of peoples from Muslim societies within or without the 
Middle East. People who live under Islamic laws are not bound together by a 
metaculture, even less by Islamic politics. Many are discriminated against and 
many more are severely punished for that reason alone. Which is to say 
‘difference’ is not a term to use only for drawing attention to dissimilarities 
between ‘Muslim’ and ‘Western’ ways and views. It is also a useful term to note 
the contrast among the ways and views of people from ‘Muslim’ societies. 
(Moghissi, 1999, p. 5).  
In fact, she is trying “to subvert the Western gaze upon her showing to the Western 
reader a more complex perspective of herself and Iran in opposition to the homogeneous other 
constructed by the West about the Middle East” (Madella, 2012, p. 1). Interestingly, Satrapi’s 
concern in juxtaposing the stereotypical image of Iran in “West” can be seen in her listening 
to her favoured music such as the Bee Gees and Pink Floyd (Satrapi, 2003, p. 37) or wearing 
“Western” clothes such as a denim jacket and Nikes or the encapsulation of her parent’s 
Marxist ideology (Satrapi, 2003, p. 130). In Persepolis, Satrapi reminds her readers that “the 
film’s about being true to yourself, it’s about humanism, and it’s a story about a life, a film 
that pleads for love and for peace. After seeing this film you don’t want to make war - or 
revolution either” (Mohammadi, 2007). Giving voice to both orientalist accusations of 
Persepolis and the actual Occidentalism in Satrapi’s intentio auctoris will diversify the 
discussion.  
Feminism 
Satrapi’s argument in favour of women’s emancipation and against the hejab has 
contributed to present her as a feminist. Satrapi notes how French feminist circles have looked 
at her as one of their own, i.e. “a perpetrator of an ideology that dictates women as superior to 
men” (Satrapi in Tully, 2004). Chute, for instance, believes that: “its [Persepolis] content is 
keenly feminist,” and states that she “will argue that we may understand the text as modelling 
                                               
47 The concept of “hegemony” is mutuated in contemporary academia from the writings of Antonio 
Gramsci. This is intended as a form of dominance, a natural process in which the power bloc and the 
subalterns are in a constant state of negotiation, compromise and change. Cultural hegemony, according 
to Gramsci, is a condition where rules are imposed by a class and thus involve coercion as well as 
consent. This process is informed by common sense (incoherent and fragmented truths) and good sense 
(the philosophy of praxis, i.e. socialism) (Gramsci, in Crehan, 2012).  
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a feminist methodology in its form” (Chute, 2008, p. 94). Satrapi, however, does not aim to be 
an advocate of feminism.  
These sick feminists, they believe that since they have shown their legs and their 
breasts, they are very free. The idea that they look down at these women just 
because they’re putting a veil on their head, it is just too much, and I didn’t want 
to participate in that at all. It would make me feel dirty, really (Satrapi in Shaikh, 
Asia Society, n.d.).  
Once again, Satrapi’s public declarations show she is not interested in ‘feminism’:  
“ABC News: People see a compelling story of women in struggle in your work, 
but you object to being called a feminist? Satrapi: I am absolutely not a feminist, 
I am against stupidity, and if it comes from males or females it doesn’t change 
anything. If it means that women and men, they are equal, then OK, certainly I 
am a feminist. It happens that I am a woman, so it becomes a ‘woman coming 
of age story.’ I think if I was a man it wouldn’t change so much, they never call 
it a “man coming of age story.” It is a human coming of age story, let’s go for 
the humanity and humanism, it’s a much better thing than this ‘womanhood’ 
and ‘manhood’ and I don’t know ‘hermaphrodite-hood,’ and etc., etc.” (Satrapi 
in Ghadishah, 2008). 
Satrapi criticises “Western” secular feminism that looks down on religion and “non-
European” societies and cultures and does not want to be associated with it, but this does not 
make her ‘not’ one. Some considers her as a feminist, due to her discussions on women’s 
empowerment in society. However, she refuses to be called a feminist, and insists on her 
argument about humanity and gender equality. Satrapi, as argued, is simplifying and 
generalising feminism and looking at it from one particular angle that positions her against the 
“Western” and secular feminist tradition in general. 
To analyse Satrapi’s voluntary rejection of feminism, it is necessary to review the 
history of writing about women’s concerns as understood in three different stages. Back in the 
nineteenth century, “European” feminist critique started with addressing the dominant 
centeredness of the male sex in society in general. The first women’s movement was an 
objection to the socio-political exclusion. According to Pam Alldred and Sarah Dennison, it 
was a “struggle for equality and integration” (as cited in Saadallah, 2004, p. 216). The second 
stage in the history of feminism, according to Gillis, Howie and Munford (2004), emerged in 
1960s as a self-defined movement (p. 1). The sharpest criticism pointed at second wave was 
actually “the claim that white middle-class feminists did not speak for all women” (Zack, 2005, 
p. 1). It seems that Satrapi positions herself against this dominant attitude in the Second Wave 
feminism. This is in line with the views of some feminists who believe that “women of colour 
experience multiple oppressions, resulting in unique identities of race, gender, and class” 
(Zack, 2005, p. 2). Third Wave feminism,48 based on Gillis et al.’s definition of the term, 
                                               
48 Based on the history of feminism, Gillis et al. (2004) believe that “the third wave has been overly 
eager to define itself as something ‘different’ from previous feminisms” (p. 2). Using the term “third 
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questions the notions of unity and collectively (2004, p. 1). Feminism in its Third Wave, 
according to Saadallah, is the one that embraces diversity. “This allows for a feminism which 
is non-monolithic and a feminism which responds to the emerging necessities and real issues 
facing women today, rather than attempting to fit all women into the structures conceptualised 
by the Second wave” (Saadallah, 2004, p. 219). Based on this definition and considering the 
intentio auctoris, Third Wave feminism seems to be more in line with Satrapi’s concerns. 
 However, as Zack puts the idea, Third Wave also needs to be more inclusive and should 
not turnthe biological difference into a barrier. In her opinion, Third wave feminism should be 
able to listen to and speak to all women with “a dimension of common selfhood” (Zack, 2005, 
p. 23). Women’s common identity should consider race, ethnicity and religion and avoid 
excluding them (Snyder-Hall, 2010, p. 259). This ideal framework, however, has not yet been 
fulfilled. Although Third wave feminism established itself upon differences in race, gender or 
sex, it “challenged the way difference has been incorporated into feminism, arguing that in the 
recognition of other women’s differences there is also a relic of the imperial dynamic of 
feminism’s hegemony” (Seedat, 2013, p. 28). According to Dawn Llewellyn and Marta 
Trzebiatowska (2013), as a legacy of previous feminisms, Third Wave feminism neglects “the 
multiple, intersecting and complex factors of identity and experience” (p. 251). Religion, as 
put by Llewellyn and Trzebiatowska, is still missing from the category of identity lists or 
probably (mis)assumed to be implicit in ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ or ‘culture’ (2013, p. 251).  
Yet ‘religion’ is a factor that intersects other identity categories, and like other 
categories can also be sub-divided. The religious and spiritual can be broken 
down according to tradition, denomination, or any number of variances which 
can add layers of complexity to how women define themselves. In overlooking 
religion, third wave feminism brackets out the complicated work religions do, 
in their many complex forms, in people’s lives. (Llewellyn and Trzebiatowska, 
2013, p. 250) 
Based on Seedat  and Zack’s argument, Third Wave feminism would also not be able 
to accommodate Satrapi’s concerns, as it remains unable to distance itself from the pitfall of 
homogenizing implicit in Second Wave feminism due to its separation of the ‘secular’ from 
‘religious’ (Llewellyn and Trzebiatowska, 2013, p. 251). Intentio auctoris clearly suggests that 
the idea of religion, race and borders ought to be avoided in feminist writings in order to 
engage with women rights and citizenship all around the world especially in the Middle East 
(Kandiyoti, 2001, p. 53). In summary, what mostly concerns Satrapi regarding feminism is 
                                               
wave” especially at an academic level, might “risk reducing its complexity and might impose 
imperatives driven by an external discourse we are, nevertheless, concerned by how this wave delimits 
itself from prior feminist theory and practice, thereby opening and closing debates within feminism” (p. 
2). According to Spencer (2004), “evidently, the third wave is not going to give us our synthesis. There 
is some doubt as to whether it exists at all beyond a contentious label” (p. 11).  
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this notion of exclusive feminism49 in that she considers the term feminism as mostly used in 
reference to “Western” women, and thus Iranian women have been excluded in this notion. 
This, as I will argue in the second chapter, might be the same reason for Satrapi’s “resistance 
to being co-opted into an uncritical feminist framework” (Seedat, 2013, p. 27). As mentioned 
above, her purpose was to erase the differences between Muslim struggles for equality from 
those of Western women. Satrapi’s neutral position and the purpose she defined for authoring 
her work, as mentioned, actually contested this binary discourse. As Madella claims: “instead 
of depicting the West as a saviour, symbol of freedom, she uses her supposedly 
autobiographical story to question the geographical dichotomy responsible for creating the 
marginalized other” (Madella, 2012, p. 2). According to Madella, what Persepolis tries to 
show is the “complexity and multiplicity of Iranian people for a reader who is not used to this 
perspective of this people” (p. 3). Being interested in her mum’s favourite book -The Second 
Sex by Simone de Beauvoir- Satrapi takes the construction of women as the other to men and 
realizes her otherness in the “West”. Therefore, as Madella suggests, “it is possible to use the 
other in Beauvoir’s The Second Sex as a parallel along with Said’s other in Orientalism” (2012, 
p. 8). Her disappointment with both the “Western” and Iranian culture can be related to her 
failure of fitting into these cultures. In this sense, her Persepolis becomes a way of 
representation that creates identity differently from those of the “Western” and “non-Western” 
feminists. Based on her claims regarding her distance from feminist circles in general 
(although she did not specify any special type of feminism), the second chapter of this thesis 
analyses Satrapi’s work in the framework of feminist studies with their defined disciplines and 
policies. Her main point, in my opinion, is that one should not look at sharp distinction between 
“European” and the Middle Eastern feminism or even talk about “Western” and “Eastern” 
feminism. Satrapi’s rejection of being a feminist could be related to her inclusive views 
towards all women. Patricia McFadden similarly argues, that attributing feminism to the 
“West” is as wrong as placing “Western” feminism against “Eastern”. The problem in 
discriminatory notions of feminism lies in ignoring the general concern of all feminists which 
is “responding to patriarchal exclusion” (2001, p. 61). 
Satrapi’s work along with her intention and position as an Iranian dissident with her 
declared message of ‘humanity’ will be used, as suggested and emphasized by herself 
throughout her work and public declarations, to prove her dual position with reference to 
discussions of the compulsory hejab in Iran or the hejab ban in France. While living in Iran, 
                                               
49 In Zack’s words, hegemonic feminism can be defined as “the U.S. group calling itself feminist and 
purporting to speak, write, and think for all women on earth was regarded by women who were not 
white, affluent, American, or northern European as representing only itself and its own interests” (2005, 
p. 6). Subsequently, a feminist theory should make sense to refer to all categories of women, i.e. colour 
and white, religious and secular, “First” or “Third-world” women. 
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the hejab itself has never been an issue for Satrapi. What she opposes is the imposition of the 
hejab by the revolutionary government i.e. applying Islamic legislations as interpreted by the 
officials at public level. As Satrapi believes, at the time when the hejab is discussed as a faith-
related or doctrinal notion, compulsion has no place in such debates. According to her, 
everything that uses the language of force is wrong. As much as Satrapi is against imposing 
the hejab on women in Iran, she disagrees with laws banning it in France. In fact, what Satrapi 
argues, in terms of the hejab, is the notion of having ‘choice’ or freedom in choosing to wear 
or not to wear it.  
Discussions concerning feminist issues in post-revolutionary Iranian society are as 
diverse as the categories of feminism. Contextualising Satrapi’s position within the diverse 
ethnicities and cultures in Iran would also clarify her intentio auctoris and thus make sense of 
her rejection of being a feminist. Any feminist movement in the context of the Islamic 
Republic could be generalised as Muslim feminism. However, the reality is more nuanced. 
Muslim feminism, according to Saadallah, is “a tactical change in response to the 
contemporary political and socio-economic realities in the majority of post-fundamentalist 
Muslim societies” (2004, p. 217). Muslim feminists “are dismantling the status quo of male-
dominated Islamic interpretation and acculturation which serves to reinforce women’s 
subjugation” (Saadallah, 2004, p. 219). With reference to Islamic feminism, Karam argues 
that, while Muslim/Islamic feminism engages with international human rights, it is grounded 
inside the Islamic sources. Muslim feminists believe that “Islam is the religion of 
enlightenment and egalitarianism and unsavoury practices relegating women to second-class 
citizenship are not intrinsic to true Islamic values or to the Shari’a [Islamic law] and never 
were” (Schwartz as cited in Saadallah, 2004, p. 219). This should not be confused with the 
Islamist feminist discourse which is not “progressive” and is only a “reflection of neo-
patriarchal attitudes” (Saadallah, 2004, p. 218). Islamist feminists do not allow an 
emancipatory presence for females to integrate with the international human rights.50 In this 
                                               
50 During the Arab Spring this has changed dramatically. Islamist feminists in Egypt mobilised women 
in rural areas in particular to gain more support. See A Quiet Revolution by Leila Ahmed (2011). 
According to Carrie Rosefsky Wicham (1990), the mainstream Islamist movement spread veiling and 
increased women’s involvement in Islamist movements. “Their goal, quite simply, as Wicham also 
notes, was to ‘indoctrinate their targets with a particular interpretation of Islam.’ Moreover, this 
interpretation of Islam was one that, as Wicham points out, ‘stood apart from and challenged the validity 
of mainstream forms of religious faith and practice.’ Islamist associations, Wicham shows, served their 
members in a wide variety of ways, providing them, for example, with valuable social support 
networks.” This support ranged from securing their jobs or obtaining visa for women to work abroad, 
“gain access to funds distributed by mosques, and even improve their marriage prospects” (Wicham as 
cited in Ahmed, 2011, p. 150).  
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regard, Satrapi’s declared statement in terms of more feminist interpretations of the Qur’an51 
seems to be in line with Muslim feminist discourses rather than Islamist feminist.    
Furthermore, apart from Islamic and Islamist feminism in Iran, secular feminists play 
an important role in discussions of feminism. They believe that Islam in general with its set of 
divine laws for women is debilitating to feminism. Azza Karam (1998) in her Women, 
Islamism and the State: Contemporary Feminism in Egypt defines secular feminism as 
grounded on human rights internationally and outside religion. The term ‘Islamic feminism’, 
according to one secular feminist, Susan Muaddi Darraj (2003), seems like an “oxymoron” i.e. 
Islam is incompatible with feminism. Haideh Moghissi in her Feminism and Islamic 
fundamentalism defines shari’ah as an entity which “distinguishes between the rights of 
human beings on the basis of sex (and religion), the Shari’a unapologetically discriminates 
against women and religious minorities” (1999, p. 142). In her words, “if the principles of the 
Shari’a are to be maintained, women cannot be treated any better. Women cannot enjoy 
equality before the law and in law. The Shari’a is not compatible with the principles of equality 
of human rights” (p. 142). Moghissi believes that it is impossible to believe in the notions of 
equality and Islam, because the nature of Islam is based on “the sexual hierarchy within the 
family and society” and the one who believes in the fundamentals of the Qur’an, “the Qur’anic 
laws and instructions on such an important question as equality are beyond human 
intervention” (1999, p. 142). Consequently, Satrapi’s critical position towards the application 
of shari’ah in the context of the society and her advocation of separation of religion from the 
state might categorise her as a secular feminist. However, based on Moghissi’s argument, 
Satrapi’s concerns regarding the hejab does not seem to focus on the hejab itself as an Islamic 
duty, rather, more significantly, she is objecting to the imposition of it by the revolutionary 
government. Classifying Satrapi as a secular feminist reads the intentio auctoris wrongly. In 
other words, her concern in this case could be read as articulating her rejection of Islam not 
Iranian politics. However, as illustrated at the beginning of this section, this is far from 
Satrapi’s intentio auctoris and her opinions and position towards the hejab.  
Political theory 
Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has faced many challenges in terms of human rights 
and democracy. Many human rights activists and feminists declared that the Islamic Republic 
                                               
51 In an interview with The Guardian (2003), Satrapi clarifies her position, and raises the rather feminist 
issue of interpretation (tafsir) of the Qur’an. The author of Persepolis insists on the need to move away 
from interpretations of the Qur’an provided by male mollahs only. According to Satrapi, the rules 
established by such male authorities are oppressive by nature for women. “Oh yes. You see, the basic 
problem of a country like mine, apart from the regime, apart from the government, is the patriarchal 
culture that is leading my country … When it touches anything it gives its own interpretation, and the 
interpretation goes towards politics, towards religion, towards everything. So that is the situation” 
(Satrapi in Tully, 2004). 
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is the source of oppression and violates the basic human rights. Women in Iran as well as many 
other Islamic societies, as argued by many feminists, suffer from discriminatory treatments 
and are subjected to inequality. Therefore, any feminist concerns in Iran have been initiated as 
the result of the state’s abuse of power against women. Discourses that question women’s 
choice and individualism have contributed to the formation of feminist movements in Iran. 
Intellectuals and upper middle-class women distance themselves from Islam, and their critical 
position towards the Islamic Republic became a constant recurring theme in many works 
following the revolution. In Talattof’s words, the significant increase in women’s issues 
especially in post-revolutionary literature is due to the state’s structuring policies. He states, 
“ironically, the Islamization of the country caused the emergence of unprecedented literary 
works by women” (Talattof, 2000, p. 140). According to Talattof, the compulsory dress code 
along with other socio-political changes provided the context for intellectual women52 in 
opposition to “speak out on all aspects of gender issues, beginning with organized resistance 
to mandatory veiling, while simultaneously breaking away from the left, which remained 
indifferent to their cause” (2000, p. 172). Since then, many secular or religious oriented 
activists worked within and beyond the borders of the Islamic state to end the discrimination 
against women, but have mostly been reprimanded. Escaping from the communal society of 
Iran to individualistic, liberated and free society of the “West” has actually “accumulated the 
necessary symbolic capital [for members of elite] to become iconic native converts to Western 
liberalism” (Nash, 2012, p. 64). In the case of Satrapi and other post-revolutionary authors, 
they mostly denounced gender policies, in particular the mandatory veiling, and produced a 
thorough critique and sometimes provocative assaults against the Islamic Republic. The 
separation of shari’ah from politics would be their final solution to many of the women’s 
problems. Many feminists in Iran such as Haideh Moghissi (1999) argue that one’s personal 
belief in Islam should not extend into the political or legal realms i.e. shari’ah. While she 
strongly believes in the separation of religion and the state, Moghissi understands a just and 
democratic society without a “Shari’a hat (Kolah-e Sharii)” (p. 1).53 Implementing the 
Islamization policies in the context of the society ought to be challenged to restrict the 
fundamentalist practices of religion and therefore to improve the human rights situation. In 
this regard, Satrapi shares the same ideology with Moghissi.  
                                               
52 For other women belonging to lower social classes, the complete break from Islam was not the case. 
“They may not wish to relinquish its spiritual and moral dimensions, or vacate it when it requires 
defending as part of their identity. But they reject its ‘instrumentalization’ […] to serve patriarchal and 
political interests” (Nash, 2012, p. 64).  
53 “Shari’a hat (kolah-e Sharii) is an expression used to refer to the manipulation of Islamic rules for 
legitimizing an illegitimate action” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 11).  
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Actually, discussion of human rights in Islamic societies is accentuated when it comes 
to women’s rights under fundamentalist regimes. In Iran, feminism seems to have emerged as 
“the opposite of fundamentalism”, and since “fundamentalists are supposed to hate 
democracy, it follows that empowering women will further the cause of feminism, which in 
turn will help eliminate Islamic fundamentalism” (Mahmood, 2011, p. 91).54 Islamic 
ideologies are always at the risk of being abused by politicians who attempt to impose a vision 
of Islam at state level to justify their autocratic ambitions. Obviously, there are many situations 
in which religion is specifically misused to oppress others. “The extremist religious politics of 
groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban are examples of misapprehending and abusing 
religion in service of particular political goals” (Zine, 2004, p. 184). According to Barlow 
(2008), Islam per se is not a problem in discussions of human rights. Rather, the problem lies 
with the implementation of Islamism by those in power. “Whereas the term ‘Islam’ refers to 
one’s personal belief system, the term ‘Islamism’ pertains to the politicization of that belief. 
Although these terms are interrelated, they are nevertheless analytically distinct” (Moghadam, 
2001, p. 43).55 When Islam is used as a support to a regime, the issues of democracy and human 
rights especially women’s issues appear to be contradictory and not congenial with the Islamic 
doctrine. In such context, the rules are the ones purported by “ayatollahs and mollas” whose 
interpretation of religious texts is “fixed and authoritarian” which “coheres around the 
masculine world of the mosque” and privilege of maleness (Ahmed as cited in Nash, 2012, p. 
53). According to Moghissi, “Qur’anic injunction and Shari’a rulings, as interpreted by the 
local ulema (jurists), continue to define women’s legal status and provide a basis for gendered 
social and cultural practices” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 7). Therefore, there is no doubt that the 
contemporary legal practices and Islamic rules are the translation of shari’ah rulings under 
rigid ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. 
 Moghissi believes that respecting the cultural differences and cultural authenticity 
should not hinder challenging the crimes, Islamic fundamentalists commit in the name of 
religion. In order to present a balanced discussion, the orientalist and the Islamophobic 
imagery of Islam in the world today should be debated along with the human rights violations 
and its devastating impact on women under the Islamic forces. “This means not participating 
in the destructive defensiveness which has shaped anti-colonial imagination in Islamic 
                                               
54 According to Shahrzad Mojab (2001), “the experience of the Islamic Republic has shown, as a matter 
of fact, that Islamic theocracy reinforces the traditional patriarchal system. Thus, far from being an 
alternative to secular, radical, and socialist feminisms [it]… justifies unequal gender relations” (p. 131). 
55 In the process of giving validity to religious democracy and human rights, velayat-e faqih as the 
unique edge of applying Islam at state level in Iran should not be representing the whole Islam and 
should not be judged as the single interpretation of Islam. It should be mentioned here that Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s velayat-e faqih is only ONE of the many understandings of the role of Islam in a modern 
nation-state. There are many other voices (such as Kadivar, or clerics like Shariatmadari, Montazeri or 
even Sistani) who do not consider a conflict between Islam and democracy. 
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societies- to refuse self-glorification and self-pity” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 4). Satrapi has also 
tried to give voice to such concerns by elaborating on the undemocratic nature of the Iranian 
policies through her objection to gender policies. Her agenda seems to be more anti-
fundamentalist rather than feminist. In one of her interviews, she mentioned: “we knew we 
were living under a dictatorship (in Iran) so we never believed in what they said. We knew 
that our leaders were dictators” (Satrapi in Dave, 2006). Satrapi’s democracy is entwined 
closely with human rights especially women’s rights. This is similar to Shirin Ebadi’s case 
who asserts, in one of her talks, that it is true that a fair and free election is the base of a 
democratic government, however, “the elected government is still obliged to observe a 
framework for democracy. That framework is comprised of human rights laws and 
regulations” (2009, p. 17). She strongly believes that human rights is a universal value and has 
nothing to do with the religion, ethnicity or ideology. Based on this link between human rights 
and democracy, Ebadi thinks that “it is quite obvious that democracy is incomplete in Iran” 
(2009, p. 19) in terms of women’s rights and freedom of speech. Ebadi’s point is shared by 
other thinkers. Jack Donnelly believes that “there is an international legal and political 
consensus on the list of rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Human Rights Covenants” (2007, p. 24). He states that the contextual differences 
and various interpretations of human rights do not threaten this universality. This, however, is 
controversial. As Elena Namli (2014) argues in her Human Rights as Ethics, Politics and Law, 
a legitimate universal claim would always leave a space for cultural and national diversity; the 
variations of region or country do require un-identical practices in terms of human rights (p. 
36). This universal and contextual consensus can be the base of disagreement between the 
Islamic Republic or the foundation of velayat-e faqih and Satrapi or the critics56 of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s political system. In Donnelly’s hypothesis, individualism is an important feature 
of any meaningful discourse on human rights. His position is rather commonly shared by many 
“Western” practitioners among them Satrapi or other memoirists. However, as Namli reminds 
us, monopolisation of individualism which is peculiar to “Western” ideology, is self-
contradictory in discussions of human rights. Religion, nationality and region are all equally 
important factors in discourses on human rights. Ayatollah Khomeini’ interpretation of 
individual liberty as subordinate to collective safeness seems to be in line with Namli’s 
ideology. According to his political theology, one’s individual concerns are subordinate to the 
communal good. Living in a community of believers demands that individuals act within the 
                                               
56 According to Kadivar six areas of conflict have been discovered between Khomeini’s system and the 
international universal concept of human rights. “(1) inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims, (2) 
inequality between men and women, (3) inequality between slaves and free human beings, (4) inequality 
between commoners and jurists in public affairs, (5) freedom of conscience and religion versus 
punishments for apostasy, and (6) extra-judicial punishments, violent punishments, and torture” 
(Kadivar, 2009). 
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limits of Islamic laws. The Islamic orders must be preserved and pursued by each and every 
individual. In Islam, the focal point is God as the lawgiver, and the duties of individuals are 
defined based on shari’ah rules. In Ayatollah Khomeini’s system, human rights are defined 
by the principles of shari’ah.  
In conclusion, Satrapi’s advocated individualism which is in contradiction with the 
communal and public identity in the Islamic Republic is the cause of her critical position 
towards Iranian policies. She believes in a democratic system, the human rights ought to be 
respected and her definition of human rights is one based on “Western” individualism. 
Consequently, the Islamic Republic violated her rights as her individualism had been 
restricted. Just like Donnelly and Ebadi, Satrapi believes in the human rights as a universal 
value not contextual one. However, this as I will show in the first chapter is not in line with 
Satrapi’s intentio auctoris which is rooted in her inclusive orientations towards humanity in 
general and respecting differences between nations and cultures. She objected to the 
“Western” feminist circles because of the exclusive nature of their ideology and the alienation 
of Iranian women. By supporting the individuality in human rights discussions, Satrapi, in 
fact, ignores the cultural, religious and national contexts in which human rights are defined 
and meaningful. This can be said to be the main source of her disagreement with the Islamic 
Republic’s policies.  
History 
Historical accounts can be very different depending upon the purpose for which they 
had been written down or the bodies who produced them. According to Rupke (2011), 
“familial or ethnic groups, social movements or religious organizations tell different stories 
and different histories, for varying purposes” (p. 287). Therefore, not all historical narratives 
are the same. My argument is that, if Satrapi’s autobiographical account ought to be used as a 
learning tool in academic environments to learn about Iranian history and culture, then one 
must acknowledge that her historical account is very subjective, and according to her public 
declarations, has been written from her personal and individual point of view. This means that 
Persepolis could be an account of Iranian history; however, it is very unlikely to represent the 
modern history of Iran impartially through an autobiographical account. The controversy over 
divergent receptions of Persepolis, consequently, has its roots in considering Satrapi’s work 
as Iranian history rather than an Iranian story. Despite unavoidable discrepancies in the 
historical accounts, what is important is that this process sheds light on divergent receptions 
of Persepolis and is a step forward in analysing the intentio lectoris.  
At some points, to use Michel Foucault’s notion of knowledge and power, some 
discourses attain priority over others and shape the explicit type of history (2005, p. 14). This 
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is confirmed by Sandra Harding that “knowledge is always socially situated. Thus, to the 
extent that an oppressed group’s situation is different from that of the dominant group, its 
dominated situation enables the production of distinctive kinds of knowledge” (2004, p. 7). 
The dominant, explicit and accessible history claims to have valid sources as evidence, 
however, this evidence has been chosen selectively (Rupke, 2011, p. 287). To study the history 
of Shi’a Islam or the history of the Islamic Republic, the base of which is derived from 
Shi’ism,57 it is crucial to adopt various sources as Shi’ism in general and the Islamic 
Revolution in particular have mostly been essentialized. Some current accounts, i.e. 
unbalanced or biased representations of Iran and Islam, has led to an incomplete 
understandings of the Islamic political agenda underway in the country immediately before, 
during and after the revolution. This account of the history and background of the revolution 
and Shi’a culture has resulted in a totally different view in the minds of the general public, 
especially those who have not been living in Iran and are more likely to perpetuate anti-Iranian 
and anti-Islamic feelings. According to Axworthy, “Iranian concerns, values, problems, 
actions and reactions are wholly explicable and rational when seen in their own proper context, 
in the round; quite open to sympathy, and even familiar” (2013, p. xxii). In order to conceive 
the reasons and causes that led to the revolution in Iran, many have tried to consider this 
phenomenon through the lens of sociology, Marxism, or other political perspectives.58 The 
results of such analyses have been published worldwide, and have mostly focused on one 
specific aspect of the revolution. The formation factors and socio-political variables have been 
interpreted differently. In order to present a more balanced and nuanced discussion, I offer a 
brief account of the revolution’s history from the viewpoint of academic scholars,59 olama, 
                                               
57 Shi’a rules and regulations are derived from the Qur’an, ahadith (narratives of the Prophet and the 
twelve Imams) and Sunnah (Ar. Sunnah; the lifestyle, teaching and practices of the Prophet). These 
sources design a holistic way of life for every Shi’a Muslim. The community ethos set by Shi’a Islam 
in Iran is meant to establish a public social order that is beneficial to everyone. Therefore, the 
commitment of the government to Shi’a Islam is not just to legitimise the power and authority of ruling 
but to keep this social order in place and to help deal with social problems in a just way. “The view of 
the Shi’ah concerning government and the nature of the persons who should assume rule was clear from 
the time following the death of the Prophet (s) down to the beginning of the Occultation” (Khomeini, 
1970, p. 33). “The government is necessary and that the function of government that existed from the 
beginning of Islam down to the time of the Twelfth Imam (‘a) is still enjoined upon us by God after the 
Occultation even though he has appointed no particular individuals to function” (Khomeini, 1970, p. 
33). “The constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran (qanun-i asasi-yi jumhuri-yi Islami-yi Iran) 
translated Khumayni’s concept of a purely Islamic government (Hokumat-i islami) into reality” (Halm, 
2004, p. 120). See also Shi’ism and Constitutionalism in Iran by Ha’iri (1977).  
58 There is no need to say that most of these researches have been conducted by foreign writers or non-
experts on Iran. Such researches have mostly been based on second-hand resources due to the writers’ 
positions as outsiders. Lack of linguistic awareness, orientalist accounts, purposeful elisions, distorted 
interpretations and the writers’ distance from the socio-political atmosphere of the revolution and the 
participating masses have led to the illustration of a fraudulent picture which is totally contradictory to 
this phenomenon and its bases. 
59 The Islamic scholars that have been used in this research are meant to reflect the insider’s point of 
view on Shi’a Islam, such as mojtahedin and foqaha. 
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Iranian historians and professionals who are mostly considered as insiders. In my opinion, it 
is a matter of absolute necessity that audiences are subject to multi-faceted knowledge and 
education to avoid deleterious perceptions in general. As it is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to go through the Iran’s political relations with the “West”, a few historical events and reasons 
which made Iran newsworthy and the centre of attention for the “West” will be mentioned in 
the next following chapter. 
Moreover, to gain a sound understanding of human rights and feminist issues in the 
Middle East especially in Iran, readings of politics, and in particular the historical and social 
context should be included. Ziba Mir-Hosseini argues: “the Shari’a can be understood and 
studied only in its complex double image, as both expressing and moulding social practice; it 
can neither be divorced from the social context in which it operates nor understood merely by 
textual analysis” (1993, p. 200). Also, Deniz Kandiyoti in her Women, Islam and the State 
emphasises on political factures along with the socio-economic process. “The subordination 
of Muslim women can neither be read off solely from Islamic ideology and practice, nor be 
entirely derived from global processes of socio-economic transformation, nor for that matter 
from the universalistic premises of feminist theory” (1991, p. 2). Rather, Kandiyoti believes 
the state plays the most significant role in highlighting gender inequalities. In an apolitical 
context, Kandiyoti argues, the specificity of Islam in local culture, the historical complexities, 
kinship and economy system could hardly be explored. In the case of Iran, pre-revolution 
history as well as post-revolutionary trajectories of the Islamic Republic and their new 
deployment of Islam in line with nationalism, and formation of oppositional movements are 
central in understanding and studying the human rights and women’s rights.  
The history of foreign powers’ intervention had a major influence on feminist issues in 
post-revolutionary era, e.g. “Westernization” policies of Reza Shah under the influence of 
Ataturk. The post-revolutionary vision is that any change in women’s condition is a concession 
to the “Western” imperialist and hegemonic agenda. In Moghissi’s words, “in the context of 
demonization of Islam and Muslims which are mostly found in the West it is essential to 
defend the rights of Muslim communities to cultural autonomy and unhindered religious 
practices” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 4). As a result, the nationalism of Iran and defence and embrace 
of Islamic culture as a symbol of identity led to views that any changes were identified as plots 
against Islam and designed by enemies (Rhouni, 2010, p. 50). This conservative approach 
which was applied by post-revolutionary government retained Islam as the basis of political 
legitimacy. As a reaction to the “Western” hegemonic discourses, the citizens’ rights, in 
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particular women, were kept within Islamic national identity.60 Any discussions of reform or 
modernity are identified (by current revolutionary government) as a “Western” attack. 
Therefore, the reaffirmation of the Islamic customs especially with respect to women became 
the centre of attention for politicians in Iran. A call to return to the authentic Islamic culture 
was an end which used women as its symbol. In conclusion, the separation of religion and 
politics, advocated by Satrapi and other memoirists, would be considered as imperialist or 
orientalist or “Western”-inspired plans against the nationalism or Islamism of the country.  
Thirty five years after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and despite both the internal and 
external threats to overthrow the Islamic Republic, the Iranian state based on the political 
thought of velayat-e faqih has survived and proved to be a stable state in the region.61 What is 
noteworthy here is that the Iranian system has been in place, despite observers anticipating its 
downfall within a few years especially with oppositions from “Western” powers. Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s understanding of velayat-e faqih is quite radical and innovative and has been 
rejected by a number of maraje’62 in the Shi’i world (which will be discussed in details in the 
first chapter) – but it has a certain appeal among many religious and revolutionary Iranians, 
because they feel it is more authentic to Iranian culture than “Western” ideologies. In short, 
the modern history of Iran shows that the political space has never lacked the presence of 
olama as representatives of religion. The integration of religion and state in Iran has its roots 
in the domination of foreign powers. The role of olama was mostly to stand against the rulers’ 
policies, e.g. “Westernization” of Iran. The historical background will pave the way to clarify 
the accusation of Islam setizi against Persepolis and similar works in post-revolutionary Iran. 
This is also beneficial in analysing Satrapi’s dissatisfaction with the current policies of the 
                                               
60 Feminist studies out of the political context mark the significance of orientalist approaches in Middle 
Eastern women’s studies. Zeenath Kausar believes that “feminism cannot or has not developed over 
time to manifest in a host of both secular and religious trajectories embraced by colonized, colonizing, 
and anticolonial communities, Muslim and non-Muslim actors alike” (Seedat, 2013, p. 31). As Fatima 
Seedat argues, “for Kausar, feminism is inherently materialistic and therefore irredeemably problematic 
for Islam. Quite close to the point of view of Kausar, Dipesh Chakrabarty believes “feminism has strong 
associations with political modernity, is similarly a construct associated with European modernity, and 
the genealogy of feminism is intimately associated with the ‘intellectual and theological traditions of 
Europe’” (as cited in Seedat, 2013, p. 30). Seedat also thinks “third-wave feminism frequently returns 
instead to posit white liberal ways of being woman as universal ways of being woman” (2013, p. 28). 
She believes in the gap between “European” and the Middle Eastern feminism and attributes the total 
feminist discourses to the hypothesis of distinctive superiority of “Western” culture over the “East”. 
61 The Gulf monarchies and Jorden have also been stable. 
62 Maraje’ is the plural form of marja’. Mojtahedin is the plural form of mojtahed. Mojtahed or marja-
e-taqlid is the only source of guidance for Shi’as who are not qualified in religious studies. “Mujtahīd: 
an authority on divine law who practices ijtihād, that is, “the search for a correct opinion…in the 
deducing of the specific provisions of the law from its principles and ordinances” (Muhammad Sanglaji, 
Qazā dar Islam [Tehran, 1338 Sh. /1959], p.14)” (Khomeini, 1970, p. 8).  
  
34 
 
Islamic Republic regarding the hejab or the human rights, as well as her disillusionment with 
the practice of democracy in Iran.  
Representation of Islam63 and Iran in media64 
According to Stuart Hall, representation is “the act of describing or depicting people, 
objects and events—as the production of meaning through language and other signifying 
practices” (1997, p. 17). Hall believes that, prior to the representation of something from an 
object to a notion or concept, that specific entity does not have any fixed meaning. Putting this 
differently, “there is no meaningful ‘reality’ beyond the processes of representation because 
representation itself constitutes meaning” (Hall, 1997, p. 17). To represent means to render 
concepts shared by a social group or culture as true or typical. With reference to the history of 
foreign powers’ interference in the Orient and the unequal relationship between the Orient and 
the “West”, Islam has mostly been perceived as belonging to the Orient and thus “has been to 
be looked at […] as if it were one monolithic thing, with a very special hostility and fear” 
(Said, 1997, p. 4). It goes without saying that “Islam and activities of certain Muslims are very 
newsworthy subjects” (Poole and Richardson, 2006, p. 1). Experts and non-experts have 
pontificated in news and TV shows about Islam with stereotypical generalisations and clichés 
(Poole and Richardson, 2006, p. 116). Unfortunately, what is usually discussed in the media 
about Islam, is in most cases at the time of political crisis. It is in such crisis that Islam is easily 
linked to extremism. According to Poole and Richardson, in very few cases, there might be 
news other than War on Terror regarding Islam (2006, p. 1). The dominant deliberate 
associations between Islam and fundamentalism, in Said’s words, has come to ensure that 
fundamentalism is a part of Islam and literally the same thing. To speak of Islam in “Western” 
countries, Said says, can mean “a lot of unpleasant things” ranging from backwardness, 
violence, primitiveness and atavism (p. 10). Said believes that it is very rare to see a neutral 
cultural or scientific article on Islam in the news: “only when there is a bomb in Saudi Arabia 
or the threat of violence against the United States in Iran has ‘Islam’ seemed worthy of general 
                                               
63 The definition of the Islamic world, according to Said, is more a part of the postcolonial world: “Islam 
belongs neither to Europe nor, like Japan, to the advanced industrial group of nations. It has been 
regarded as falling within the purview of ‘development perspective’, which is another mode of saying 
that Islamic societies were considered for at least three decades to be in need of ‘modernisation’” (Said, 
1997, p. iii). In short, Said’s definition of Islam is the “West’s” menace. The Islamic nation is known 
as “they” and is imagined to stand against the “West”: “France, Britain, and in particular the United 
States” (p. xlix). To his belief, other great civilizations of the Orient such as India and China do not 
seem to be a factor of apprehension like Islam. “Only Islam seemed never to have submitted completely 
to the West” (Said, 1997, p. 5). As Said suggested - and in order to be clear with the terms like “Islam 
and the West” - it is important to mention here that “labels purporting to name very large and complex 
realities are notoriously vague and at the same time unavoidable” (1997, p. 7).  
64 All those cultural apparatus that are delivering the message of Islam to Americans and Europeans, 
Said believes, includes the media, namely the newspapers and magazines, internet, TV and radios.   
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comment” (1997, p. 16). Therefore, Islam has become the core argument in policy making 
circles as well as the media (Said, 1997, p. xx). This type of knowledge does not need to be 
documented or properly proved. Based on Michel Foucault’s notion of knowledge and power 
discussed above, the news media and reporting are powerful enough to “produce the objects 
of our knowledge, and govern the way these topics and objects of our knowledge are 
discussed” (Fayyaz & Shirazi, 2013, p. 54). As long as Islam is the subject, the negative biases 
and communicable set of feelings are easily accepted (Said, 1997, p. 47).65  
As mentioned in the history of Iran’s relation with the “West”, among all Muslim 
countries - Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan etc. in the world 
- Iran continues to be the centre of attention for the “West” (according to Said’s definition of 
“East” and “West”), especially for the United States. The textual analysis of the news and 
articles on Iran and Iranians in “Western” news sources shows that “Western” media 
representations have been mostly negative, and filled with stereotypes that “are not simply 
efforts aimed at describing the real Iran, but rather form the basis of what Said refers to as a 
powerful ‘community of interpretation’ that often reflects and reproduces certain xenophobic 
stereotypes of non-Western foreign subjects” (Fayyaz & Shirazi, 2013, p. 53). That is to say, 
the dominant representations focus on the old orientalist discourses which stems from the 
Islamic culture and Iran’s commitment to Islamic rules. Indeed, Iran’s unique Shi’a 
government, the hostage crisis of 1979 and its nuclear program have been all contributed to be 
the focus of the rest of the world (Eid and Dakroury, 2010, p. 15). Edward Said (1997) noted 
this in commenting a Los Angeles Times report back in 1991 where Robin Wright, an expert 
on Islam and a senior advisor of the Bush administration, observed that: “we have to be smarter 
in dealing with Islam than in dealing with communism 30 or 40 years ago” (Robin in Said, p. 
7). However, “the danger of simplifying a ‘myriad of countries’ was noted, but the only picture 
in the five column piece was of Ayatollah Khomeini (the founder of the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran). He and Iran, embodied all that was objectionable about Islam, from terrorism and anti-
Westernism” (p. 7).66 In the last thirty five years since the Islamic Revolution, the ontological 
basis of media representations are still remarkably durable. 
A “Western” scholar, Axworthy (2013) believes that there are other reasons to study 
and comment on Iran. “As long as the linear development of [the] Middle East to the Western 
                                               
65 This can be true about “West” to some degree. It is very unlikely that all those who talk about Islam 
and the “West” have a solid grip on all dimensions of Islamic culture or “Western” culture. Obviously, 
such people are very few “but this does not prevent people from confidently characterizing ‘Islam’ and 
‘the West’ or from believing they know exactly what it is they are talking about” (Said, 1997, p. 10). 
Orientalists and Occidentalists are of this group.  
66 See also: “The absence of newspaper regulation compared to broadcast news media allows 
newspapers to print the often extreme views of columnists and letter writers” (Poole and Richardson, 
2006, p. 2).  
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model is no longer the only option, Iran’s history and culture cannot be avoided” (p. xix). 
While he thinks that Iranian Shi’ism should not be labelled as “fundamentalism”, he expresses: 
“in the West, we think we know about Iran, but what we think we know is often misleading or 
simply false” (p. xx). He adds that: “we think of images of demonstrations and chanting crowds 
and assume (encouraged by our news media) that Iranian Shi’ism is a dangerous, 
uncontrollable, fanatical force” (p. xxi). The “anti-Western” and anti-imperialist politics of 
Iran that have led to the country’s economic and cultural self-sufficiency - despite the crippling 
imposed sanctions – Axworthy believes, is another key point which has made Iran 
newsworthy. The reactionary counter-response of Iranian policies is based on a particular 
interpretation of Islamic doctrine (Khomeini’s velayat-e faqih), and the governments’ policies 
are determined by strategic and geopolitical considerations in particular when it comes to 
dealing with the “West”. During the hostage crisis, which happened on 4th November 1979, 
the peak time when Iran was in the news, the consensus on this issue was to focus on the 
hostage event itself.67 It was a reality that was transferred all over the world without further 
explanation of the political circumstances, the situation that lead to such an event, the history 
of the foreign interferences, the international threats or the reasons for the revolution. All were 
ignored at the price of the term “hostage”.68 Since that event, Iran has been in the headlines of 
American news. As Said described, there has been no specific change in the world’s (not just 
Americans’) view of Muslims for the last three or four decades, despite political changes. This 
mood of outrage has been conveyed through American media to other parts of the world. 
According to Van Dijk, “the media are not neutral, common-sense[d], or rational mediator of 
social events, but essentially help reproduce preformulated ideologies” (1988, p.11). Central 
to my argument in the final part of the first chapter, is giving importance to the relationship 
between media and politics. It remains true that an independent press and a courageous 
journalist can pursue ‘truth’. In order to avoid essentialsing the media, an example of The 
                                               
67 “For several months ABC scheduled a daily late-evening special, America Held Hostage, and PBS’ 
Mac Neil/Lehre Report ran an unprecedented number of shows on the crisis. For months Walter 
Cronkite would add to his “that’s the way it is” a reminder of how many days the hostages had been in 
captivity” (Said, 1997, p. 82). 
68 As mentioned earlier, the ‘wicked’ label of ‘hostage’ was enough to prompt the world to ignore more 
than a century of American political and economic interference in Iran. In “the background of the so 
called capitulations […] various powers beginning with England were given extraterritorial economic, 
diplomatic, and juridical privileges in Iran” (Said, 1997, p. 102). Quite subtly, Said refers to a quotation 
from Ayatollah Khomeini about the political and diplomatic rights that were given to the English and 
Americans by the Shah. This has never been mentioned in the media: “if the Shah would run over an 
American dog, he would be called to account, but if an American cook should run over the Shah … no 
one has any claim against him” (p. 102).  
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Guardian campaign to uncover media intrusion, as well as the war documentary by John 
Pilger69 will be discussed.  
Apart from media, Iran has been increasingly discussed by politicians, historians, 
sociologists, academics, and so forth. Studies of the history and culture of revolutionary Iran 
continue to be conducted on a number of fronts and in different languages. These, however, 
are not easily accessible to everybody. More often such works target scholarly – or highly 
specialised – audiences. Similarly, like media dispatches, the literature produced by Iranian 
diasporas/exiles after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, mostly in the form of memoirs, are 
popular readings amongst diverse audiences. Quite often, the accounts of post-revolutionary 
authors can be very similar to those of the media representations. This is nothing new when 
one considers their critical position towards the Islamic Republic’s governmental structure and 
policies. However, with regards to Satrapi’s intentio auctoris, this seems to be paradoxical. 
Detailed analysis of Satrapi’s social background with secular orientations in Iran before the 
Islamic Revolution, one would not expect her to support the Islamic rituals and ideologies 
being practiced and applied at public level by the revolutionary government.  
Autobiography: fact or fiction? 
Following the study of divergent receptions of Persepolis, the second level of inquiry is 
its analysis as a form of autobiography. “Satrapi’s Persepolis is an unconventional 
autobiography” (McIntosh, 2013, p. 1). Schroeder believes that Persepolis is semi-
fictionalised (2010, p. 6). “Indeed, Satrapi has said that everything she presents in her memoirs 
is true, but that the stories are not a moment-by-moment documentary of the events in her life. 
‘You always have to arrange things to tell a story’ Satrapi has said of her writing and 
illustrations” (Schroeder, 2010, p. 6). In fact, Satrapi as an autobiographer tried “to invent 
herself despite the weight of her family history, and autobiographical singularity emerges in 
negotiation with this legacy” (Miller, 2007, p. 543).   
It is argued that an autobiography is inevitably a personal and selective account, and 
cannot be taken as a complete and unbiased representation of a larger picture, especially one 
involving events as complex as the Islamic Revolution and gender issues in Iran. As Keshavarz 
informs us, autobiographies are an incomplete illustration of another culture:  
                                               
69 John Pilger (b. 1973) is an Australian born journalist. His articles appear worldwide in famous 
newspapers such as The Guardian, Los Angeles Times and The New York Times. He was the “chief 
foreign correspondent and reported from all over the world, covering numerous wars, notably Vietnam. 
Still in his twenties, he became the youngest journalist to receive Britain's highest award for 
journalism, Journalist of the Year and was the first to win it twice. Moving to the United States, he 
reported the upheavals there in the late 1960s and 1970s. He marched with America's poor from 
Alabama to Washington, following the assassination of Martin Luther King. He was in the same room 
when Robert Kennedy, the presidential candidate, was assassinated in June 1968” (Johnpilger.com).  
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Portraits of people or of social and cultural conditions should be like tapestries 
woven out of a hundred different threads, or like mosaics made of many tiles. 
When there are holes in the tapestry or tiles missing, the entire picture is 
distorted. RLT [or Persepolis and other aforesaid memoirs] contains a few 
patches of truth. In this entirety, however, it is a tapestry with many holes, a 
mosaic that has every other piece missing (Keshavarz, 2007, p. 18).  
Many scholars have challenged the referential truth of the autobiography believing that 
selective accounts depend upon the omission (purposely or otherwise) of various facts, or 
simply on lapses of memory. According to Chambers (2013), “auto/biography is often seen as 
a ‘truthful’, direct, and unmediated form but […] it is in fact situated within and beyond genre 
conventions, and edited in ways that are far from innocent” (p. 6). Chambers actually 
distinguishes between autobiographers who are Muslim and diasporic and others. She believes 
the rules of writing an autobiography are adopted and subverted by this group. It is one of their 
strategies to use obliqueness to reluctantly rejecting the discussions about oneself and 
elaborating more on a collective identity. As Anderson argues, “this may be part of a deliberate 
strategy employed by many non-Western and diasporic auto/biographers to incorporate 
occasional silences and elision into their writing” (Anderson as cited in Chambers, 2013, p. 
3). Therefore, “it is misleading to identify individuals as being somehow emblematic of the 
history of a whole nation” (Rushdie as cited in Chambers, 2013, p. 5). According to this point 
of view, works like Persepolis may not be considered as cultural and historical realities or true 
renditions, as they cannot be impartial narratives. Similarly, Raymond Federman, adheres to 
the belief in “the impossibility of recapturing the historical reality” (as cited in Charlson, 2001, 
p. 91). The same line of thought is followed by Kate Millett:  
Of course it is impossible to tell the truth. For example, how does one know it? 
I will not belabour the difficulty by telling you how hard I have tried. And if 
compulsion forces me to tell the truth, it may also lead me into error, or 
invention (as cited in Miller, 2007, p. 538). 
However, as Elliott reminds us, “with postmodern understandings of the constructed 
nature of subjectivity, comes a challenge to the autobiographical subject. As the self is a 
constructed fiction, so are the autobiographical narratives that define it” (Elliott, 2003, p. 3). 
Studies of the transnational approach to memoir writing suggests some more possibilities in 
considering the memoirs as genres that “create effects of reality and truth that are central to 
the ways the world is understood” (Whitlock, 2008, p. 8). Helen Buss argues that the memoir 
is a fluid and dynamic network that “personalise history and historicise the personal. They are 
about individuals, and they are also about an event, an era, an institution, or an identity” (Buss 
as cited in Whitlock, 2008, p. 7). The French critic Philippe Lejeune has famously defined the 
autobiographical genre as “a retrospective prose narrative produced by a real person 
concerning his own existence, focusing on his individual life, in particular on the development 
of his personality” (1982, p. 193). Notably, Paul de Man (1979) has argued that memoirs make 
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it impossible to tell what is true by fictional (ised) components. In this view, autobiography 
should be separated from fiction. This suggests the question that: “is it autobiography if parts 
of it are not true? Is it fiction if parts of it are?” (Lynda Barry, 2002). This line of thinking is 
worth investigating as other interpretations, similarly, challenge the nature itself of the 
autobiography as a literary genre and as a truthful narration/rendition. If a fiction means that a 
piece of work is not factual, then Persepolis is definitely not a fiction with regard to reflecting 
and illustrating critical moments in Iranian history. Through descriptions of the revolution and 
the war with Iraq, Satrapi reports her traumatic experiences and the hardships she underwent. 
The revolution and the war with Iraq, on which Satrapi abundantly relates her views, are not 
fictional events. “Memoir by definition”, according to Anne Whitehead, “describes 
experiences that the author has lived through” (2004, p. 31). Under the influence of Art 
Spiegelman’s Maus, Satrapi’s Persepolis is therefore believed to belong to the “fiction side of 
the ledger” (Charlson, 2001, p. 91). The prize-winning Maus II was firstly labelled as fiction 
in The New York Times’ best-seller list. This was because the editors believed that a comic 
book with humans illustrated with animal heads cannot be considered as a true story. Only 
after Spiegelman himself asked the editors, the placement of Maus has been changed to non-
fiction. Through using the “photographic facts”, Spiegelman “crafts an aesthetic of post 
memory to emphasize the subjective world of emotions and fantasies as an important part of 
memory, autobiography and photography” (Elliott, 2003, p. ii).  
Persepolis reflects the experiences of Satrapi’s coming of age and according to her 
declarations, she added elements of fiction to be able to tell her story. Mary Jo Netiz believes 
that “all knowledge is partial” and is inspired by the inhabitants in locations and times (p. 56). 
Satrapi’s Persepolis is confirmed to be the personal story of an upper-class woman which is 
reflecting the life of her own group or culture as victims of misogynist policies of the Islamic 
Republic.70 Satrapi never claimed that she has illustrated the reality; her Iranian story claimed 
to be written from a very “subjective” point of view and that it cannot be a “fair point of view” 
in representing the whole Iranian society (Satrapi in Walt, 2008). By insisting on the 
truthfulness of the events that actually happened during the revolution in Iran, Persepolis blurs 
the borders between fact and fiction. Satrapi’s Persepolis “might more properly fall under the 
category of what Linda Hutcheon calls ‘historiographic metafiction’, which are both intensely 
self-reflexive and yet paradoxically also lay claim to historical events and personages” 
(Charlson, 2001, p. 94). Henceforth, “Persepolis is not purely fact, it is also fiction, in the 
sense that the reader views the truth through the multiple perspectives of the narration and the 
comic” (Meier, 2009). My argument in the third chapter will focus on the ambiguous status of 
                                               
70 Feminist standpoint perspective believes “that an individual’s actual location in the social and 
physical world and the work that s/he does there shapes her/his understandings” (Netiz, 2011, p. 55). 
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Persepolis as an autobiography which is wavering between fact and fiction. Failure in 
considering Persepolis as a post-modern unconventional autobiography will lead to 
pigeonholing it as either a fact or fiction. This is the first step in straying from the dynamic 
nature of autobiographies and can be the source of biased orientalist/occidentalist judgements.    
Summary of chapters 
Chapter 1 examines Satrapi’s concerns over the undemocratic and dictatorial nature of 
the Islamic Republic. In her interview with Powells, she declared that Iranian officials are 
dictators and democracy is an illusion (Satrapi in Dave, 2006). She has also mentioned that, 
she would never go back to her country unless democracy is accomplished there. Regarding 
this declaration, this chapter explores the complex nature of democracy and the need to 
justification and argumentation of its compatibility with an Islamic system. Particularly, I have 
chosen to analyse Khomeini’s theorisation of, and approach to, velayat-e faqih as discussed in 
Hokumat-e Islami. The rationale of my choice is to reflect on the political and theological 
thought of Ayatollah Khomeini, a controversial figure in the “West” with episodes such as the 
Satanic Verses controversy,71 as applied by the current ruling system in Iran. The point here is 
differentiating between the systems of velayat-e faqih from that of Islam. By reflecting on the 
complexities of religious democracy and the critique of Khomeini’s velayat-e faqih, I hope to 
contribute to a more nuanced, and critical debate on democracy in Iran as well as Islam in 
today’s world.  
To clarify the ambiguities and complexities of Iranian political system and the 
emergence, formation and application of velayat-e faqih as the system of governance in Iran, 
a history of olama’s relationship with the rulers before Khomeini is necessary. This history 
starts from sixteenth century Safavid dynasty which established Shi’ism as the formal state 
religion in Iran. Initially, the role of olama was limited to providing living directions for the 
community of believers. The authority and position of olama developed towards the end of 
the nineteenth century and with the inception of Qajar dynasty. In fact, the Qajar period is 
marked by the presence of olama in politics. Started with the tobacco concession, the olama’s 
presence in politics lead to the establishment of the constitutionalism. This movement was to 
limit the authority of rulers especially in granting different advantages to foreign powers and 
to Islamicise the country. Needless to say that, the Constitutional Revolution was the starting 
point in shaping disagreements between olama in Iranian history. Aspirations to establish a 
complete Islamic state which is ruled by olama as the deputies of the Hidden Imam started 
                                               
71 Salman Rushdie’s novel Satanic Verses (1988) was accused of blasphemy for some of its contents. 
In 1989, Imam Khomeini issued a hokm (order) – presented in the media as fatwa – in which he 
condemned Rushdie to death and urged Muslims to kill him. A series of attempted killings took place, 
none successful. Khomeini’s unequivocal order is reported in Axworthy (2013, p. 298).  
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with Khomeini. The theory of the velayat-e faqih as applied in today’s Iran is actually 
Khomeini’s mystical and political reading of jurisprudence. His denial of the political 
legitimacy of the rulers before the Islamic Revolution lead to the formation of the full-fledged 
political responsibility of olama. Ayatollah Khomeini equated the authority of the faqih with 
that of the Prophet and infallible Imams. Debates over the legitimacy of the authority of the 
faqih has thereof been very controversial post-Khomeini. Considering the Islamic governance 
as a divine system creates divine duty for citizens, the defiance of which is considered as a sin. 
Based on Khomeini’s interpretation of divine duties for citizens, Satrapi’s banishment from 
her home country after publishing her work, which was read as anti-Iranian by the Islamic 
Republic, is explicated. Needless to say that, Ayatollah Khomeini’s political thought has never 
been wholeheartedly embraced by all olama or the Iranian nation. Many have been critical to 
the absolute level of authority of the faqih and argued the electoral process of choosing a faqih 
and his accountability.  
Chapter 2 is intended as the analysis of Satrapi’s critique of compulsory72 hejab 
(veiling) in Iran. Persepolis discusses the imposition of the veil as the epitome of state-
enforced gender discrimination. In so doing, Satrapi continues a discourse initiated by the best-
selling autobiography of Betty Mahmoody (Not without My Daughter, 1987) and followed by 
Azar Nafisi (Reading Lolita in Tehran, 2003), and Shirin Ebadi (Iran Awakening, 2007).73 It 
has been argued that these autobiographies with their critical position towards Iranian policies 
– irrespective of their actual motivations – legitimise the perspective that Islam is indeed an 
oppressor of women. Scholars like Marandi, Mahmoud and Nash believe that these accounts 
are normally articulated in the form of “Western” discourse of rights into Muslim societies, 
focusing on the oppression of women by men. Therefore, the aforementioned memoirs are 
dubbed as neo-orientalist texts. Satrapi’s position on the hejab is reinforced throughout the 
book by means of irony, humour and the artistic rendering of the idea of veiling itself. The 
articulations of gender inequalities in an Islamic context suggest the feminist efforts to reclaim 
women’s rights in Islamic countries. Accordingly, a group of feminists in Iran started a 
different discourse which is understood separated from the current political and male-
dominated interpretations, paying special attention to the interpretation of the original sacred 
text rather than the historical and cultural dynamics. Satrapi and Ebadi’s argument on gender 
inequality in Iran is to a larger degree in line with this movement. They are in fact objecting 
                                               
72 “One month after the revolution in March 1979, revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini announced 
that ‘women should not be naked in these ministries. There is nothing wrong with women’s 
employment. But they must be clothed according to religious standards’” (Naghibi, 2007, p. 59). 
73 “There is a substantial body of work on the veil in the diasporic Iranian feminist community; while 
some diasporic Iranian feminists acknowledge the complexities of the [veiling] issue, a regrettable 
number tend to fall back on the discourse of the veil as oppressive, thus endorsing a colonial feminist 
position of the unquestioned naturalness of the unveiled body” (Naghibi, 2007, pp. 62-63).  
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to the relationship between government and religion in the formation of gender identities and 
roles. It is actually the state that reinforces the patriarchal power structure. According to Asma 
Barlas (2001), the “contextual” and “extratextual realities that shaped the understanding of the 
original text of the Qur’an and its interpretation” can be questioned (p. 1). Barlas believes that 
the Qur’anic teachings have provided women with equality and possibility of egalitarianism. 
In other words, the patriarchal and political interpretations of the shari’ah circumscribe the 
public engagement of women. In her opinion, the Taliban is an extreme example of this view, 
and the Islamic Republic with its regulations on women’s dress code in public is another 
example. Furthermore, some scholars like Valentine M. Moghadam believe that a secular 
framework for women’s rights should be embraced by many religious or Islamic activists in 
Iran. “This is because their project of reinterpreting Islam and challenging patriarchy cannot 
be realized within the theoretic framework currently in place in the Islamic Republic of Iran” 
(Moghadam as cited in Barlow, 2008, p. 40).  
This chapter analyses Satrapi’s position, message and intention in the framework of 
feminist concerns and discourses. The objection of the autobiographers does not necessarily 
put them under the banner of feminism as their main objection is the ‘foundationalism’ of the 
Islamic Republic, which they believe has violated the basic human rights. Satrapi’s rejection 
of being a feminist is thus being explored with reference to her purpose of authoring her work. 
Her self-designed way of hejab, her rebellious position towards the hejab and her wilful 
rejection of feminism have all given voice to her intention to wipe off the binary notions of 
“Western”/ “Eastern” woman. Her purposeful rejection of feminism is due to the fact that 
different notions of feminism (mostly third wave) have actually failed to include race, colour, 
ethnicity or religion. Although the pluralistic nature of feminism has always been the concern 
of feminists, however, the current clichés proved otherwise.  
The state policy of mandatory veiling (the hejab), the centre of a heated debate in Iran 
as well as in the rest of the world, is an aspect of Iranian culture that is informed by, and 
depends on, the history of Shi’a Islam and the identity of Iran as a modern nation. If Persepolis 
(and similar narratives) is to be used in educational and public contexts (e.g. media) it is 
necessary to engage with a more nuanced analysis of the Iranian culture. This should include 
the history of kashf-e hejab (removing the veil) in Iran, and the political significance of veiling 
in order to give meaning to anti-imperialist policies of the Islamic Republic, and the debates 
of the hejab as a sign of empowerment and/or anti-colonial signifier.  
Chapter 3 analyses the discourses regarding the “objectivity, truth, and authenticity” of 
an autobiography (Hathaway, 2011, p. 251). This revolves around Persepolis and its epigones, 
with particular emphasis on their being semi-fictionalised. Following Satrapi’s “political 
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book” (Bonzano, 2013), Persepolis, which recounts the post-revolutionary Iran (1979), 
Persepolis 2.0 and Zahra’s Paradise are two recent graphic novels which tell the story of post-
election Iran (2009) and the Green Movement74 in a similar way to Satrapi’s Persepolis. It is 
not surprising that Satrapi’s concerns have been the source of inspiration for other diaspora 
Iranians.  
On one hand, one of the redeeming points of Persepolis is providing its audiences with 
an “accurate time-table portrayal of the political events that took place from 1979 to 1984 - a 
chaotic and turbulent time in Iran’s modern history” (Barzegar, 2012, p. 1). On the other hand, 
it is argued that the detailed and complicated history of Iran is impossible to be depicted 
through Satrapi’s subjective point of view. This chapter is intended to analyse the study of 
autobiography and reclaims its difference from an historical account or a biography or media 
reports. This is, however, controversial as some scholars believe that an autobiography cannot 
be impartial especially when it is affected by different psychological, emotional and traumatic 
experiences of its creator. This jeopardises the sense of sincerity or authenticity of an 
autobiography. According to Lejeune, autobiography is “the retrospective prose narrative that 
someone writes concerning his own existence, where the focus is his individual life, in 
particular the story of his personality” (Eakin, 1989, p. viii). The word like ‘narrative’ and 
‘story’ in Lejeune’s definition can be debated against the concept of “sincerity, which is at 
once the sine qua non of autobiography as a genre” (Eakin, 1989, p. ix). In fact, the relationship 
between the narrative fiction and an autobiographical fact is debated as not an easy one. 
Elements of trauma and misery can affect the narration of truth. This becomes even more 
serious in case of Muslim autobiographies and their popularity in “Western” capitalist market. 
Confrontation of fact and fiction in Muslim autobiographies especially those of the exiles can 
overwhelmingly affect their representations of Islamic culture.  
                                               
74 The Green Movement is one of the most important challenges that “shaped spontaneously in the days 
immediately following the presidential elections in June 2009” in the history of the Islamic republic 
after the 1979 revolution (Nabavi, 2012, p. xi).  
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CHAPTER ONE 
ANALYSIS OF SATRAPI’S CONCERN OVER DEMOCRACY IN IRAN 
Introduction 
In an interview with Walt (2008), Satrapi was asked what would take her back to Iran. 
She replied: “the day we have a democracy, I will probably go back to Iran”. This affirms that 
she believes there is no democracy in Iran currently under the Islamic Republic.75 In another 
interview with Powells, Satrapi declared: 
We knew we were living under a dictatorship (in Iran) so we never believed in 
what they said. We knew that our leaders were dictators. Here (in America), 
people believe that they live in a democracy, which is an illusion. The real war 
is not between the West and the East. The real war is between intelligent and 
stupid people. There is much more in common between George Bush and the 
fanatics in my country than between me and the fanatics of my country. There 
is much more common ground between me and normal people here in America 
who don’t want that. As an Iranian, I feel much closer to an American who 
thinks like me than to the bearded guy of my country (Satrapi in Dave, 2006). 
In the above examples, Satrapi does not seem to believe that democracy exists either in 
Iran or America. Satrapi’s work, as interpreted by intentio lectoris, seems to ignore her 
position towards the political system in the US and the leadership and policies of President 
Bush. It seems as if global audiences, heavily influenced by biased international criticism 
against Iran, are unlikely to grasp the sense of Satrapi’s intentio auctoris. In a time marked by 
strong international bias against Islam in general, this is even more difficult to detect.76 
Irrespective of Satrapi’s intention, her accounts towards the Iranian system could be concurred 
to bring about the demonised picture of the Islamic Republic as undemocratic and oppressive 
in its nature and history. 
Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and more recently after the 2009 presidential 
election, the violations of human rights have been brought to attention. Diverse uprisings and 
movements occurred in recent years protesting the autocratic nature of the Islamic government 
in Iran. None or very little nuanced analysis of such concerns has been debated so far. Some 
memoirists aspire for better democratization of the country and not necessarily overthrowing 
                                               
75 In another example, when she was asked about the reason why she had to leave Iran for the second 
time, she briefly mentioned her unhappy marriage as one result and stated: “I wanted to do my artistic 
work, and in Iran you have censorship. It was difficult for me to do the work I wanted to do” (Satrapi 
in Walt, 2008). In this example, she considers the Iranian law system as limiting her capabilities. 
Satrapi’s main point which she seems to be unhappy with, is more about the specific censorship of laws 
in the Islamic Republic and the general censorship in “Western” media. 
76 Ironically, the “West” now needs Iran more than ever to cope with the expansion and the threat posed 
by the self-nominated IS (Islamic State). It will be interesting to see how the situation evolves and 
whether Iran, in view of the current situation, would still be enlisted in the “axis of evil”.  
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the current doctrines of the Islamic Republic i.e. velayat-e faqih as articulated by Ayatollah 
Khomeini and enshrined in the Iranian political system while some others seek to overthrow 
the Islamic regime. Satrapi’s position, in this regard in my opinion, is that of the former group. 
As her primary concern is being an autonomous individual, her definition of democracy 
pertains to respecting the human rights. In her views, human rights are universal values 
including the freedom of speech and thought and action. She animates her agency free from 
the force of religion or politics and thus advocates the separation of religion from the state. 
Satrapi supports a reformative and progressive approach to religion which adheres to a private 
and personal system of belief. It can be argued that her secular orientations and her dislike for 
the application of shari’ah in the context of society by the government have come to conclude 
her absolute repugnance for religion or anything religious. However, based on her intentio 
auctoris, and her rejection of the political systems in Iran and the “West” (America or France), 
it seems that Satrapi’s focus is spinning around the inclusive and pluralistic nature of 
secularism rather than the evacuation of life from religion. What Satrapi considers as 
democracy is respecting differences and maximising the interactions. In order to analyse 
Satrapi’s declaration of democracy as an illusion in both Iran and the “West”, this chapter 
examines firstly the meaning of democracy both at the global level and within religious 
contexts. Discussions of democracy in Islam in general or Iran in particular cannot be separated 
from the modern religious or political history of both. This gives great importance to 
understanding the religious authority and justifying the politics of the Islamic Republic in Iran, 
as well as clarifying the accusations of Islam setizi against Persepolis.   
According to Diamond & Plattner (2009), “The prestige of democracy began to soar” 
(p. xi) in different parts of the world today, however as a political aspiration, “democracy is 
everywhere praised, yet nowhere achieved” (Blaug & Schwarzmantel, 2001, p. 1). As a 
practice, democracy is subject to different challenges. Many countries are in a status between 
authoritarianism and democracy “variously labelled by political scientists as semidemocracy, 
pseudodemocracy, competitive authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism, or a hybrid 
regime” (Diamond & Plattner, 2009, p. x). Based on this and according to Diamond and 
Plattner, Iran with a few other countries such as Russia or Venezuela is a “nondemocracy that 
has been challenging the Western democratic model with increasing self-confidence” (2009, 
p. xiii). However, according to Goddard, the index of democracy produces a number of 
surprises in the world today. Goddard clearly differentiates between the practice of democracy 
and the country’s foreign policy. He illustrated this contrast by using two samples in the Gulf 
region. On the “Western” side of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is deeply oriented towards the “West” 
in its foreign policies. The Saudi government has firm military agreements with the US and is 
highly dependent on the American oil companies, but “it does not make any pretence of being 
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democratic, being governed essentially by the Sa’ud family without an even elected advisory 
body” (Goddard, 2002, p. 3). On the other side of the Gulf, Iran “despite its virulently anti-
Western rhetoric over the past 20 years […] with the often repeated descriptions of the United 
States as the ‘Great Satan’ and Britain and France as ‘little Satans’, is a functioning 
democracy” (Goddard, 2002, p. 3). Goddard believes that not only Iran does have formal 
elections, “it also has elections whose results are not known until the votes are counted!” 
(2002, p. 3). Based on these opposing views, “democracies can differ greatly in the degree to 
which they encourage consensus versus competition, shared power versus majoritarian rule, 
and public authority versus private action” (Diamond & Plattner, 2009, p. xiv). The levels of 
democracy also vary in different democratic regimes. This is primarily discussed in the context 
of Islam’s compatibility with democracy. Islam has always been understood as a monolithic 
religion in which the politics and religion are overlapping. The spirituality is defined at a public 
level to figure Islam’s original message as an ummah. Many thinkers believe that Islam is so 
tightly insulated with traditions that it contains no glimmer of hope to deal with a modern and 
complex challenge like democracy or human rights. However, as Goddard argues, “Islam and 
Islamic world in other words, are not the same, since the former involves certain ideals and 
aspirations, while the later represents concrete realities, and as with all ideals the Islamic world 
practices Islam to differing degrees” (Goddard, 2002, p. 3). In Iran, challenges have been over 
the belief that the Islamic traditions that predominate in Iranian political system inhibits the 
emergence of a democratic system. Obviously, in the case of Iran, most critics’ concern is not 
just Islam in general, rather it is the velayat-e faqih as a ruling system. This doctrine “allows 
the clergy to exercise a veto over all branches of government, to screen potential political 
candidates and to appoint the leader of the feared Revolutionary Guard, among other powers” 
(Marineau, n.d., p. 93). As the legitimacy of all political decisions depends upon the 
confirmation and authorization of the vali-ye faqih, then velayat-e faqih is argued as not 
compatible with democracy. Velayat-e faqih in Iran is simply one reading of Islam, hence, it 
seems quite essential to consider discussions of democracy within the Iranian system as one 
version of the ‘Islamic world’ not the only representative of the Islam. The argument continues 
to address the religious, social and cultural factors in Iranian system that can sustain or 
undermine democracy.  
The last part of this chapter analyses the ways through which Iran and the Islamic Shi’a 
culture in general are represented in the world media especially “Western”. This will shed light 
on Satrapi’s intentio auctoris in authoring her work. With the strategic significance of Iran for 
the “West” especially post the American hostage crisis, representations of Iran and the Islamic 
culture were not far from “certain xenophobic stereotypes of non-Western foreign subjects” 
(Fayyaz & Shirazi, 2013, p. 53). Regarding the history of the relationship of Iran with the US, 
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the basis of the scholarly inquiry has shown that “the link between press and policy is 
enormously complex and subtle” (Dorman & Farhang, 1987, p. 2). This does not necessarily 
mean that there is a cause and effect relations but rather, it suggests that “if the press does not 
make foreign or defence policy, in some important ways it helps set the boundaries within 
which policy can be made” (Dorman & Farhang, 1987, p. 2). It is argued that the interplay of 
the media and political powers is the reality behind the messages being transferred through 
media. This clarifies Satrapi’s critical position towards both the undemocratic structure of 
“Western” countries as well as her dissatisfaction with the journalists. While this position 
makes sense with reference to the orientalist representations of Iran, however, I try to show 
how some media have escaped the political influences and worked independently to a degree 
that they have harshly questioned those in power. An example of the Watergate affair and the 
case of John Pilger will clearly demonstrate the great respect towards an independent and free 
press. As identified in Satrapi’s objection, the standard for criticism of the media is relative 
through investigating the reports of old orientalist clichés which denigrates Iran as an inferior 
with propensity to extremism or as “anti-Western” incapable of making political relationships 
with the “Western” countries. This gives meaning to Satrapi’s intentio auctoris to write her 
work. This chapter will be closed by representations of Islamic rituals in post-revolutionary 
memoirs. It is argued that Satrapi and other’s representations have shown not much difference 
from those of the biased media. The orientalist or stereotypical representations of Islamic 
rituals in many biased media and memoirs can be attributed to the current political 
complexities. However, considering Satrapi’s position as a royal family individual whose 
lifestyle is different from that of the majority of Iranians, one should not expect her to support 
ideas or rules that limit her individual freedom and autonomy.    
History of religious leadership and political authority pre Islamic Revolution  
The relationship between religion and state in Iran is of great importance due to the 
locus of authority in Shi’ism which resides in the family of the Prophet, namely the Twelve 
infallible Imams. The doctrine of Imamate, as mentioned earlier, is the focal point around 
which the religious authority and political governance revolves. During the Occultation of the 
last Imam Al-Mahdi, the vacuum of leadership of the Islamic community is filled by jurists 
and olama who are considered as his indirect deputies in his absence. Shi’a political thought 
is extrapolated from a spectrum of beliefs in charismatic authority of the jurists. This spectrum 
ranges from complete deputyship and authority of the jurists to limited expounding Islamic 
matters. There has always been disagreement between olama regarding the scope of the 
political authority of jurists. The neglect of such debate could be to the detriment of 
understanding the theological basis for hierocracy state relationships in Iran as well as 
understanding the reasons behind the accusation of Islam setizi by Iranian officials.  
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The turning point in the history of religion-state relations is paying attention to early 
sixteenth century Safavids dynasty in Iran, which established Shi’ism as the formal state 
religion. Shi’ism in Iran started in 1501 by the Safavid dynasty.77 “The Safavids enforced 
adherence to Shi’ism as a matter of state policy… Shi’ism became deeply entrenched in the 
cultural, intellectual and political life of Iran” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 20).78 “Both activist and 
quietist attitudes to prevailing authority could be deduced from the Imami belief, but it is clear 
that the latter came gradually to dominate the mainstream of Shi’ism, leaving its trace also on 
the Safavid and post-Safavid Shi’ism” in Iran (Algar, 1969, p. 2). The most considerable 
contribution of the olama to the community was based on providing living directions based on 
the exemplary models and imitations, ijtihad. In this regard, the olama are the source of 
guidance for the community of believers and are considered as the intermediaries between the 
infallible Imam, divine source and the people. As following the guidance of Imam is the 
unquestionable duty of a Shi’a Muslim, at the time of his concealment, the institution of the 
mojtahid had the merit of providing the authority (not necessarily political) “for it implies a 
greater acquaintance with the religious law” (Algar, 1969, p. 9).79 Addressing the political 
realities by olama after the proclamation of Shi’ism by Shah Isma’il in 1501, “along with the 
Usuli school’s triumph over the Akhbari80 school, which allowed the former to expand the role 
of reason and rationality in religious discourse and expand their scope of authority, gradually 
culminated in Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e faqih” (Mavani, 2013, p. xi). 
Through exercising practical functions, the authority and position of olama developed towards 
the end of eighteenth century and the demise of Safavids. Contesting the legitimacy of the 
state never happened in Safavids, however, the Qajar period is marked by the olama having 
considered themselves as the regents of the Hidden Imam. Admittedly, they never questioned 
the legitimacy of the Qajar rulers but objected to their autocratic policies and their cooperation 
with the European imperial powers. During the period of mashrutiyyat or constitutionalism 
                                               
77 “Islam came to Iran in the eighth century, and the religious identity of Shiite Islam has dominated 
since it was established by the Safavids in the sixteenth century as the state religion” (Sreberny-
Mohammadi & Mohammadi (1994, p. 11).  
78 “From the sixteenth until the present century, Iranianism and Shi’ism blended for many people. 
Shi’ism was ‘neither a mere reflection of Iranian social relations nor its sole determinant’; rather, it 
became ‘inextricably interwoven within Iranian social relations.’”(Sedghi, 2007, p. 35). 
79 “Whereas one of the principles of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam is the consensus of the entire living 
community, in Shi’ism the consensus is restricted to the olama, both the living and the dead” (Algar, 
1969, p. 9).  
80 The Akhbari movement or the traditionalist “considered all binding norms to be explicitly contained 
in the 'Traditions' of the Prophet and the Twelve Imams, and which therefore denied the juristic authority 
of the doctors of religious jurisprudence (mojtahid) to deduce binding norms from the sources of the 
Sacred Law” (Arjomand, 2009, p. 46). The Usuli movement (rationalism) “was launched by Aqa 
Muhammad Baqir Bihbahani (1705-1803)” (Arjomand, 2009, p. 46) put an end to Akhbari movement 
and “became established as the sole authoritative method of Imamite jurisprudence, although the hadith-
related sciences continued to develop as required by al-ijtihad al shar’i” (Sachedina, 1988, p. 21). The 
latter school was the source of inspiration for many religious students during the Qajar period.  
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(1906-1911), some olama (and not all of them) only referred to restricting the Shah’s authority 
through shura and shari’ah.  
Rarely mentioned clearly, this contradiction was the main source of friction between 
olama and political power throughout the nineteenth century. In a number of events, the most 
important of which was the tobacco concession,81 the state effectively alienated itself from 
people. The repeal of the tobacco concession in 1892 was the prelude of the Constitutional 
Revolution and reiterated the opposition of a group of olama with the state – Many olama 
opposed the Constitutional Revolution and fully supported the Shah. The presence of olama 
gave new direction to the ruling status and domestic situation of Iran which was under the 
increasing involvement of foreign powers. Towards the end of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the Qajar dynasty in Iran started to disintegrate and 
collapse. Amir Kabir,82 prime minister of the Qajar Shah/ruler, was assassinated by the Shah 
because of his plans and reforms to make the country independent from foreign powers. In 
fact, he was the first person to stand against colonialism, the foreign political and economic 
invasions, whereas the king was highly dependent on Russia and Great Britain and had viewed 
his reign’s continuity in terms of foreign support. The Shah gave many different advantages 
to foreign merchants and thus limited the opportunities for domestic merchants, which made 
them vulnerable and unable to compete with numerous European merchants. This caused 
dissatisfaction among Iranians, olama and tradesmen. Many olama were especially displeased 
with the king and his policies for two main reasons. First, the Qajar dynasty granted a number 
of concessions to the Russian and British Empires, and second, they let foreigners dominate 
the political, economic and cultural system of Iran. It was the beginning of the dissatisfaction 
of religious and ordinary people with state politics. “The strong position of the ulema in Iranian 
society meant that when secular authority failed or was challenged, almost always the ulema 
(or at least some of them) emerged as leaders of political dissent” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 22).  
The political history of Iran has never lacked the presence of olama as representatives 
of religion. There has never been absolute separation between religion and politics in Iranian 
history even at the time of secular governors. In March 1891, the decree (fatwa)83 of Ayatollah 
                                               
81 In this monopoly, “all rights concerning the sale and distribution of tobacco inside Iran, and the export 
of all tobacco produced in Iran, were vested in the Imperial Tobacco Corporation, which in turn was to 
pay the Iranian government £15 million a year” (Algar, 1969, p. 206). 
82 Amir Kabir (1807-1852) was the chief minister of the Shah of Qajar dynasty and the most capable 
figure in modernizing Iran. See Daniel. E. L. (2012). The History of Iran. (2nd ed.). California, US: The 
Greenwood histories of the Modern Nations.  
83 “The tradition of issuing politically significant edicts or legal rulings (fatwas) has a long history in 
modern Shiite history. It extends back to the dramatic ‘Tobacco Protests’ instigated by the 1890 fatwa 
of Ayatollah Seyed Hassan Shirazi against the ‘Tobacco Concession’ granted by Naser al-Din Shah to 
the British Imperial Tobacco Company” (A. Sadri and M. Sadri, 2010, p. 173). 
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Mirzaye Shirazi84 cancelled the Tobacco concession granted to a British Major, Gerald Talbot. 
The Tobacco Regie was established in 1880 by Nasir al-Din Shah, Qajar king, with the British 
Empire. In this monopoly, all producers and owners of tobacco in Iran were forced to sell their 
products to agents of the Regie, who in turn could resell it at their own prices. This monopoly 
violated the working relations between producers and sellers and jeopardised the job security 
of a significant number of people in Iran. Since then, mass protests began to emerge in 
opposition to foreign domination under the supervision and support of olama to protect 
national interests. According to Keddie, the Tobacco movement was very significant in Iran 
because: “Iranians saw for the first time that it was possible to win out against the Shah and 
foreign interests […] there is a direct line from the coalition which participated in the tobacco 
movement […] culminating in the Constitutional Revolution” (Keddie, 1966, p. 131). By the 
end of June 1906, in the wake of the relentless efforts of olama and tradesmen, the Shah of 
Qajar was forced to issue the decree which created the first parliament in Iran. The 
Constitutional Revolution (1906) had actually limited the Shah’s despotic rule and corruption. 
In order to ensure that the principles of Islam were established and the laws conformed to 
Islamic norms, it was therefore officially enacted that at all times there should be at least five 
mojtahids presented at the committee to supervise the process of law-making. These religious 
scholars had the right to reject and repudiate any laws which were at variance with the Islamic 
shari’ah. According to the mashrutiyyat, the Shah would still be the ruler of the country but 
his powers would be limited by the people in the forms of the parliament and by Islamic law 
through the mojtahids. Thus, one must not forget that the relationship of religion with the state 
started in Iran many years before (i.e. Tobacco Regie) the Islamic Revolution. Tobacco 
concession united many olama and the nation against the state. Those olama that supported it 
played an important role in mobilising their followers but they were not the only agents and 
certainly not the only leaders of the nation. According to Algar, “throughout the century, 
objections not only to the state, but also to foreign aggression and encroachment, were voiced 
in Islamic rather than in nationalistic terms” (1969, p. 24). Towards the eve of Qajar rule and 
with the increasing opposition of the olama with the state, the background prepared for the 
demand of constitution. After obtaining the grant of constitution, with the condition of the 
systematic and dominant application of Islamic shari’ah, opposition of olama was renewed 
due to the incompatibility of the constitutional laws with Islam.  
                                               
84 Mirzaye Shirazi (1814-1896) was the highest Shi’a authority who played a major role against the 
Regie. See Amirahmadi, H. (2012). The Political economy of Iran under the Qajars. London, United 
Kingdom: I. B. Tauris.  
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Shaykh Fazl Allah Nuri (1842-1909)85 with Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba’i and Sayyid 
Abd Allah Bihbahani were the prominent mojtahids that supported the constitutional 
government. However, soon after its establishment, Shaykh Fazl Allah turned against the 
constitutionalists and declared that “the Islamicised constitution (mashruteh-ye mashru’ah) 
for which he had been fighting was different from that which came out of the Constitutional 
Revolution” (Ridgeon, 2005, p. 37). As Ridgeon states, “this conflict which led to a split 
amongst the leading olama and strengthened the tyrannical tendencies of the existing royal 
circle, can be rated as the first effective drawback the young Persian constitutional regime 
suffered” (2005, p. 38). The primary division among olama initiated with the Constitutional 
Revolution. In terms of legislative oversight (which later introduced in the constitution), those 
who were supporting the constitution believed that by designating at least five mojtahid in the 
parliament, the Islamic ordinances are guaranteed to be applied; while the anti-
constitutionalists considered the nature of constitution to be against Islam. As mentioned 
earlier, Shaykh Fazl Allah Nuri who was among the supporters of the constitutionalism 
withdrew from his activities, denying the validity of legislations as for example the freedom 
of press. He believed this freedom “is detrimental to Islam because it does not allow any 
punishment for malicious accusation (iftira), backbiting (ghaybat), slander, obsession, abusive 
language, insult, and the like” (Ridgeon, 2005, p. 40). Some anti-constitutionalist olama 
believed that the current constitutionalism is just an imitation of foreign policies, while some 
others thought that it is the Islamic application of rules that is problematic, and would cause 
other nations not recognising Iran as a constitutional state. At this stage, constitutionalism was 
more a tool in the hands of olama to limit the ruler’s power, and their role in this model was 
just supervisory “because they held that the messianic Imam’s concealment rendered all forms 
of government imperfect and thus could be construed as usurping his exclusive right to 
govern” (Mavani, 2013, p. 185).  
After the First World War, due to the unlimited political and economic influence of the 
Russian and British Empires, Iran had lost its political power and authority. The British Empire 
took advantage of Russia’s retreat from Iran and asked Iran to devolve the authority of the 
Persian Cossack Brigade to them. Among all Cossack officers, Reza Khan became a Brigadier 
General with the support of Britain. The Qajar emperor who was overthrown was Satrapi’s 
grandfather (2003, p. 22). Facing chaos and being on the verge of fragmentation, the Qajar 
dynasty was the centre of a political vacuum. As the only strong and functioning combatant, 
Reza Khan took the opportunity afforded by the British Empire and seized the capital in 1921. 
                                               
85 He was a prominent opponent of the constitutional movement closely aligned with the shah – he only 
reluctantly accepted the constitution and talked about mashruteh-ye mashru’ah to limit shura and ensure 
the overall oversight over legislation of the olama. 
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He removed the Qajar Shah, crowned himself and established the Pahlavi dynasty. Reza Khan 
largely succeeded in overcoming Iran’s interior and foreign threats with his strong army. He 
then decided to establish a republic to organise his plans for modernizing Iran.  His reforms 
met with clerical dissidence, especially from Ayatollah Moddares86 for one main reason. This 
reason was due to the previous experience regarding the establishment of such a republic in 
Turkey during the 1920s - for removing the religion from the everyday lives of people. A few 
days later, Reza Khan organised a meeting with religious scholars and olama to discuss the 
issues regarding their dissatisfaction about establishing a republic. He finally pleased them 
with his command to abolish the republic. With this step, Reza Khan enjoyed the olama’s 
support and satisfaction. He had also insisted that his relinquishment of his plans for a republic 
was due to his commitment to Islam and respecting the olama and strengthening the base of 
religiosity. The olama felt that a republican system is non-Islamic while a monarchy is more 
in line with Islam.  
Hegemony and authoritarianism were just one perspective of Reza Khan’s reign. The 
other perspective was his plans to modernize Iran. He started altering people’s lives with his 
preliminary actions to delete the Qajari epithets and force people to choose a surname for 
themselves. This was his first action to get rid of the rest of the ostensible traces of the Qajars 
and provide the background to his formal and socio-economic transformations. However, this 
was the starting point. Soon a specific and formal dress code became compulsory for members 
of government staff. After his return from Turkey, and under the influence of secularism and 
“Western” hegemony, Reza Khan ordained a change in dress code for all people - both men 
and women - throughout the country. In this programme, men were supposed to wear 
“Western” style hats and women to remove their hejab in public. As mentioned before, and in 
line with anti-Islamic movements, in view of the position of the hejab in religious beliefs and 
in the social life of people, the policy of kashf-e hejab was significantly showing Reza Khan’s 
bias towards “Westernization” and his dictatorship. In any case, this action faced resistance 
from the people, especially the olama. At the beginning of his reign, Reza Shah supported the 
olama to legitimize his rule. When his rejection of the constitutional laws was uncovered 
openly, pro-constitutionalist clergies started to oppose him. Among them, Ayatollah Seyyed 
Hasan Modarres (1870-1937) was the most prominent figure. He “tried to negotiate a 
settlement that left room for liberal government - but failed” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 37). Along 
with individual and public protests, the majority of people who considered such policies to be 
                                               
86 Ayatollah Seyyed Hasan Moddares (1870-1937) was the notable Shi’a cleric in supporting the Iranian 
Constitutional revolution and was martyred during the reign of Reza Pahlavi. See Abrahamian, E. 
(2008). A History of Modern Iran. New York, US: The Cambridge University Press.  
  
53 
 
in contradiction with their religious beliefs refused to accept it. In order to make them silent, 
the Shah ordered the massacre of the demonstrators.  
This issue was never underestimated by Ayatollah Khomeini who was very young at 
that time. In many cases, he used the opportunity to complain and reject the absolute authority 
and “Western” style government promoted by the Shah. Following a secular nationalist model, 
Reza Khan tried to secularise and modernize Iran by publicly and loudly blaming Islam and 
the olama for the country’s backwardness. After Reza Khan, Mohammad Reza continued on 
this line. In 1950, a constituent assembly was held on behalf of the Shah and franchised him 
the right to close down the parliament. In this assembly, the people had no role in choosing 
representatives or in changing existing legislation. Reza Shah installed a secular dictatorship 
which was different from the “Western” political system. In the “West”, there are liberal 
democracies which was not the system that Reza Shah implemented. So, he initiated socio-
cultural “Westernisation”87 but not really the establishment of a “Western” liberal democracy. 
Ayatollah Khomeini objected to a mere replication of the secular political system, and stressed 
the importance of a convergence between the olama and the people of Iran in order to defy the 
Shah’s dictatorship. In his period of political contention against the Pahlavis, he repeatedly 
referred to this system and condemned the Shah for breaking constitutional rules.88 Ayatollah 
Khomeini89 was the most prominent power in opposition to such policies. 
According to Mavani, “the phase of aspiring to establish an Islamic state begins with 
Ayatollah Khomeini outlining his theory of the jurist’s governance in 1953, expanding the 
jurist’s scope of power and authority to encompass direct involvement in political issues” 
(2013, p. 185). In fact, Khomeini’s reading of the Islamic government “arises from the 
historical development of the Shi’i clergy in Iran since the nineteenth century, during which 
they became socio-economically independent from state support and politically more self-
confident” (Scharbrodt, 2014, p. 382). Ayatollah Khomeini’s spiritual and mystical 
inclinations had important consequences such as denial of the political legitimacy to rulers like 
the Pahlavis. This is a radical departure from the views of olama in the past who objected to 
the policies of the Shahs or attempted to restrict their powers, but never questioned their 
                                               
87 “Members of the Iranian ruling class, specifically its shahs, were eager players in the technological 
modernization of their country; they were great admirers of “Western” gadgetry, quick to see its appeal 
and potential domestic use, especially as instruments of coercion and political control” (Sreberny-
Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 1994, p. 44).  
88 Ayatollah Khomeini’s objections to the constitutional laws of 1906 were mostly that it was not based 
upon Islam. In his Hokumat-e Eslami (1970), he frequently attacks the constitution of 1906 and 
declared: “what connections do the articles of the constitution…have with Islam?” (Khomeini in 
Mottahedeh, 1987, p. 380). 
89 Khomeini studied Islamic philosophy and erfan, mysticism, in hozeh. He had also special interests in 
contemporary politics. Some olama of his time were more conservative than him, and would rarely get 
involved in politics. According to Mottahedeh, mysticism and politics may appear strange to secular 
thought, but it definitely has a specific meaning in Shi’a Islam: 
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legitimacy. In his views, the political authority during the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam is 
upon the clerical body and it is their responsibility to form the Islamic government. The 
guardianship of a just and knowledgeable jurist cannot be realised if the Prophet had failed in 
appointing a successor who would execute the laws in the Islamic society after himself. 
Velayat-e faqih is thus not debated in other schools of Islam or other types of Shi’a doctrine 
“because it is only this school of Shi’i thought that maintains belief in the Hidden Imam who 
continues to guide his community through his generally designated deputies” (Sachedina, 
1988, p. 6). Expanding the discourse of the Usuli School, Ayatollah Khomeini represented a 
sharp distance from the Shi’i traditions as a quietist model. According to Algar, “for Khomeini, 
however, spirituality and mysticism have never implied social withdrawal or political 
quietism, but rather the building up of a fund of energy that finds its natural expression on the 
socio-political plane” (Algar as cited in Ridgeon, 2005, p. 197). Ayatollah Khomeini’s position 
as an arif (mystic) and the faqih (jurist) made him combine mysticism with juridical context 
and come to the concept of velayat-e motlaq of the clerical body. In this theory, a full-fledged 
political and social authority is given to a well-qualified jurist who is assuming the hidden 
Imam’s deputy and possessing the prerogative to rule. Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic 
government built upon the idea of the integration of religion and politics in Islam. According 
to Khomeini, the governance of the faqih, as the highest religious authority is the ideal form 
of government. 
The concept of velayat-e faqih was first promulgated in 1970 in Najaf, Iraq in a series 
of his lectures. According to Khomeini, the authority of a faqih in executing laws and 
establishing the government is the same as the authority of the Prophet and infallible Imams. 
However, this authority is not absolute in the sense that the faqih does not have authority over 
other foqaha.90 This absence of hierarchy left the space open for other foqaha to supervise and 
control the faqih in power and does not refer to a collective government by a group of foqaha. 
As Khomeini was aware of the controversial nature of his velayat-e faqih, he gave examples 
of those clerics whose fatwas were treated as a political ruling such as the fatwa of Mirzaye 
Shirazi regarding the prohibition of the consumption of tobacco. Nevertheless, the doctrine of 
velayat-e faqih has never been wholeheartedly embraced by all Shi’i olama or all Iranians, 
among them the post-revolutionary memoirists.    
                                               
90 Foqaha is the plural form of faqih. “Faqih is one learned in the principles and ordinances of Islamic 
law, or more generally, in all aspects of the faith” (Khomeini, 1970, p. 7). According to Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the faqih has the same authority as the Prophet and Imams in terms of function and authority 
(p. 34).  
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Velayat-e faqih: religious history 
After the Prophet Mohammad’s death (circa 632 CE),91 Islam entered a new era of crisis. 
There was disagreement between factions on who was to succeed the Prophet. A minority 
party (Ar. Shi’a)92 saw the legal successor in Muhammad’s son-in-law and cousin, Ali (Ar. 
ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib; c.ca 600-661 CE), who was allegedly appointed mawlā (Ar. master)93 in 
Ghadir-e Khom by the Prophet Muhammad himself.94 Despite Shi’as’ belief, the caliphate (Ar. 
khilāfa, “succession) began with Abu Bakr (573-634), a close companion of the Prophet and 
one of the first converts. Twenty-five years after the original dispute, Ali became the fourth 
caliph. But in 661, after Ali’s martyrdom, tensions continued. Shi’as believe that the line of 
leadership continued with the sons of Ali (Hasan and Hussain), who both are considered the 
Prophet’s direct progeny. However, the descendants of the third caliph, Othman (Ar. ʻUthmān 
ibn ʻAffān; 577-656) were hostile to this. In 680, Ali’s son Hossain (Al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī ibn 
Abī Ṭālib; 626-680) and all his male family members and friends were massacred in Karbala 
(present day Iraq) by the army of Yazid (647-683), the second caliph of the Umayyad 
Caliphate. He and his seventy-two companions were beheaded, and their bodies cut into 
pieces. His female family members and the children became captives. Ever since, Shi’as 
                                               
91 Unless otherwise indicated, in this thesis I will retain the Common Era (CE) designation and the 
Gregorian calendar associated to it.  
92 In Arabic language, Shi’a can be used in its general sense but also to indicate Shiites, the “party” of 
Ali. “The word shi’a (pl. shiya’ or ashya) and other derivative forms from the root word sh-y- appear 
in the Qur’an and the hadith literature with varied meanings and significations. Over time, it acquired a 
technical meaning in historical and sectarian works: those who supported Ali and believe that the 
Prophet had explicitly designated him as his temporal and spiritual successor. Its lexical meaning, 
namely, ‘group, party, sect, or faction,’ is evident in several Qur’anic verses, all but one or two of which 
have a negative connotation: ‘As for those who have divided their religion and broken up into factions 
[shiya- plural of shi’a], have nothing to do with them [O Prophet]’ (Q.6: 159), ‘We will seize out of 
each group [shi’a] those who were most disobedient toward the Lord of Mercy’ (Q. 19:69), ‘We sent 
messengers among the various communities [shiya] of old, but they mocked every single messenger 
that came to them’ (Q. 15:10); and ‘Pharaoh made himself high and mighty in the land and divided the 
people into different groups [shiya]’ (Q. 28:4). This term is also used in the sense of a partisan, follower, 
or supporter in: ‘and of his partisans [shi ‘ati-hi] was Abraham’ (Q. 37:83)” (Mavani, 2013, p. 35).   
93 “The Shi’is interpret this word as explicit evidence of Ali’s official designation as the prophet’s 
successor in both the political and religious spheres, and even more so, as Muhammad was commanded, 
according to the Shi’is, to designate him by Q. 5: 67” (Mavani, 2013, p. 2).  
94 There are a number of ahadith to prove the event of Ghadir-e Khom. For example, “Hadith Yawm 
ad-Dar (day of the prophet’s invitation to his kinsmen); Hadith Manzilah (The Prophet’s designation 
of Ali as his deputy in Medina during the Tabuk expedition); Ayat al-Wilayeh (Ali’s offering of a ring 
to a beggar and the subsequent revelation of a pertinent verse); Event of Ghadir Khumm; and Hadith 
ath-Thaqalayn. See Tafsir kabir, vol. 12, pp. 28,53 under Sureh al-Ma’idah, verses 55,67; Sirah ibn-
Hisham, vol. 4, p. 520; Tarikh Tabari, vol.2, pp. 319,322; Al-Ghadir, vols, 1-3; Califate of Imam Ali” 
(Algar in Khomeini, 1970, p. 15). “O Apostle! Deliver what has been revealed to you from your Lord; 
and if you do it not, then you have not delivered His message and Allah will protect you from the people, 
surely Allah will not guide the unbelieving people” (5:67). The most famous hadith regarding the event 
of Ghadir is in Tafsir Kabir which explains the history; After finishing the hajj, the prophet took Ali’s 
hand and said: “whoever whose mawla (master) I am, Ali is his master. O Allah love him who loves 
Ali and be the enemy of the enemy of Ali ; help him who helps Ali  and forsake him who forsakes Ali” 
See A Brief History of the Fourteen Infallibles (Tehran, Iran: WOFIS).    
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mourn the event as the essence of injustice, the victory of the oppressors over the righteous, 
of the strong over the weak, of the corrupt over the pious. The Caliph Yazid has become the 
archetype of all worldly wickedness, and Hossain the model for heroic self-sacrifice. Karbala 
gained the status of holy city for Shi’a Muslims, along with Najaf (present day Iraq, the tomb 
of Ali). “It is asserted that the proclivity or tendency toward the Shi’i world view and the 
definitive schism became crystallised only after the massacre of Hossain, […], an event that 
serves as a catalyst in the formulation of a unique Shi’i identity” (Mavani, 2013, p. 33).  
Twelve Imami Shi’a Muslims believe that the leadership of the omat-e Islami after the 
martyrdom of Imam Ali have been passed upon twelve Imams.95 The last Imam has been in 
Occultation (ghaybah) since 874 CE.96 The concept of Imamat in Shi’ism is key. Having been 
appointed by Allah by means of an uninterrupted chain that goes back to the Prophet 
Muhammad, the Imams do not merely possess political authority. They belong to the highest 
level of piety among believers:  
Imamate is instituted by divine installation (nasb); only Allah truly knows who 
possesses the qualities required to fulfil this duty, therefore only He is capable 
of appointing them. Shi’a considers Imamate, like Prophethood, to be a 
fundamental belief, and obedience to the authority of their Imam a religious 
obligation (Vaezi, 2004, p. 56). 
There are also several ayat in the Qur’an that apparently talk about the Imamat, the 
religious and political leadership of the omat-e Islami. Shi’as believe that the twelve Imams, 
Ali and his male progeny, are the rightful successor of the Prophet. They possess a high level 
of divine knowledge and are infallible (ma’sum), just like the Prophet. As direct descendants 
of the Prophet, children of Fatemeh and Ali are members of Ahlulbayt, the family of 
Mohammad. According to Shi’as, the twelve Imams are the only source of commentary and 
interpretation of the Qur’an.97 The term vali (guardian) is also a crucial one: “Allah is the 
guardian of those who believe” (2: 257). According to Vaezi,  
                                               
95 “In Imami theological circles the members of the Household of the Holy Prophet (pbuh) are referred 
to as The Fourteen Infallibles. Namely, the Prophet (pbuh) himself, his daughter Fatima (as), his son-
in-law Ali (as), then his grandson Hassan (as), and Hussein (as) and the nine descendants from Hussein 
(as): Ali b. Hussein (as), Muhammad b. Ali (as), Ja’far b. Muhammad (as), Musa b. Ja’far (as), Ali b. 
Musa (as), Muhammad b. Ali (as), Ali b. Muhammad (as), Hassan b. Ali (as), and the twelfth Imam 
known as al-Mahdi (ajfs)” (Nakshawani, 2014, p. 13).     
96 The Twelfth Imam of Shi’as was born in 869 CE. “Four years later, after the death of his father Al-
Askari, the Eleventh Imam, he was hidden from the authorities of the Abbasid caliphs as a precaution. 
His whereabouts were disclosed only to a very few of his followers. Four of his father’s close associates 
became successive mediators between the Imam and his followers until the year 941. This period has 
been considered by the Imamites as the first or the short occultation (Soghra) of the twelfth Imam” 
(Hossain, 1982, p. 9). “At the death of the four deputies no successor was named, and the Greater 
Occultation (ghaybat-i kobrah) began and continues to this day” (Algar in Khomeini, 1970, p. 19). See 
also Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in history by Nasr, S. H., Dabashi, H., & Nasr, A. V. R., 
(1989).   
97 The word Imam means ‘leader’, one who is followed by a group: “One day we shall call every group 
of people by their respective Imams” (17: 71). The title Imam, however, does not necessarily have a 
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When the term velayat is attributed to the Imams, it carries the implications of 
“mastership”, “sovereignty” and “lordship”. This is to indicate the authority of 
the Imam over the believers, who are subject to his guardianship. Imami 
theologians refer to the Qur’an (e.g. 5: 55) and the prophetic traditions to 
support the exclusive authority (velayat) of the Imams (Vaezi, 2004, p. 58). 
The central axis of Ethna-ashari Shi’a (twelve Imami political thought), as well as other 
Islamic schools of thought, is to believe in the absolute authority of Allah and his laws. The 
Prophet and the Twelve Imams are subject to divine appointment by God.98 In the absence of 
the twelfth guide, Imam Al-Mahdi, the Twelver Shi’a adopt a system of vicegerency. The 
religious and political authority of the omat-e Islami is entrusted to all olama in their entirety 
(as expressed in the notion of al-niyaba al-‘amma) – who are pious, just, capable and 
knowledgeable to continue the lines of Imams. The most knowledgeable jurist is called vali-
faqih, a scholar of shari’ah (jurisprudence). Therefore, velayat-e faqih refers to the authority 
of a faqih in the absence of the hidden Imam. In fact, Khomeini’s idea of velayat-e faqih is not 
new in Shi’a fiqh, but he significantly expanded the scope of velayat-e faqih in a direction not 
envisioned before. One needs to acknowledge that in spite of the opposition of some olama, 
many others have expressed favourable opinions. Among them, for example, Ayatollah 
Ahmad Naraqi (1829) holds similar views to Khomeini about the importance of olama in 
holding political power. He, (although had a very different understanding of the extent of the 
guardianship rights), tried to collect evidence from Shi’a ahadith and to prove that the 
guardianship rights were entrusted to the most knowledgeable and just jurist at the time of the 
Great Occultation.99 After Ayatollah Naraqi, Khomeini put much emphasis on guardianship 
of the faqih. His first reason for examining this issue from a political point of view was the 
manipulation and misinterpretation of Islam in the modern world by orientalists and 
imperialists. He, in this manner, denounced views that represent Islam as incapable to govern 
the society “at the age of industrial civilization” or suggesting that “legal provisions of Islam 
are inadequate to resolve the social problems, and to provide us with appropriate answers” 
(Khomeini, 1970, p. 4). Admittedly, Khomeini believed the imperialistic powers were trying 
to distort Islamic principles to achieve their own desires. In Ayatollah Khomeini’s view, Islam 
                                               
moral implication: “And we made them (but) Imams inviting to the fire; and on the Day of Judgment 
no help shall they find. In this world we continued to curse them; and on the Day of Judgment they will 
be among the hateful” (28: 41-42). The Qur’an has also mentioned those types of Imams who are 
appointed by Allah himself. “And we assigned from among them some Imams who guide by our 
authority since they were patient and believed firmly in our signs” (32:24). The word ‘Imam’ can be 
used as ‘vali’. Vali or velayat has several meanings such as “friend, supporter, devoted or protector” 
(Vaezi, 2004, p. 57). 
98 “Only God is your vali and his Apostle and those who believe. Who perform prayer and pay alms 
while they bow” (5:55). 
99  “In all instances, where the Prophet and the infallible Imams (a) had been authorised and assigned as 
guardians except in cases, where this had been excluded due to religiosity legal requirement. In all 
instances, related to religious and living duties of people that must be carried out” (Khomeini, 1970, p. 
4).  
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is the religion of anti-imperialism. The nature of Islam is based on freedom and independence, 
but imperialists, with various colonial measures (economic, cultural, etc.) are trying to control 
Muslim countries and exploit their resources. Orientalist views of Islam present Muslims as a 
homogeneous community blindly adopting few ritual norms (e.g. prayer) and concerned with 
gender segregation (e.g. the hejab). According to Khomeini, separation of Islam from politics 
is promoted by enemies of Islam to alienate Muslims from Islam and their own destiny 
(Khomeini, 1970, p. 5). With reference to ahadith and ordinances of Islam, just in a very few 
cases there is emphasis on individual duties of Muslims in front of their creator. These 
individual aspects of Islam have very little to do with the salvation of the nation. Since the 
political and social aspects of Islam determine the destiny of the nation, Khomeini’s idea of 
hokumat-e eslami is especially targeted at the faulty notion of separation of religion and 
politics. As mentioned in the introduction, it is clear that, Khomeini’s view is in sharp contrast 
to Satrapi’s individuality and the way she considers religion as a personal affair and promotes 
separation of religion from politics consequently.    
In Khomeini’s school of thought, faith and morality are true solutions to social problems 
and human miseries. Wealth and affluence alone cannot be applied in a society devoid of 
morality and spirituality. Islamic laws are to regulate the life of men and women in the modern 
world, and to provide eternal salvation. To this end, and to guarantee the application of Islamic 
laws in the labyrinth of society, a specific form of government is needed. In Shi’a Twelve 
Imami School, the Islamic community has never been abandoned without a qualified leader. 
The Prophet of Islam, before his death, designated Imam Ali to expound, legislate and enforce 
the Islamic laws. And so did his descendants. Therefore, there is no era in Islamic history that 
the omat has been lived without a leader (and the Islamic system of governance). In 
Khomeini’s political doctrine, all the affairs of a Muslim community must be in conformity 
with laws appointed by God, and a faithful leader with executive governmental institutions is 
needed. At the time of the Greater Occultation, in order for the Islamic ordinances to be fixed 
and not transformed or distorted or deformed, the existence of a powerful executive authority 
is important. As Khomeini puts it: “The Sacred Legislator of Islam is the sole legislative 
power. No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the 
Divine Legislator” (Khomeini, 1970, p. 29). It is incumbent on every Muslim to obey the laws. 
Muslims in an Islamic society are not just abiding by the social rules. They are performing 
their duty in front of God. The vicegerent of Allah does not have any duty but implementing 
the rules of God, and supervision over the correct implementation of them. The leader should 
be knowledgeable; not only with knowledge of religious matters, but also with knowledge of 
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jurisprudence and politics.100 In this regard, the foqaha101 are preferred to other olama or 
religious scholars. Khomeini believes the faqih has responsibility for the guardianship of the 
omat-e Islami, and keeping the unity of Islamic society falls within his responsibilities. 
Everything which is threatening the solidarity of this unique community must be 
annihilated.102  Naturally, there will be legal restraints and limitations in rules’ application that 
are defined by the government within the Islamic framework. 
There are some important issues that should not be neglected. First of all, the vali-ye 
faqih, regardless of his highest religious qualities, is not ma’sum. He is subject to making 
mistakes. Therefore, he is not necessarily chosen directly by the Hidden Imam.103 The highest 
political leadership, vali- ye faqih, is chosen through elections. Many Shi’a scholars believe 
velayat-e faqih is that the authority of vali leaves no space for the authority of people as in 
liberal democracy (e.g. the accusation of dictatorship by Satrapi against the Iranian officials). 
The authority of people in the Islamic government is accomplished through shura 
(consultation). The word ‘shura’ in Arabic means to consult or to ask for advice. The 
etymology of the Arabic word is shar ul-asal which literally means to extract honey from the 
hive. This implies that the person who is consulting others can get the best result at the end 
(Ghorshi, 1994, vol. 4, p. 88). In the Qur’an, shura is used with the same meaning. The Prophet 
of Islam and all the believers are recommended to consult each other on social and political 
affairs. For example in sureh Al-e-Imran, verse 159, it says: “and take counsel with them in 
the affair; so when you have decided, then place your trust in Allah; surely Allah loves those 
who trust” (3:159). From this ayeh, one can understand that shura has base in Islam - Islamic 
leaders have to consult other Muslims, by means of elected representatives, in administering 
the omat’s affairs. This ayeh was revealed in Medina after the formation of the Islamic state 
by the Prophet, and that is why it is said that consultation should be performed within the 
Islamic government (Ostadi, 1981, p. 7). From these textual references, public participation is 
known as significant and basic in Islamic government. Without considering the authority of 
                                               
100 According to Imam Ali, only the most knowledgeable person has the right to rule the omat-e Islami: 
“O men! The most qualified among men for the caliphate is he who is most capable and knowledgeable 
of Allah’s commands” (Imam Ali in Nahj al-balaqah, Sermon. 172). 
101 In another hadith, the Imam mentioned to the role of foqaha in the society as a fortress: “Believers 
who are foqaha are the fortresses of Islam” (Rizvi, 1978, vol. 1, p. 38). The meaning of this statement 
is that the foqaha “were the guardians of Islam, protecting its beliefs, ordinances and institutions in the 
most comprehensive manner” (Khomeini, 1970, p. 43). 
102 For example, adultery can cause corruption and loosen the ties of family life as the primary base of 
the society. Therefore, penal provisions need to be implemented to establish the Islamic order in the 
society. In this case, prohibition of adultery is more important than praying and fasting. The former is a 
social problem while the latter is an individual one. It is a Muslim’s duty to protect and preserve Islam. 
103 “The quality of ismat (divinely bestowed freedom from error and sin) only appertains to the prophet, 
his daughter and the twelve Imams” (Algar in Khomeini, 1970, p. 36). “It is worthy to mention that 
infallibility is an inseparable trait of those who propagate divine laws; yet, because infallibility is a 
prerequisite for prophets and Imams in their roles of propagating divine rules, it does not mean that 
others, who also propagate, are safeguarded from sins” (Amini & Qazvini, 1992, p. 79). 
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people, the Islamic government is not legitimised. Rashid al-Ghannouchi (b. 1941) in 
Participation in Non-Islamic Government in Liberal Islam defines the Islamic government as 
follows: 
The Islamic government is one in which: 1- supreme legislative authority is for 
the shari’a, which is the revealed law of Islam, which transcends all laws. 
Within this context, it is responsibility of scholars to deduce detailed laws and 
regulations to be used as guidelines by judges. The head of the Islamic state is 
the leader of the executive body entrusted with the responsibility of 
implementing such laws and regulations. 2-political power belongs to the 
community (ummah), which should adopt a form of ‘shura’ which is a system 
of mandatory consultation (1998, p. 91).  
As Ghannouchi states, participation in the political affairs of the Islamic government is 
a duty for all Muslims. Isolation and separation from politics has nothing to do with the Islamic 
shari’ah laws. It is incumbent on the vali to consult, and it is a responsibility shouldered by 
the public to take part in the state’s affairs. It is only through shura that the idea of dictatorship 
is prevented in the omat. This process of “power-sharing” can achieve many aims, such as: 
“development, social solidarity, civil liberties, human rights, political pluralism, independence 
of the judiciary, freedom of the press, or liberty for mosques or Islamic activities” (1998, p. 
92). Sadek Sulaiman (b. 1933) also compares the shura with basic elements of democracy. 
“Shura in Islam does not differ from democracy. Both shura and democracy arise from the 
central consideration that collective deliberation is more likely to lead to a fair and sound result 
for the social good than individual preference” (Sulaiman as cited in Vaezi, 2004, p. 174). 
Manifestation of shura in the Iranian political system is defined through the Parliament, 
Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts. The pro-Khomeinis, for example, state that 
velayat-e faqih does not deny the role of other foqaha, who are almost at the same level as the 
vali-ye faqih. They believe there is a democratic process for the vali to be chosen, i.e. through 
a body of elected foqaha who have been previously chosen by people. This group of foqaha 
is called the Majles-e Khobregan (Assembly of Experts).104 This group of jurists will supervise 
and control the faqih’s usage of power and authority. Therefore, he is not free of popular 
control to follow his own interests or abuse his authority.105  
                                               
104 “The Assembly of Experts is a clerical council responsible for electing the Supreme Leader of Iran. 
Though members are elected by popular vote, all candidates are subject to disqualification by the 
Council of Guardians…The Assembly of Experts convenes every six months to review the activities of 
the Supreme Leader in power and decide whether to further extend his term” (Alexander and Hoenig, 
2008, p. 18).  
105 The scope of the vali’s authority is supervised and controlled by a group of jurists. Ayatollah 
Khomeini in his Saheefeye Noor said: “I do not want to impose (my will) on my people, and Islam does 
not permit us to establish a dictatorship. We follow our nation’s votes and act according to their views. 
We have no right, God has not conferred such a right to us, and the Prophet (pbuh) never permitted us 
to impose our ideas upon Muslims” (Khomeini, 1982, vol. 10, p. 181). 
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Velayat-e faqih and its critics 
In theoretic analysis of velayat-e faqih, the critics could be categorised as follows. In 
the first place, some critical views compare Khomeini’s political thought with liberal 
democracy only, and conclude its incompatibility. This view denies the general base of 
religious democracy. Another category is those critics who consider velayat-e faqih from a 
religious point of view. This group refers to the evidences and reasons used to prove and 
establish velayat-e faqih and, hence rejects the religious base of it. Among this group, Mohsen 
Kadivar106 can be named. Kadivar as an Islamic reformist distinguishes between historical and 
real Islam. According to him, historical Islam includes elements of autocracy while ‘real’ 
Islam mandates democratic features. Being partly based on the historical notions of Islam, 
Kadivar believes that Khomeini’s velayat-e faqih is not compatible with democracy. In 
discussing the relationship between velayat-e faqih and democracy, Kadivar states that it is 
necessary to differentiate firstly between Islamic republicanism and velayat-e faqih. The 
former, it is argued, is a form and method of governance that can lead to or give rise to the 
latter. Therefore, the two concepts are not the same. What is currently running in Iran is an 
amalgamation of these two which means that all the organs of the government are performing 
their duties under the supervision of an appointed and full-fledged authorised vali-ye faqih. 
Secondly, based on the presumption that Islam is not incompatible with democracy. Kadivar 
states velayat-e faqih and Islam as a religion and system of beliefs are different. The 
implementation of velayat-e faqih as a system of governance does not have a base in Islamic 
jurisprudence according to Kadivar. In his opinion, Islam in itself does not contradict with 
democracy, rather if velayat-e faqih becomes the system of governance, then definitely, Islam 
is incompatible with democracy. Kadivar rejects the base of velayat-e faqih as lacking the 
proper Islamic foundation, while many other critics have disputed the scope of authority of the 
faqih. Most Shi’i maraje’ agreed on the deputyship of the Hidden Imam by foqaha. This 
deputyship is either motlaq (absolute) or nesbi (proportional). Those who believe in absolute 
authority of the faqih, give credence to the faqih’s authority in almost all areas attributable to 
the infallible Imams i.e. Naraqi, Khomeini and his followers. Others, however, consider 
limited political or social responsibility for the faqih. “Many Shi’ite clerics remained apolitical 
because they viewed politics as a profane and secular activity in conflict with their profession 
                                               
106 Mohsen Kadivar is a “philosopher, theologian, an Iranian dissident who has been in exile since 2008, 
and research professor of Islamic studies at Duke University (Durham, North Carolina, US). Born in 
1959, he studied at the Islamic seminary at Qom earning a certificate of ijtihad (highest degree in Islamic 
religious tradition). He received his PhD in Islamic Philosophy and Theology from Tarbiat Modares 
University in Tehran. Specializing in classical Islam and contemporary Islamic thought, his main 
intellectual interests and topics of publications include: classical Muslim philosophy, classical and 
modern Shi’a theology and legal theories, human rights and democracy in Islam, and political theology 
in post-revolutionary Iran” (En.kadivar.com, 2011). 
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and mission in life” (Semati, 2008, p. 208). Therefore, velayat-e faqih cannot be accepted as 
the only authoritative model.107  
The meaning of guardianship is literally different from solely representing the public. 
Guardianship or velayat receives detailed treatment for the critics of velayat-e faqih. The 19th 
century scholar, Sheikh Morteza Ansari (1781-1864) developed the theory of velayat-e faqih 
but did not extend the guardianship of the faqih to political leadership (Sachedina, 1988, pp. 
218-229). According to Ansari (19th century scholar who is not directly responding to 
Khomeini), the discretionary authority of the faqih to possess the properties of the people and 
to manage the public and political affairs of the Muslims, in the same way as the Prophet and 
the Imams, is not proved within Islamic references. Ansari stated that such a right cannot exist 
for anyone. “The Qur’an states that the Prophet has more right (awla) over believers than they 
have over themselves (33: 6)” (Sachedina, 1988, p. 215). This form of velayat is invested in 
the infallibles only, according to Ansari and with reference to Islamic sources.  
The most heated debate on the velayat-e faqih among foqaha revolves around the extent 
of the authority of vali, the fully competent jurist. For example, Abol-Qasem Khoei (1899-
1992), an influential marja’, “rejected Khomeini’s arguments on the basis that he had 
exaggerated the significance in faqih of the concept of velayat, which (according to Khoei) 
was properly confined to the guardianship of widows and orphans” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 140). 
After Khoei, one of his most prominent students who is considered as his successor also, 
Ayatollah Seyed Ali Hosseini Sistani in Najaf, continued to reject Khomeini’s school of 
velayat-e faqih. Ayatollah Sistani believes that “if a faqih (jurisconsult) wants to possess 
wilaya in the state’s administration, he must secure the people’s general approval (maqbuliyya 
‘amma)” (Mavani, 2013, p. 197). According to Sistani, Khomeini was in a higher religious 
position than Khamenei (the current vali-ye faqih). He was qualified for being a marja’ for 
Shi’as while the latter is not ranked among sources of emulation. Sistani’s views have been 
challenged by some contemporary olama in Iran. They argue that every single Shi’a including 
the maraj-e taqlid must obey the vali-ye faqih. Among the pro-government jurists, Ayatollah 
Muhammad Taqi Mebah Yazdi, the director of the research institute of Imam Khomeini, 
strongly believes that the supreme faqih is the Imam’s deputy and should be viewed as him, 
namely infallible. According to Mesbah Yazdi, the public approval is not needed to verify the 
                                               
107 “Other paradigms exist, such as those presented by Ayatollahs Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (d.1980), 
Muhammad Hossain Fadlallah (d. 2010), Hosein Ali Montazeri (d. 2010), Salehi Najafabadi (d. 2006), 
Muhammad Mahdi Shamsuddin (d. 2001), Mehdi Haeri Yazdi (d. 1999), Mohsen Kadivar, Muhammad 
Mojtahed Shabestani, Muhaqqiq Damad, Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush, and other eminent Shi’i jurists and 
scholars. All of them merit serious consideration due to their nuanced understanding of the range of 
opinions on this issue and for playing a pioneering role in proposing different political paradigms which 
constitute an integral part of the Shi’i political thought” (Mavani, 2013, p. xi). 
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validation of Imam’s post. The deputy of Imam is not presented to the public to attain their 
endorsement. The faqih receives his legitimacy from God through the messianic Imam. 
Obeying his authority is an unconditional duty.108 This point of view opposes the general 
meaning of democracy which includes elections by people. According to Kadivar, in such a 
system the instalment or dismissal of the vali-ye faqih is a divine act and therefore beyond the 
capacity of the general public. Also, in this situation, the supreme leader is not counted for his 
actions as he is only accountable in front of God. This absolute authority is contradictory to 
the notions of democracy. On this basis, it can be argued that there is no distribution of power 
in the political system of Khomeini and decisions that affect the society do not necessarily 
gather consensus. According to Schmitter and Karl, “democracy is in jeopardy of military 
officers, entrenched civil servants, or state managers retain the capacity to act independently 
of elected civilians or even veto decisions made by the people’s representatives” (2009, p. 9). 
It so appears that in the system of velayat-e faqih, the legitimacy of almost all public decisions 
is depending upon the decision and views of the supreme leader. 
Among the critics of Khomeini, Hossein Ali Montazeri’s109 interpretation of the Shi’i 
scholarship is quite different. Montazeri believes that the Islamic ruler should have the public 
support and endorsement in a form of a social contract. “The end result is something called 
the ‘electoral and limited guardianship of the jurist’ (velayat-e entekhabi-ye moqayyade-ye 
faqih)” (Mavani, 2013, p. 154). In this model, he used verses of the Qur’an and different 
ahadith to justify the validity of velayat-e faqih and asserted that the jurisconsult is not only 
chosen by the people “but rather selected on account of his proficiency and expertise in 
temporal and religious matters” (Mavani, 2013, p. 154). Based on this view, the jurisconsult’s 
legitimacy is originating from the holy sources, however, it is necessary for the jurist to have 
the support and endorsement of the people. In his post-revolution writings, Montazeri 
“expanded the jurist’s scope of power and eliminated the plurality of authority in government. 
He accomplished this by invoking the principle of public allegiance to thwart any dissent or 
disagreement by the other jurists” (Mavani, 2013, p. 155). At the time of Khomeini, Montazeri 
                                               
108 Mohsen Kadivar summarises the faqih’s domain of power: “The citizenry—having been placed in 
care of the supreme leader—has no say in the appointment or dismissal of the waliy al-amr, and no 
authority to oversee his conduct of wilayat, or his personal conduct (that of the waliy al-amr, or supreme 
leader). Opinion of the supreme leader constitutes the measure of proper decisions regarding public 
domain. It is expected of the public to conform to, and coordinate with the views of the supreme leader—
not the other way around. All public domain functions derive their legitimacy through their attribution 
to the supreme leader. The most important religious duty of the people toward the supreme leader is to 
accept his verdicts, obey his edicts and help him succeed. Wilayat is obligatory—not elective. It is 
permanent, and life-long—not transitory. And it is binding on all human beings, without any exception 
or condition” (Kadivar, 2011). 
109 Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri (1922- 2009) was a Shi’a theologian who was critical of the Iranian 
domestic and foreign policies. He was a leading critique of velayat-e faqih and dissident to 
Ahmadinejad. 
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lost his status for expressing his disagreement on administrating the state affairs. Later on, he 
rebuked Ayatollah Khamena’i on his scholarly position and mentioned his junior position in 
comparison to Khomeini. He also called upon a number of other jurists to speak out against 
the injustices of the state. Emphasising the idea of people’s participation in confirming the 
status of vali-ye faqih, Montazeri made the case of Imam Ali who sought public allegiance to 
question the full-fledged authority of the faqih advocated by Khomeini. In other words, what 
mostly concerned Montazeri, was the election process of vali-ye faqih which lacks the popular 
sovereignty. This concern has been analysed by conservative arguments of velayat-e faqih by 
Vaezi with precision and astuteness under the rubric public sovereignty and shura in Islamic 
state.110 Montazeri’s concerns has been shared by other scholars such as Mohsen Kadivar or 
lesser known one such as Mohammad Mehdi Shamsuddin, Mehdi Haeri Yazdi or Abdolkarim 
Soroush.  
Embedded in the complex multi-confessional context of Lebanon, Shamsuddin 
rejects Khomeini’s concept of the guardianship of the jurisconsult (wilāyat al-
faqīh) and develops the notion of wilāyat al-umma ʿalā nafsiha (the 
guardianship of the people over themselves): in the time of the occultation of 
the Imam, authority and sovereignty rest with the people and not with the 
jurisconsult as deputy of the Imam. (Scharbrodt, 2014, pp. 381-82) 
Quite similar to Shamsuddin, Haeri Yazdi and Kadivar who were both trained in 
“Western” universities and Islamic seminaries, approached the issue of governance not only 
from a jurisprudential (fiqhi) but from a philosophical and historical perspective. According 
to Haeri, administrating the state’s affairs “falls under the rubric of practical and universal 
intelligence, wisdom, and experience, and, as such, has no relationship with one’s mastery of 
jurisprudence” (Mavani, 2013, p. 169). “Haeri Yazdi argues that the political roles and offices 
the Prophet and Imams assumed, were subject to public endorsement and ‘not linked to their 
primary mission, but rather coincidental’” (Scharbrodt, 2014, p. 382).  
Almost all of these scholars argued the public role in government structure through 
election and consultation. Praising certain characteristics of democratic principles, the above 
mentioned scholars believe that there is space for democracy in Islam, however, the velayat-e 
faqih as applied currently in Iran does not sanction democracy. According to Marineau, “many 
contemporary thinkers in Iran are attempting to reconcile a religious-informed vision of 
government with the modern forms of democracy, rather than simply eschewing the former 
                                               
110 “According to article 107, a group of elected experts (a few jurists are elected by people every seven 
years) shall elect a well-qualified faqih as the political leader. Both the authority of shari’ah (velayat -
e faqih) and the sovereignty of the people in this political regime make it a mixture of democracy and 
guardianship. Hence it should be categorised as a ‘meritocracy’, because it does not go hand in hand 
with all the standards of guardianship. What distinguishes this model of ‘meritocracy’ from 
guardianship is the role of the people in participating in the distribution of political power and in shaping 
political decisions through their representatives” (Vaezi, 2004, p. 131). 
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for the latter” (n.d., p. 93). “Since its inception in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been 
the stage for continuous struggle over defining the legal limits and boundaries of freedom, and 
its Islamic justification” (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2000, p. 34). Being governed under the Islamic 
principles for more than 30 years, Mehran Kamrava claims that Iran “is in the midst of a silent 
revolution of ideas, which is occurring at a unique juncture in Iran’s history” (2008, p. 7). 
All Shi’i olama in their entirety exercise collective deputyship (al-niyaba al-‘amma) of 
the Imam in Occultation. However, what most of them disagree with is the scope of this 
authority. Opposite to the comprehensive authority advocated by Khomeini, hisbiyya affairs 
are considered as the domain of power for the deputy of Imam. This includes “issuing legal 
opinions on juridical issues, implementing the penal code (hudud) and discretionary penalties 
(ta‘zir), inviting people to righteousness and discouraging them from committing abominable 
acts, instituting congregational prayers (especially the Friday prayer), supervising 
endowments and collecting religious dues” (Mavani, 2013, p. 14). Furthermore, limited 
authority over the unclaimed properties and orphans and endowments also fall within faqih’s 
responsibility. This limited authority has been critically interrogated by Khomeini. He thus 
considered a more in-depth role for the jurisconsult for the leadership of the public at the time 
of Occultation. In short, Khomeini’s definition of the authority of faqih is “an extension of that 
enjoyed by the infallible Imams” (Mavani, 2013, p. 180).111 With this proclamation, 
governmental ordinances are given priority to other religious injunctions. According to 
Khomeini, the government “is part of the absolute deputyship of the Prophet, is one of the 
primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all other secondary injunctions, even 
prayers, fasting and hajj” (Khomeini, 1981, pp. 82-3). Therefore, it is a divine duty to preserve 
the Islamic government and its non-performance is considered as a sin.  Based on Khomeini’s 
interpretation of divine duties for citizens, Satrapi’s banishment from her country -after 
publishing her work which was read as anti-Iranian by the Islamic Republic- is explicated. 
Satrapi’s work can be compared to Satanic Verses (1988) by Salman Rushdie. Accusation of 
Islam setizi, setting a battle against Islam, is similar to Rushdie’ case. Satrapi and Rushdie’s 
case is similar and different. They were received differently around the world. Some believe 
the ruling was against freedom of speech, whereas some agree with Khomeini that Rushdie’s 
work was an insult to the Prophet, the Qur’an and all omat-e Islami. According to Iranian 
officials, the command of apostasy, hokm-e ertedad, is a political order in Islam. This means 
                                               
111 According to Khomeini, “God has conferred upon government in the present age the same powers 
and authority that were held by the Most Noble Messenger and the Imams with respect to equipping 
and mobilizing armies, appointing governors and officials, and levying taxes and expending them for 
the welfare of the Muslims” (as cited in Mavani, 2013, p. 181). 
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that the apostate starts a battle purposefully against Islam. As Rafsanjani112, the former 
president of Iran (1989-1997) said, Rushdie’s insult against the Prophet of Islam and the 
Qur’an was “not an action by an individual or something stemming from taste, but a collective 
and extensive effort to instigate a cultural confrontation with Islam” (Pipes, 2009, p. 128). 
Quite similar to accusations of orientalism against Persepolis, an Iranian newspaper said about 
the Satanic Verses that it was “an attempt to spread a false picture of Islam in order to restrict 
the spread of Islam” (Pipes, 2009, p. 129). As Pipes reports from Iranian officials, “the book 
and its publishers were only a link in the chain of the new anti-Islamic cultural ploys” (2009, 
p. 129). According to Orientalist critics, it can be argued about Persepolis, that Satrapi’s 
attempt in envisaging her love towards her country is a way of denigrating Islam and the 
Islamic culture of Iran by comparing the compulsory dress code, lack of individuality, gender 
inequality and inability with the “Western” cultural norms and values. The critics and Iranian 
officials, of course, have warned us with the orientalist discourse inherent in Satrapi’s critique 
despite her intentio auctoris.  
Democracy and Islam: a disarticulation? 
In what follows, the argument deploys a double investigation of the genealogy of the 
idea of democracy in general and the manner in which it has functioned and been understood 
in post-revolutionary Iran. This will serve two purposes in developing the argument. First, and 
minimally, is investigating Satrapi’s concerns over the term ‘democracy’ as “illusion” in both 
the Islamic Republic and the “West”. In doing so, some demonstrable understanding of the 
roots of democracy is necessary. Second, it is essential that a discussion be mounted regarding 
the relationship between human rights and democracy within the Iranian context. This is to 
consider Satrapi’s position as a liberal and progressive figure in promoting individuality in the 
religious communal system of Iran.  
 As discussed earlier, one should differentiate between the concept of Islam and the 
Islamic world. According to Wilfred Cantwell, Islam in itself does not exist. “In a sense this 
is obvious. There is indeed nothing called ‘Islam’ which can speak for itself; there are only 
‘Muslims’, practitioners of Islam, who attempt to speak for it” (Cantwell as cited in Goddard, 
2002, p. 4). On the same basis, there is nothing that can be called ‘democracy’. It is, rather, 
the ideas and opinions of different theorists and practitioners that give meaning to democracy. 
                                               
112 Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (b. 1934) was the fourth Iranian president, in office from 1989 to 1997. 
He announced his candidacy for the 2013 election but was disqualified by the Guardian Council. He is 
accused of supporting the Green Movement (Mohammadi, 2013). Seyyed Mohammad Khatami (b. 
1943) was the fifth president of Iran from 1997 to 2005. He was famous for his reformist politics and 
Dialogue Among Civilizations. He announced that he would be a candidate for the 2009 election but 
withdrew from the race in favour of Mousavi. He is also accused of supporting the Green Movement 
(BBC News, 2009). 
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In many parts of the world, when democracy is posed, the issues of individual autonomy and 
human rights are coming to mind. In many “Western” European countries or in the United 
States of America, there is no such a thing as total submission to the wills of the government. 
There is a strong relationship between democracy and individual liberty. The natural or basic 
human rights are well protected in “Western” cultural heritage. Outside this circle and 
especially in societies where religion plays a significant role, there is no such a thing as 
individual liberty in the way it is defined in a “Western” context. Therefore, it would be wrong 
to consider democracy or human rights as promoting individuality or as universal values. 
 Amartya Sen believes “a country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy; rather, 
it has to become fit through democracy” (Sen as cited in Diamond & Plattner, 2009, p. xxvii). 
Apparently, there are some considerations which would merit democracy as a universal 
value113. For example, democracy “has instrumental value in enabling people to express their 
needs and claims. And democracy has ‘constructive importance’ in helping society ‘to form 
its values and priorities’” (Diamond & Plattner, 2009, p. xxvii). However, assuming that there 
should be an agreement on the essence of democracy at a global level, is wrong. The 
phenomenon of multiculturalism in postmodern societies makes it difficult for democracy to 
have a fixed universal foundation. The claim that the values of democracy are universal arises 
from the fact that “the Western liberal democracies have been so effective in exporting-or 
imposing- their own values” (Blaug and Schwarzmantel, 2001, p. 3). Looking at democracy 
as a product of a particular civilisation with no validity for other cultures creates scepticism 
when encountering the debate over cultural relativism. The genealogy of the word 
‘democracy’ suggests respecting differences and maximising the interactions. No universally 
fixed values are recognisable in relations with democracy. The political conflicts within a 
democracy are inevitable. Based on the preference of collective or individual needs, 
democracies can be ranged from liberal to social. Circumscribing or extending the public realm 
are two extremes of this spectrum. Both cases are considered as democratic but differently. If 
it carries to one side, it can destroy the legitimate authority. Based on this idea, there are many 
different types of democracy with various effects. The case of the Islamic Republic in Iran 
with its social orientations can still be considered in the range of democracies although, this 
might not be in line with Satrapi’s more liberal orientations in the structure of democracy. The 
complex nature of democracy, quite opposite to Satrapi’s views, suggests that it is impossible 
                                               
113 Notwithstanding the problems that democracies have in establishing themselves as universal, they 
are sharing some general characteristic. Schmitter and Karl state that, “what distinguishes democratic 
rules from non-democratic ones are the norms that condition how the former come to power and the 
practices that hold them accountable for their actions” (Schmitter and Karl, 2009, p. 5). Sen states that 
“democracy has a universal role to play in preventing the abuse of power, and in helping people to 
formulate and understand their own needs, rights and duties” (Sen as cited in Blaug and Schwarzmantel, 
2001, p. 5). 
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to create universal ideals and that this complexity needs proper argumentation or justification 
in a different culturally religious system, i.e. the velayat-e faqih in the Islamic Republic.  
Moreover, Satrapi’s message in regarding democracy as an “illusion” is similar to her 
rejection of being a feminist. She seems to have more inclinations towards the inclusive and 
pluralistic understanding of feminism. Accordingly, one can argue that her criticism towards 
democracy has roots in her belief in the global concept of democracy, the base of which is 
respect for liberal and individual set of rights. According to Blaug and Schwarzmantel, 
“invocations of ‘We the people’ can lead to ideas of ‘organic democracy’, in which the people 
are defined as a unitary bloc in terms of opposition to an ‘Other’, which comprises minorities 
of an ethnic or racial or political kind” (2001, p. 2). This, once again, is in line with Satrapi’s 
intentio auctoris.  
The most common definition of democracy equates with considering fair and free 
elections in which a substantial body of qualified adults can take part. Also “during the 
intervals between elections, citizens can seek to influence public policy through a wide variety 
of other intermediaries: interest associations, social movements, locality groupings, 
clientelistic arrangements, and so forth” (Schmitter and Karl, 2009, p. 6). Another commonly 
accepted feature of democracy that can be associated with universality is the majority rule. 
According to Schmitter and Karl, any government that manages to make “decisions by 
combining the votes of more than half of those eligible and present is said to be democratic, 
whether that majority emerges within an electorate, a parliament, a committee, a city council, 
or a party caucus” (2009, p. 6). Thirdly, democracies should also have some space for 
cooperation between different authorities, parties, movements and policies. In contemporary 
political discourse, the idea of cooperation can go hand in hand with the idea of civil society. 
Civil society, according to Schmitter and Karl, is “an intermediate layer of governance 
between the individual and the state that is capable of resolving conflicts and controlling the 
behaviour of members without public coercion” (2009, pp. 7-8). The final central feature of 
democracy is either directly or indirectly elected representatives. The representatives are 
usually members of political elites and professionals who do significant works in modern 
democracies and fill state key offices. It is argued that without them, democracies can easily 
fail. The question here, regarding the ruler of the society, is the process through which these 
elites are chosen and the ways based on which they hold accountable for their actions. 
Although Satrapi did not talk in details about democracy, in my opinion, her views are mostly 
oriented towards an intermediate relation between the state and civil society among other 
features of democracy. The Islamic Republic, in many critic’s views, falls within democracies 
with fledgling civil societies. This might be due to the fact that Iran does not have universal 
suffrage based on the four features of democracy discussed above. These features are only 
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general and can differ to a considerable degree in different institutions. This is confirmed by 
Blaug and Schwarzmantel “if democracy is far from straightforward in its theory, if the 
historical trajectory of democratic politics leaves large questions which have not been and 
cannot be finally resolves, the same is true of the problem of practice” (2001, p. 6). In order 
for a democracy to exist in practice, the polities should move away from autocracy. This 
movement could be a mixture of different elements and procedures that are differently 
democratic. For example, in the process of ultimate decision making, the state can make 
substantive decision, which the general public may not agree with (e.g. compulsory hejab in 
Iran). As individuals or different parties are supposed to be equally active in political actions, 
their special preferences might not be taken or acted upon by the rulers. In other words, the 
public favourite course of action might be in sharp contrast with that of the state. Also, the 
political process might not be based on the autonomy of individuals (e.g. lack of individuality 
in Iran), and may be decided on the state’s considering the national interest or some other 
official reasoning. Finally, the chief executive body may not be directly chosen by citizenry, 
e.g. election of vali-ye faqih. While each of the above features can be considered as an element 
in making democracy happen, they should not be seen as “standards for evaluating the 
performance of particular regimes” (Schmitter and Karl, 2009, p. 12). It would also be wrong 
to conclude them as part of the generic meaning of democracy. Consequently, the compulsory 
hejab or lack of individuality can be considered as a form of democracy, while many like 
Satrapi strongly disagrees with. Different ideologies about democracy might make it easier to 
apply and approach, but they are not necessarily prerequisites to make it possible.  
In what follows, I intend to discuss the connotations of the word ‘democracy’ in the 
Islamic context. The context of this debate is Khomeini’s conviction that the relationship 
between democracy as a “Western” product and Islam is that of antagonism. As the Islamic 
Republic has been historically against the United States and many other European countries, 
considering them as the Great or Little Satans, this antagonism marks opposition to 
democracy. My discussion regarding the compatibility of Islam with democracy would benefit 
from considering different perspectives of scholars and thinkers in the Muslim world. As 
mentioned earlier, the Islamic world is different from “real” Islam. It is ‘Muslims’ that give 
meaning to Islam. Geaves describes the concept of “real Islam” as a kind of “ideal” society 
manifested at the time of the Prophet of Islam in Medina. “Muslim societies since that period 
can be seen to represent the ‘real’: pragmatic attempts that are usually perceived as falling 
short of the Qur’an’s vision of community” (2005, p. 76). However, with the belief that Islam 
is perfectly practical at any time, the “real” and “ideal” is still obtainable “despite the 
differences over where the ideal can be found” (Geaves, 2005, p. 76).  
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Not all Muslims speak the same language and share the same ideology regarding 
democracy. To many like Ali Benhaj, Sayyid Qutb or Abul-A’la Mawdudi, democracy equals 
unbelief (kofr) and is diametrically incompatible with Islam. On the other hand, Mahmud al-
Aqqad, Mohsin Kadivar, Abdolkarim Soroush or Bassam Tibi, believe that democracy is 
essential to Islam. Bernard Lewis in his Islam in History argues that, democracy is outside the 
Muslim world (1993, ch. 26). Samuel P. Huntington believes that “Western” culture is tied 
with the separation of religion from state which is a foreign concept in Islam. Believing in 
binary discussions of “East” and “West”, Huntington sees Islam and not just Islamic 
fundamentalism as the main problem of “West”. “He asks rhetorically, ‘Where does Europe 
end? And answers, ‘Where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin.’” 
(Huntington as cited in Stepan, 2009, p. 118). For Huntington, other religious civilisations in 
the world “lack the unique bundle of cultural characteristics necessary to support Western-
style democracy” (as cited in Stepan, 2009, p. 118). The same Manichean ideology exists 
among some Muslim scholars. Qutb (1906-66) states that “after the decay of democracy, to 
the extent of bankruptcy, the West has nothing to give to humanity… the leadership of Western 
man has vanished… it is time to take over and lead” (as cited in Goddard, 2002, p. 4). Both 
Qutb and Khomeini focus on the meaning of democracy as the sovereignty of people, a 
foundation which diametrically opposes the sovereignty of God (hokumat-e Allah bar 
mardom) in Islamic philosophy.114 In Qutb’s view, the authentic Islamic society is the one 
ruled by Allah not by the people. The human being is incapable of governing himself. This is 
the meaning of theocracy. Khomeini also believes,  
Islamic government is a government of law. In this form of government, 
sovereignty belongs to God alone and law is His decree and command. The law 
of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the 
Islamic government. Everyone, including the Most Noble Messenger (s) and his 
successors, is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity—the law that has 
been revealed by God, Almighty and Exalted, and expounded by the tongue of 
the Qur’an and the Most Noble Messenger (s). If the Prophet (s) assumed the 
task of divine vicegerency upon earth, it was in accordance with divine 
command. God, Almighty and Exalted, appointed him as His vicegerent, “the 
vicegerent of God upon earth”; he did not establish a government on his own 
initiative in order to be leader of the Muslims. (1970, p. 29). 
 Overall, the position identified by Qutb and Khomeini is an issue for Islamic states. 
They identified that the foundational law is shari’ah in an Islamic state- therefore the 
government interprets shari’ah into legal codes but it does not create new laws not based on 
                                               
114 According to Mehdi Bazargan “God who, by definition, is omniscient, omnipotent, sovereign, and 
aware of the good and evil is better qualified to judge what is proper for human beings than human 
beings themselves. Does this belief leave any other option for believers than unconditional surrender to 
God’s will?... you realize that this doctrine leaves no room for the freedom and will of the people to 
administer their own affairs and to question- much less reject- the representatives of God who claim 
immunity from error as successors to the prophet” (1998, pp. 74-5).  
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Islamic law- this is different governing process than in “Western” democracies where 
government is the law-maker. Some critics describe this as returning to traditional ideas and 
as a failure to go along with the modernisation process and the development of technology 
relevant in the world today. In a newly reformed message, Mawdudi argues that “a purified 
Islam needed to be practiced within the confines of an Islamic state which would provide the 
correct ideological framework for the nation to address modernisation” (Geaves, 2005, p. 90). 
In this way, Mawdudi ascribes sovereignty to God to govern human affairs. In Goddard’s 
view, what Qutb or Khomeini believe in “has not prevented the widespread use of the term 
today in the sense of a society which either claims or aspires to be governed according to the 
will of God” (2002, p. 5). However, Goddard argues that the sovereignty of God as advocated 
by Khomeini or others is not mentioned in the Qur’an or ahadith or the Sunnah of the Prophet. 
“It is in fact a modern phrase which is essentially a reaction to secularism as an ideology, and 
it is the latter which Qutb is essentially rejecting” (2002, p. 5). According to Geaves, 
“secularism, nationalism and Western models of democracy are all based on the 
Enlightenment ideal of the sovereignty of the people” (2005, p. 91). This is also true about 
Khomeini with reference to his “anti-Western” and anti-imperialist ideology regarding the 
“West”. In Khomeini’s views, Islam has a sworn enemy, namely the “West”. For Khomeini, 
the “Western” powers are “imperialists,115 the oppressive and treacherous rulers, the Jews, 
Christians, and materialists [who] are all attempting to distort the truths of Islam and lead the 
Muslims astray” (Khomeini, 1970, p. 78). This rejection of democracy is much related to its 
attribution to the “Western” context, and thus incidental to assuming that the “separation of 
church and state and secularism are core features not only of Western democracy, but of 
democracy itself” (Stepan, 2009, p. 120). As the clichés are bound to repeat about Islam and 
Islamic world, the hostility of Islam with secularisation seems to become more stable. The 
prevailed feeling is that “there is a strict and irreducible opposition between two systems-Islam 
and non-Islam” (Filali-Ansary, 2009, p. 357). As Abdou Filali-Ansary argues, “to be a 
secularist has meant to abandon Islam, to reject altogether not only the religious faith but also 
its attendant morality and the traditions and rules that operate within Muslim societies” (2009, 
p. 357). Secularism has been therefore mistakably assumed to be the same as atheism or total 
unbelief. Filali-Ansary believes that secularism has long been existing within Muslim 
societies, however the current “fundamentalist” ideas contradict it and everything comes with 
it, namely democracy. He states, “as a historical process, secularization has so transformed life 
in Muslim societies that religion, or rather traditions built on religion, no longer supply the 
                                               
115 By imperialists, Khomeini mostly meant Britain and USA. “The British imperialists penetrated the 
countries of the East more than three hundred years ago. Being knowledgeable about all aspects of these 
countries, they drew up elaborate plans for assuming control of them. Then came the new imperialists, 
the Americans and others. They allied themselves with the British and took part in the execution of their 
plans” (Khomeini, 1970, p. 87).  
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norms and rules that govern the social and political order” (2009, p. 360). However, 
secularisation has become an alien issue among Muslims, because it was more or less equal to 
“Westernisation”. This is rooted in the history of colonialism in Arab and Islamic civilizations. 
This history actually “gave birth to some great and lasting misunderstandings, as a result of 
which Muslims have rejected key aspects of modernity (secularization and, to some degree, 
democratization) as an alienation and a surrender of the historical self to the ‘Other’” (Filali-
Ansary, 2009, p. 366). Filali-Ansary’s argument can explain the banishment of Persepolis and 
the accusation of Islam setizi put in place by Iranian officials. Satrapi’s “Western” secular 
background and her progressive views have been interpreted as imperialist or materialist 
approaches to separate Islam from politics and distort Islamic values. Hence, the condemnation 
of her work in the Islamic Republic.  
Mark Tessler emphasises the important position of political liberalization and 
democracy among Arab scholars. In his Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, he shows 
the influence of Islam on attitudes towards liberalization and democracy. While some 
“Western” scholars believe that talking of democracy and human rights is of no use among 
Arabs and Muslims, Tessler’s research shows the interest of Lebanese, Jordanian and Egyptian 
political scientists and sociologists in emphasising the role of democracy in controlling the 
“unchecked authoritarianism” and the “political chaos” (Tessler, 2002, p. 338). As Tessler put 
it, studies of democracy are based upon two distinct concerns. One is the political process and 
the other is political culture. The political process is the kind of mechanisms “that make 
political leaders accountable to those they govern, including free, competitive, and regular 
elections” and political culture is the political orientations of citizens and “the need to develop 
civic and participatory norms at the level of the individual citizen” (2002, p. 338). Reluctance 
towards valorisation of democracy shows the level of commitment to democracy among 
citizens at large. In the case of Iran, according to Axworthy, it has proven that Iranian citizens 
“believe in or aspire to democracy” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 414). Satrapi’s critical position 
towards the policies of the Islamic Republic along with Amir& Khalil’s Zahra’s Paradise are 
good examples of democratic orientations of Iranian citizens. In Ronald Inglehart’s words 
“democracy is not attained simply by making institutional changes or through elite level 
manoeuvring. Its survival depends also on the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens” (2000, 
p. 96). The crisis of 2009 election demonstrated that democracy is not just limited to Satrapi 
and other elites. However, if democracy is controversial in the Iranian system, the problem 
lies in different interpretations of Islam by officials and clergies in Iran. 
The applicability of this view is noted by Iliya Harik “who writes that ‘in the long run, 
of course, a democratic government needs a democratic political culture, and vice versa’” (as 
cited in Tessler, 2002, p. 338). Tessler’s studies concluded that the variance in attitudes of 
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Muslims towards democracy depend upon the variation in interpretations of Islamic laws by 
Muslims scholars and theologians. The conservative religious attachments ended up with 
venom towards democracy as an opposite to theocracy which is ruled by God. According to 
Vali Nasr, “Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best or tactic 
that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state” (2009, p. 378). Unlike 
Islamists, Nasr believes that Muslim democrats “reject or at least discount the classic Islamist 
claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari’ah state, and their main goal tends to be the 
more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platforms and stable governing conditions” 
(Nasr, 2009, p. 377). Anwar Ibrahim believes that attributing the pure sovereignty only to God 
is an extremist view that is just a misreading of the religion. Ibrahim states that “freedom is 
the fundamental objective of the divine law. Islam has always expressed the primacy of ‘adl, 
or justice, which is a close approximation of what the West defines as freedom” (2009, p. 371). 
Justice, Ibrahim continues, “entails ruling according to the dictates of Islamic law, which 
emphasize consultation and condemn despotism and tyranny” (2009, p. 371). Unlike 
Khomeini and Qutb, who believe that imperatives of Islam are not in line with the elements of 
constitutional democracy, Ibrahim claims that “freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, 
and the sanctity of life and property” are clearly stated in the Qur’an, hadith and Sunnah of 
the Prophet (2009, p. 371). Furthermore, by embracing the concept of shura or consultation 
by Qur’an (chapter 42), Islam has always been supportive of democracy. Filali-Ansary 
strongly believes that “democracy may even end up being described as a Western adaptation 
of an originally Islamic principle” (2009, p. 362). Mohamed Abed Jabri states that “democracy 
is the only principle of political legitimacy which is acceptable nowadays in Muslim societies” 
(as cited in Filali-Ansary, 2009, p. 362). Among those who support democracy in Islam, “a 
guided democracy” is a system that works within the limits set by shari’ah. “Iran may be 
considered as a case where this kind of doctrine has been implemented” (Filali-Ansary, 2009, 
p. 362). In addition to the elements which are common among constitutional democracies, 
Ansary believes that Iran enjoys “elected parliaments and executives […] and a high council 
of experts and a religious guide who are entrusted with ensuring that the laws and decisions 
made by democratically elected bodies are in conformity with religious principles and rules” 
(2009, p. 362). The necessity of consultation and its requirements in the Iranian ruling system 
made it a kind of Islamic democracy.  
In supporting the idea of Islam’s compatibility with democracy, Mahmud al-‘Aqqad 
(1889-1964) as a modernist and liberal scholar focuses on two concepts of ijma’ (consensus) 
and bay’a (allegiance of members). As Goddard analysed, the former is considered as the 
“third foundation of Islamic law”, in which the Muslim community or their legal 
representatives decide who is going to be the ruler of the society (2002, p. 7). The latter means 
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securing the prerogative of ruling by validating through the public. This concept used to be a 
legal contract between rulers and ruled in the early ages of Islam. The scholarly interpretations 
of Islam show that the divine narratives are no longer defined in a monolithic way. As Ansary 
put it, “religious attitudes are no longer defined in terms of a combination of strict observation 
of rituals and the adoption of pre modern views, but rather as an informal but deeply felt 
adherence to principles of morality” (2009, p. 365). With reference to an example from the 
Qur’an, sureh Al-Baqarah, verse 256 (La ikrah-a fi din), meaning there is no compulsion in 
religion, Stepan emphasises on the strong nature of “Islamic tolerance” in the Qur’an (2009, 
p. 365). This gives way to ideas of human rights activists and democratic theorists like Satrapi 
and others, that there shall be no obligation imposed upon citizens in a Muslim community. 
One must acknowledge that different atrocities can be committed in the name of Islam. The 
Islamic fundamentalists and extremists flagrantly violate the citizen’s basic and natural rights 
to justify their political behaviours by manipulating the Islamic injunctions. It is argued that 
in such a context, Islam is being considered as an opposition or resistance to democracy.  
In short, democratization of the velayat-e faqih is mostly concerned by groups of 
reformists from both religious and non-religious sects. The reformists argue that the modern 
requirements of the time need reinterpretations of Islamic doctrine to make it compatible with 
the complexity of the modern time i.e. human rights issues. Playing an active role in forming 
a civil society and pluralistic formulation of the authority has expedited the scholarly 
discussions of governance in post-Khomeini Iran. By reinterpreting the religious texts, modern 
reformists have tried to limit the authority and power of the vali-ye faqih and increased the 
public role in political decision making. New models of governance are suggested with the 
aim of circumscribing the guardianship and limiting it to supervisory position, rather than the 
complete administration of state affairs or the obligatory duty of public towards the supreme 
leader. The new state-religion models articulate that Islam is not the source of the problem in 
Iran, rather the political manipulation of Islam by those in power defined velayat-e faqih as an 
alternative to democracy. The legitimacy of a ruling system lies in not only the participation 
of people in political decision making, but also in preserving and respecting human rights.  
From what discussed so far regarding how democracy is defined and functioning in the 
Islamic Republic, part of Satrapi’s concern about democracy has been addressed. However, 
Satrapi’s concern over totalitarianism or dictatorship in Iran does not seem to focus on this 
aspect of democracy i.e. power sharing or fair elections. Rather, her main argument, in my 
opinion, foregrounds that democracy is more about freedom of thought and speech, 
individualism and respect for human rights free from political interferences. She is aspiring to 
a world without political boundaries (similar to her position towards feminism), which may 
explain one of the reasons why she thinks that democracy is an “illusion”. Her views on 
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democracy are shared by many other scholars or elites in and out of Iran. Many critics have 
built a case for either a different democratic religious or non-religious political system that is 
benefited from the separation of religion and politics. Based on this, new relationship between 
religion and state would pave the way for secularism to creep into the Islamic political context.  
The politics of secularism 
The secularised conception of Islam makes it difficult for many religious intellectuals 
to claim a religious identity based on doctrinal commands. The ethical practices of religious 
groups may be judged as a false return to traditionalism, which is resistant to modernity, 
liberalism and rationality. This trend establishes a binary basis between Islam and the “West” 
which adopts disrespect, racism and violence directed towards not only the militants and 
fundamentals but traditional Muslims. In Nash’s words: “Islam as a religion is the unwelcome 
guest at the feast of Western secularism” (2012, p. 15). Calls for liberalizing and secularising 
Islam, so that Muslims may live a ‘moderate’116 existence are issued by a number of political 
perspectives from left and right. According to Mahmood, secularizing Islam as a political 
liberal project “enjoys the support of the US State Department, which recently allocated over 
$1.3 billion under an initiative titled ‘Muslim World Outreach’ to transform the hearts and 
minds of Muslims through a range of theological, cultural, and pedagogical programs” 
(Mahmood, 2011, p. 96). This political agenda seeks to build networks with moderate scholars 
of Islam to promote a liberal interpretation of Islam through preaching, school curricula, TV 
shows and media production. This is in line with the US policies of War on Terror, a campaign 
claimed to have clear feminist agendas to create democracy in the Muslim world. This is 
confirmed by Geaves too. The British government’s definition of moderation seems to imply 
a core model which “is transferred from that of a universal deity experienced internally as a 
common mystical experience usually posited by essentialists, to that of ‘moderation’ that fits 
into the liberal/secular worldview of religion” (Geaves, 2004, p. 68). Although it is quite 
ambiguous how a ‘moderate version’ of Islam would decrease the possible attacks against the 
“West”, the incessant efforts were made to re-orchestrate Islamic doctrines free from politics.  
It can be argued that secularism does not only mean evacuation of religion. As Mortimer 
argues, “secularism is not synonymous with godlessness, or with hostility to religion as such” 
(as cited in Nash, 2012, p. 13). However, the political agenda behind it suggests otherwise. 
Harvey Cox differentiates between secularism and secularization. As he explains, 
“secularization delivered culture and society from tutelage to religious control and a closed 
                                               
116 According to Geaves, “once we begin to think of orientalism as a kind of Western projection to assert 
cultural and intellectual superiority over the Muslim world in which the West defines the Muslim reality 
and relays it back as the ideal model of Muslim perception of themselves, then we can begin to 
understand the problematic nature of powerful Western leaders defining for Muslims who is a ‘terrorist’ 
and who is ‘moderate’” (2004, p. 66).  
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metaphysical worldview and was basically a liberating development”, while secularism “is an 
ideology, a new closed world-view which functions very much like a new religion […] like 
other isms it menaces the openness and freedom secularization has produced” (as cited in Nash, 
2012, p. 13). Secularism sets against the public articulation of any religious identity. It aims at 
decoupling Islam from plural identity and making religion a private system of belief. This 
liberal worldview of religion, as Geaves puts it, appears not to be as pluralist as it claims 
though. “It is indeed another form of absolutism” (2004, p. 69). The dislike of secularism for 
multiculturalism and self-identification of Muslims in public provided the space for the 
emergence of “Islamic fundamentalism”. According to Gray and Ruthven, “Islamic 
fundamentalism is a kind of oriental Frankenstein’s monster, a flawed response to the 
McDonaldization of the world (as cited in Nash, 2012, p. 14). “Both Arab nationalism and 
Islamism are effectively products of Orientalism in reverse” (Nash, 2012, p. 17). As Minoo 
Moallem argues, “the creation of an Islamic ethnicity is as much the work of orientalism and 
Western representational practices as it is the result of negotiations and contestations of 
Islamic nationalism and fundamentalism” (2005, p. 119).  Mahmood also believes that the 
agenda behind the message of Osama bin Laden was clear. He simply wanted to end the 
“Western” domination on “Arabs and Muslims who are currently witnessing one of the most 
unabashedly imperial projects undertaken in modern history, a project that, as a number of 
observers have pointed out, has done more to fuel the militant cause than to eliminate it” (2011, 
p. 97). As Ruthven puts it, the fundamentalist mentality is “a religious way of being that 
manifests itself in a strategy by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their 
distinctive identity as a people or group in the face of modernity and secularization” (as cited 
in Nash, 2012, p. 18). Within the Iranian context, with reference to their history of “anti-
Westernism”, “foundationalism” appeared as a form of resistance to “Western” cultural 
hegemony. As the result, the function of nationalism defied secularism. In fact, Khomeini’s 
strict belief in the full-fledged authority of the faqih and full application of Islamic practices 
in the context of society has been organised as a response to modern “Western” secular 
influences.  
As Mahmood argues, Abdolkarim Soroush is one of those intellectuals who is 
“testimony to the hegemony that liberalism commands as a political ideal for many 
contemporary Muslims, a hegemony that reflects the enormous disparity in power between 
Euro-American and Muslim countries today” (2011, pp. 97-98). Soroush’s asserted “model of 
governance is an ‘extra-religious’ argument, one that cannot be articulated through an 
intrareligious debate” (Mavani, 2013, p. 203). As Mavani put it, Soroush’s model claims 
“independence” of state from religion rather than its “separation” (Soroush’s proposed model 
is different from Satrapi’s simplistic rendition of separation of religion from the state, 
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however, they both share the same concern towards the nature of political system and the 
situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic). This model focuses on the new hermeneutic 
of the divine text which represents a sharp break from the contemporary form of ijtihad 
undertaken by a fully qualified mojtahid. According to Soroush, understanding the divine text 
is time-bound. This means that “changes in knowledge render natural and Islamic matters that 
were once considered ‘unthinkable’ and ‘non-Islamic’” (Mir-Hosseini, 2005, p. 228). He is 
criticising the “olama’s unwillingness to admit this at a theoretical level and to take 
consciously planned steps to revise their understanding in the light of current realities” (Mir-
Hosseini, 2005, p. 228). In this way, Soroush challenges the institution of velayat-e faqih in 
Iran, referring to the absolute authority of the faqih to veto the decisions made by the 
parliament. By creating a space for secularity, Soroush has made an adaptable version of Islam 
with modern circumstances. It is argued by him that Sunni Muslims who do not believe in the 
continuation of successorship through the lines of Imams, have established an autonomous 
civil society which is more in line with the division of religion from the state. According to 
Soroush, since no other authority following the Prophet enjoys divine power in Sunni Islam, 
the state affairs became institutionalized and there is no obligation for anyone to obey the vali-
ye faqih. As Mavani states, this is quite similar to the separation of state from church in 
American constitution. In such a context, there is no pressure on citizens to promote religious 
ethics. But, there is no place for institutionalising the religious rules within the public context. 
The laws administered by the state are religion free. Soroush’s argument is in fact drawn upon 
finding alternatives in orthodox practices of Islam to make it compatible with secular liberal 
ideals and his line of thought has never been reversed. According to Mahmood, he does not 
even consider the possibility of keeping the Islamic practices as embraced by many Muslims 
today “and rethink some of the secular liberal values that are so readily upheld today, such as 
freedom of choice, autonomy, and indifference to religious forms of belonging” (2011, p. 98). 
While Soroush’s concerns, can be argued, to be similar to that of Satrapi, there is one main 
difference between the two. While critical of the “Islamic fundamentalism”, in my opinion, 
Satrapi supports a reformative and progressive approach to Islam. This secular conception of 
Islam is adhered to a private and individual system of belief which promotes the separation of 
religion from state (as desired by Satrapi). The protagonist of this secular model is an 
autonomous individual and “self-choosing subject who might appreciate the spiritual truths 
religious traditions symbolize, but is enlightened enough to understand that these truths 
command no epistemological or political force in this world” (Mahmood, 2011, p. 94). 
Embedded in this secular model is the conception of freedom of choice for individuals who 
animate their own desires free from the force of the religion, scriptures, traditions, rituals or 
state organisations. Satrapi would properly be fixed into such framework. 
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In discussions of secularism, what is at stake is the mode of pluralism. If public culture 
is being missed from conditions of modernity, then its democratic iteration will be 
undermined. As Souillac argues, it is wrong to conflate laicite with state authoritarianism. 
Referring to the hejab ban in France in 2004, Souillac believes that confusion between 
secularism and state authoritarianism “detracts from those positive aspects of secular political 
culture that foster participatory democracy precisely because secular values hinge on their 
articulation in a viable public sphere in which all are encouraged to demonstrate their views, 
and passionately if they wish” (2011, p. 87). He believes there should always be a balance 
between “respecting the individual’s rights to freedom of conscience and religion… and 
maintaining a public sphere devoid of all religious symbolisms” (2011, p. 87). Secularism, in 
Souillac’s words, should be motivating and empowering for citizens including those minorities 
who are marginalised because of their religion. It is therefore unfortunate to reduce secularism 
to fundamental contemporary French policies, because this confusion does not serve the 
important principle of pluralism and republicanism. It is in such context that Satrapi criticises 
the French government’s policies on the hejab. Based on debates on the intentio auctoris, and 
with regards to Satrapi’s neutral and dual position towards the hejab, it could be argued that 
the type of secularism she is advocating (just like her position towards feminism or the 
universal human rights) is plural and public oriented, the axis of which is respecting and 
tolerating the individual freedom. Certainly, the hejab ban in France in the name of secularism 
led to a “lose-lose situation, discrediting Western judicial and parliamentary democratic 
institutions and running against European human rights laws against discrimination. They do 
not serve the cause of women’s autonomy, and can reinforce instead that of xenophobia” 
(Souillac, 2011, p. 94). This concept, which is in line with “otherisation”, mostly concerns 
Satrapi.  
In conclusion, notions of human rights and democracy are heavily influenced under the 
politics of both Islamism and secularism. Secularism in its plurality assumes sovereignty for 
individuals while Islamism calls for a collective national and communal identity. As far as 
secularism is concerned, Islamism exists i.e. the antimodernist, anti-secular or “anti-Western” 
reaction. According to Souillac, to challenge the binary oppositions of Islam and secularism 
(as a “Western” product), it would be wiser to consider the public culture of laicite which 
accounts for democratic citizenship. This focuses on deterritorializing Islam using “a universal 
form of Islam delinked from the specificities of local cultures” (Nash, 2012, p. 19). This means 
bringing about religious reformation based on “foundations of the exercise of citizenship, 
through which citizens can consistently reinterpret the collective historical experience of 
popular sovereignty, and contest the democratic legitimacy of governments, laws, and 
policies” (Souillac, 2011, p. 88). Satrapi’s rejection of a system whether it is Islamic or secular 
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is therefore in line with the plural notion of sovereignty for individuals. She attempts to deal 
with an individual identity at a global level. This is different from sovereignty of people in a 
Western democratic system in which individuals still have to remain within the law as an 
absolute framework and they are considered as criminalised or enemies of the state if they 
breach the law. An example of this case is Satrapi’s opinion about the freedom of choice in 
clothing in any context, secular or Islamic. She believes if one wants to be naked, s/he should 
be free, while this is in contradiction with the state laws made under the sovereignty of people.  
Her criticism towards the Islamic system in Iran or the secular system in France is a means to 
claim her identity as an autonomous free individual. 
Human rights and velayat-e faqih as moral politics 
Investigating the situation of democracy and a just social order in the Islamic Republic, 
as discussed earlier, could be actualized through discussions of vali-ye faqih, the scope of his 
power and authority and the process of his election. Furthermore, proceeding to a thorough 
analysis of democracy in Khomeini’s system may also be possible through observing different 
understandings of human rights in different contexts. As Elena Namli argues, law, morality 
and politics are hand in hand and essential in understanding the human rights. In her Human 
Rights as Ethics, Politics and Law, Namli critiques the monopoly of liberal understanding of 
human rights “as independent individuals, rational reasoning as the opposite term of traditional 
reasoning, and freedom as autonomy” (2013, p. 139). She believes that the “Cartesian 
individualism, modernistic rationalism” and freedom of individuals “includes a sizeable 
colonial legacy and Western origin” (2013, p. 139). This is problematic in considering the 
human rights at universal level as it suppresses the complexity and uniqueness of “other 
cultural and ideological narratives” (2013, p. 139). My argument is based on understanding 
the system of velayat-e faqih and human rights within the moral and political nature. This 
opens the gates of contextual evaluation and interpretation and criticism of both entities. I 
consider the case of velayat-e faqih and its implementation in the social, religious and political 
spheres in the discussions of its compatibility with democracy and human rights. What needs 
to be avoided is considering a fixed and absolute framework for democracy, human rights and 
velayat-e faqih or in other words putting them as positive laws.  
In Namli’s words, there is no concept of international universal human rights. Many 
human rights activists like Satrapi consider human rights as applicable universally with no 
enforcement of violence, and believe that human rights should be accompanied with 
“Western” liberal democracy to be applicable in “non-Western” societies. This view, however, 
according to Namli, belongs to secular, liberal and “Western” proponents of democracy and 
human rights, in itself is wrong “since the concept of freedom as autonomy lies at the moral 
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core of liberalism and any violent enforcement of liberalism must be seen as a self-
contradiction” (Namli, 2013, p. 140).  
Among those who believe in the universality of human rights, as it is argued by Namli, 
there are many who seek to persuade others with the idea that human rights is violated in a 
religious context (e.g. velayat-e faqih). The risk of the imperialist and reductionist view of 
universal human rights lies in considering it as politics free and a “Western” product in 
opposition with the traditional cultures and civilizations. However, we need more sensitivity 
as well as reliable knowledge in different religious settings as “religion neither can nor should 
be excluded from politics” and “as an important part in the life of many individuals and 
societies, it is a casual factor in politics and must therefore be involved in a transparent fashion 
in a political discourse” (Namli, 2013, p. 141). As Namli believes, out of religious context, the 
politics of human rights are not legitimate. Some might argue that human rights are rational 
and in opposition with the base of the Islamic Republic which is foundational and traditional. 
Here, there is a twofold reduction. One is presenting the system of velayat-e faqih as an Islamic 
dictatorial and thus an in-flexible legal system, and the other is the ideology of human rights 
as absolute set of laws which cannot be approached in different social or religious context. 
Both reductions are problematic per se. By presenting the velayat-e faqih as an Islamic system, 
we are generalising the notion of Islam and thus otherise it as contrasting the “Western” 
ideology. However, Islam is a set of divine laws which requires “an advanced interpretative 
apparatus before it can be used in a social and legal setting” (Namli, 2013, p. 142). This gives 
way to ijtihad.117 New and up-to-date interpretations of the Qur’an according to contingent 
needs are encouraged by Islam. Scholars like Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na’im believe that “any 
understanding of Sharia is always the product of ijtihad” and that “there is nothing to prevent 
the emergence of a new consensus that ijtihad should be freely exercised to meet the new 
needs and aspirations of Islamic societies” (as cited in Namli, 2013, p. 142). In Na’im’s view, 
the contextual interpretation of the Islamic law is the responsibility of all Muslims in all era. 
In this regards, there is no universality defined for Islam as an abstract set of laws.118  
                                               
117 The daily demands of individuals are addressed with proper reference to the Qur’an. This is called 
ijtihad or independent reasoning. According to O’Mahony, Pererburs & Shomali (2006): “Ijtihad is a 
very demanding qualification and involves deep knowledge of several disciplines and mastering several 
skills” (p. 45). 
118 There is a difference between Shi’a and Sunni in terms of ijtihad. According to Shi’as, the Qur’an 
can be interpreted only by those who have the necessary knowledge to do so. In Shi’a Islam, not 
everybody is allowed to interpret the text. For the Qur’an to answer the daily demands, there should be 
olama or foqaha or mojtahidin to derive the rules of fiqh from the Qur’an. According to Shi’i tafsir of 
the related ayat, it is compulsory for a group of Muslims to study religion and become experts so that 
the others can refer to them for their problems and questions. This tafsir of ijtihad is applied in the 
system of velayat-e faqih. The faqih is considered as the expert in Islamic fiqh and is qualified enough 
to do ijtihad. “Thus, it becomes clear that in the Shi’i thought respect for and obedience to the faqih is 
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On the other hand, considering “human rights as politics” as Michael Ignatieff argues, 
reveals the selective and particular interests of governmental and non-governmental activists 
who invoke the attractive moral aspect of human rights rather than its political specificities. 
Ignatieff believes, in terms of human rights, it is impossible to claim neutrality or impartiality. 
This idea makes the universality of human rights impossible. Notwithstanding, he believes in 
the “moral universalism” and “liberal individualism” to practice human rights properly (as 
cited in Namli, 2013, p. 144). This is actually in line with Satrapi’s concern over the freedom 
of choice as an individual. As mentioned before, she believes that the very recognition of her 
individual freedom makes her rights a universally valid issue. Based on Namli’s argument 
regarding “Western” notion of freedom as the legacy of colonialism, Satrapi and her line of 
thinking can be argued in opposition. Here, Satrapi presents a “Western” definition of freedom 
of choice while “individualism is not a universal moral content of human rights” (Namli, 2013, 
p. 146). Namli strongly believes that ‘individualism’ like many other articulated norms is 
political and in need of critique and development and thus cannot be considered as a universal 
norm. In her words, universality means preventing from declaring any norm to be universal 
(2013, p. 146). Human rights laws which are universally accepted includes a set of political 
agreements between the states worldwide, however there is no legitimate body to enforce 
them; they should be implemented “by means of national policies and legislation” (Namli, 
2013, p. 146). In this respect, it can be argued that Khomeini with the foundation of velayat-e 
faqih found a unique way to sustain and implement human rights laws in the context and within 
the parameters of velayat-e faqih. At the same time, with reference to the critics of Khomeini’s 
system, there exist different interpretations as to what proper implementation of human rights 
could be in Iran. Consequently, recognising the alternative notions of individuality and 
freedom of choice (especially those which are promoted by the “West” and known by Satrapi) 
does not mean rejection and non-implementation of human rights. Instead, it can be said that 
Khomeini’s system creates an opportunity for the opponents of “Western” individualism to 
apply a more contextual (based on different national, cultural and religious contexts) practices 
of human rights. The role of democracy becomes strengthen in inviting various (“non-
Western”) governmental authorities and different groups and individuals to engage in 
approaches to human rights implementation more practically within the society’s national 
policies. In the case of human rights, quite opposite to manipulation of her work by imperialist 
                                               
respect for and obedience to knowledge and piety that qualify someone to have such a position and not 
to the person as such” (O’Mahony, Pererburs & Shomali, 2006, p. 45). It so emerges that unqualified 
individuals cannot derive rules from the Qur’an, or interpret the Qur’an based on their knowledge, needs 
and preferences. In fact, one should discriminate between hermeneutics and ijtihad in Shi’a context. 
Hermeneutics is mostly based on the fore-knowledge and decision of the interpreter. This type of 
interpretation is forbidden in Shi’a Islam and is against the divine revelation. Relying on one’s former 
experience, background, knowledge and beliefs can deviate the interpreter from the origin of Qur’an, 
whereas Qur’an must be interpreted by Qur’an according to Shi’as.   
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market, Persepolis has been read or interpreted in line with the current dominant “Western” 
definition of individuality, which is mostly shared by many “Western” or “Eastern” scholars. 
However, as argued by Namli, what really matters in discussions of human rights or secularism 
is not the notion of “individuality”, rather, the pluralistic and inclusive and contextualised 
nature of discourses to avoid any exclusion or xenophobia.  
Iran and the West in media and politics  
The history of modern Iran in the last hundred years is literally impossible to review 
without including its relations with foreign powers. In the thirty-five years since the Islamic 
Revolution, the successive exacerbation of tension with “Western” countries, “Iran continued 
to arouse seething passions […] as a result of the incredibly detailed, highly focused attention 
of the media to the event and Iran’s demonization for years after it” (Said, 1997, p. 81). There 
has been an intense focus on Iran and Iranian socio-political issues in world media. Since the 
Iranian hostage crisis (November 1979 – January 1981),119 Iran has been identified by the US 
as a hostile country.  
Due to the length of the period (444 days), the poor handling of the incident by 
Washington and its intense media coverage the event had a strong impact on 
American public opinion. The episode was framed as ‘America held hostage’ 
by the US media, which depicted the entire nation victimised by ‘Islamic 
terrorists’ (Poole and Richardson, 2006, 122). 
On January 22nd 2002, on the occasion of his State of the Union Address, former US 
President George W. Bush grouped Iran with North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea) and Iraq in the “axis of evil”.120 This has been intensified by various forms of 
stereotyping Islamic culture and religion. Edward Said believes that the hostage crisis of 
Americans in Iran “came to symbolize represented American relations with the Muslim world” 
(p. 83), not just Iran. Actually, what happened (and lasted for a few months) perpetuated the 
attitudes of many Americans towards Muslims in general. To many in the USA, being a Shi’a 
Muslim means being “anti-American” (p. 84). And being anti-American means trouble. A few 
weeks after the crisis, a New York Times headline approached the issue of the crisis by making 
                                               
119 A diplomatic crisis between Iran and the USA resulted after Iranian students supporting the 
revolution seized the US embassy in Tehran and held hostage fifty-five people (US diplomatic personnel 
and other US citizens) for 444 days. According to Edward Said, “the Iran story” has become the focused 
attention of the media since the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran (1979, p. 80). This has significantly 
affected the opinion of the general public, and saturated them with anti-Iranian and anti-Islamic notions. 
120 The term is highly evocative in the USA, as it was originally used during WWII to indicate Germany, 
Italy and Japan. However, it is worth mentioning that the current “Western” geopolitics seek to change 
the perception of Iran because of new situation in the Middle-East (ISIS).  
  
83 
 
a link between Shi’ism and the seizure. From then on, there was no distinction between 
Iranians and Arabs (p. 88).121  
Furthermore, based on Said’s argument, Iran cannot be ignored by the “West”, as it was 
one of the major suppliers of oil and gas in the region which is politically and strategically 
regarded as volatile (Said, 1997, p. 6). The geo-political position of Iran in the region as “the 
first political creature in the Middle East” (Farhi, 2012, p. 4) is a prominent feature that puts 
Iran in the news today. Another example that pointed the finger at Iran was the Lebanon-Israeli 
conflict in 2006. Two Israeli soldiers were killed at the border line between Syria and Lebanon 
by Hezbollah missiles. Beaumont in The Guardian in 2006 wrote that “both Hezbollah and 
Iran have threatened retaliation for an attack in which a top Iranian general and six Hezbollah 
fighters were killed by Israeli army a week before” (Beaumont, The Guardian, 2006). It is also 
believed that the modern facilities and complicated war equipment of Hezbollah well reflected 
the military aid and support of Iran. “The conflict confirmed the deepening hostility between 
Iran and Israel, and the awareness in Israel of the multi-layered threat from Iran” (Axworthy, 
2013, p. 393). With the toppling of Saddam and following these two important events in the 
Middle East, the theory of a Shi’a Crescent formed. Coined by King Abdullah of Jordan, and 
backed up by Mubarak in Egypt, UAE, the British government and others, Iran was believed 
to destabilize the region with the help of the Shi’a population of Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.122 The connections of different Shi’a political groups with Iranian 
clerics that started from the Revolution of 1979 has explicitly aggravated the anti-Iranian 
circumstances, contributing to the malevolent image of Iran in the region.   
Apart from the huge oil and gas reserves, Iran’s embankment of the plan for generation 
of the nuclear power, almost independently of the “Western’s” partnership,123 exacerbates the 
political relations between Iran and the “West”. In addition to the peaceful nuclear programme, 
there were some claims by a number of “Western” countries that Iran plans to build nuclear 
weapons. Although, Iran consistently denied it, but after the testing of one of its missiles in 
2000 and the talk of one Iranian officials based on the need of the world of Islam to “acquire 
nuclear weapons to balance those of Israel”, “Western” concerns intensified (Axworthy, 2013, 
                                               
121 That is why, “many people, even otherwise well educated people, think of the Iranians as Arabs, but 
they are not […] in many ways Iranians have traditionally defined themselves against the Arab identity 
of much of the rest of the Middle East region” (Axworthy, 2013, p. xx).  
122 The Shi’a Crescent theory actually formed as a “smokescreen to divert Western attention away from 
the awkward fact that the most vicious anti-Western extremism and terrorism of the previous decade 
had been Sunni in origin” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 394).  
123 In 1970s, with the full support of America, Iran’s nuclear energy production started. Later in 1979, 
with the help of “German contractors Kraftwork Union (KWU), the work had reached an advanced 
stage”, and in 1995, after an agreement between Iran and Russia, the work on Bushehr reactor was 
almost finished. Finally, in “September 2011 Iran announced the plant had finally begun producing 
electricity” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 381).  
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p. 381). On the other hand, from the official point of view of the Iranian government,124 many 
found it hard to believe that,  
If a state like Britain for example (in the middle of peaceful Europe, and 
protected  by EU and Nato alliances) continues to value nuclear weapons for 
self-defence, the same should apply for a state like Iran, which suffers attacks 
from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in the 1980s, and whose neighbours 
include some that are unstable (Iraq, Afghanistan), several near-neighbours that 
are nuclear-armed (Russia, Israel, China) and one neighbour that is both 
unstable and nuclear-armed (Pakistan). (Axworthy, 2013, p. 382) 
Consequently, Iran was under international pressure to agree on further inspections of 
the nuclear installations by NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) since 2002. From the Iranian 
perspective, the US was behind the EU Three125 and is opposed to any kind of nuclear 
programme let alone the uranium enrichment. In 2006, the IAEA (the International Atomic 
Energy Agency which is responsible for checking the compliance with NPT) announced that 
Iran failed to meet the obligations and therefore imposed the first set of sanctions against Iran. 
Furthermore, “Israel has warned that it may take military action to destroy the Iranian nuclear 
(weapon) programme if the programme is not halted by other means” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 
386). Following this, a Pentagon consultant added that: 
For some advocates of military action, the goal in Iran is not regime change but 
a strike that will send a signal that America still can accomplish its goals. Even 
if it does not destroy Iran’s nuclear network, there are many who think that 
thirty-six hours of bombing is the only way to remind the Iranians of the very 
high cost of going forward with the bomb. (Hersh, 2006) 
Along with the nuclear issue, the harsh and radical position of former President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad126 towards Israel outraged the “Western” world. Ahmadinejad’s 
speech included a direct quotation from Ayatollah Khomeini. Israel must be wiped off from 
the map.127 His reference to the ‘myth’ of the Holocaust was largely condemned outside Iran. 
Accordingly, Slaughter in Avineri (2007) believes that: “Iran with a popular, accountable, and 
rights-regarding (PAR) government would not be a threat, even if it developed a nuclear 
weapon. But an Iran with a president who denies the Holocaust” would be a potential threat. 
                                               
124 Needless to mention that Iranians themselves have different views on the nuclear programme. 
According to Axworthy: “within Iran the nuclear dispute produced an upsurge of nationalist feeling in 
favour of Iran’s right to nuclear power, and it was difficult (not just because of regime censorship, but 
because of the general strong feeling on the subject) for anyone to express dissent” (2013, p. 385).  
125 EU Three refers to the troika consisting the United Kingdom, Germany and France. 
126 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (b. 1956) was the sixth president of Iran for eight years from 2005 to 2013. 
He was famous for being a “highly devout Shiite and a strident nationalist whose desire was the Middle 
East without Israel”, and for his highly anti-American policies (Watson, 2008, p. 124). 
127 The words of Imam Khomeini were included in Ahmadinejad’s speech. “In rejimeh eshghalgareh 
Qods bayad az safeyeh ruzegar mahv shavad”, which literally means that “this Jerusalem-occupying 
regime must disappear from the page of time” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 388). Although the wording of 
Ahmadinejad had astounded many in the “West”, the Iranian officials declared that it was nothing new 
based on Khomeini’s line of thinking.   
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As a BBC news article states, the Holocaust issues and the conference128 convened in Tehran 
in December 2006 created an opportunity for scholars and thinkers to express their points and 
views freely about the Holocaust which is not possible in many European countries. This 
action of the Islamic Republic was considered as not acceptable and a danger for the “West” 
(2006).  
At his monthly media briefing in London, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair called 
the Holocaust conference ‘shocking beyond belief’. He described Iran as a 
‘major strategic threat’ to the Middle East, saying: ‘Iran is deliberately causing 
maximum problems for moderate governments and for ourselves in the region 
- in Palestine, in Lebanon and in Iraq’. He added there was ‘little point’ in 
including Iran and Syria in regional issues, such as Iraq, ‘unless they are 
prepared to be constructive’ and that it would be a ‘major challenge’ to deal 
with Iran. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, flanked by visiting Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Olmert, said: ‘we reject in the strongest terms conferences held 
in Iran on the supposed non-existence of the Holocaust. Germany will never 
accept this and will use all possibilities at its disposal to oppose it.’ (BBC news, 
2006) 
International pressure and the trade sanctions were obvious outcomes. Mostly applied 
by the US government- especially after the hostage crisis- or under its pressure, the sanctions129 
limited Iranian businesses, damaged the economic system, increased unemployment and 
caused inflation. According to BBC news (2015), the sanction plans on Iran are approved by 
the UN, the EU and some other countries such as Japan and South Korea. Prohibiting almost 
all trade with Iran targeted the oil industry which is an important issue in government 
expenditure. Although the US claimed that the sanctions have been enforced to exert pressure 
on the Iranian decision to peruse a nuclear programme, their effects fell on the lives of ordinary 
citizens. The Iranian nuclear programme and the Holocaust provocation laid the region’s 
crimes at the Iranian door. The US administration with the support of the British government 
associated their difficulties in Iraq with Iran. They claimed that the Iranians played major role 
in destabilizing Iraqi situation. The inter-religious violence in Iraq was believed to be the cause 
of Shi’a/ Sunni struggles.130 On the other hand, during the Iran-Iraq War (1980s), which lasted 
                                               
128 Based on a BBC news report (2006): “Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has met delegates 
at a conference in Iran questioning the Holocaust, drawing widespread international criticism. Iran says 
it wants to debate what it calls taboos surrounding the Holocaust. Conference participants include white 
supremacists and Holocaust deniers”.  
129 “The four rounds of UN sanctions included: A ban on the supply of heavy weaponry and nuclear-
related technology to Iran. A block on arms exports. An asset freeze on key individuals and companies. 
The EU also imposed its own sanctions, among them: Restrictions on trade in equipment which could 
be used for uranium enrichment. An asset freeze on a list of individuals and organisations that the EU 
believed were helping advance the nuclear programme, and a ban on them entering the EU. A ban on 
any transactions with Iranian banks and financial institutions. Ban on the import, purchase and transport 
of Iranian crude oil and natural gas - the EU had previously accounted for 20% of Iran’s oil exports. 
European companies were also stopped from insuring Iranian oil shipments” (BBC news, 2015). 
130 By contrast, there were good evidences that the largest number of suicide bombers and insurgents in 
Iraq were from Saudi Arabia, the “West’s” greatest ally in the region. This is reported in Los Angeles 
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for eight years, Iraq was supported by the US and other “Western” powers with the belief that 
it was necessary to control Iranian religious extremism (Axworthy, 2013, p. xxi). For similar 
reasons, according to Michael Axworthy (2013), the main aim was to control the Iranian power 
and presence in the region, the US funded Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (2013, p. xxi). 
“With some justification, Iran viewed itself as the victim, and the fact that Saddam was then 
supported by the United States reinforced greatly in the Iranian collective psyche an image of 
America as arch-enemy” (Avineri, 2007, p. 44). It is argued that it was probably after the 
imposed war that the USA came to be known as the “Great Satan”131 by the Islamic Republic. 
“Here was a beleaguered, God-fearing Islamic republic fighting against the Western, godless 
juggernaut” (Avineri, 2007, p. 44). 
Based on the history of Iran’s relations with the “West”, the concept of discourse by 
Foucault (2005) makes sense to understand how a specific representation gains traction. One 
should keep in mind that the media, press and news reporting “are powerful to the extent that 
they profoundly influence the way that people understand certain objects, people and events. 
While the media may not fully determine public opinion, it does succeed in determining and 
normalizing its own topics of interest” (Fayyaz & Shirazi, 2013, p. 54). What becomes news 
actually forms our knowledge. According to Said, what is conveyed and interpreted by the 
press is “neither spontaneous nor completely ‘free’: ‘news’ does not just happen, pictures and 
ideas do not merely spring from reality into our eyes and minds, truth is not directly available” 
(1997, p. 48). “It is unrealistic to think that the news could somehow report the truth in a way 
that everyone would see” (Bennett, 2009, p. 36). Also it is inevitable that the truth is 
manipulated before broadcasting by the media.132 Unfair and biased coverage can happen for 
a number of reasons. The press and policy relationship is not an easy one. The media and press 
abide by the rules and conventions. “The interplay of media, power and politics” are the 
realities that shape the message being transferred by the media (Kamalipour, 2010, p. xix). 
Since the rules are set by a fixed assumption, then the picture of Islam or Iran ought to be 
                                               
Times on 15 July 2007. Needless to mention that, the newspaper information is usually open to general 
public. “Although Bush administration officials have frequently lashed out at Syria and Iran, accusing 
it of helping insurgents and militias there, the largest number of foreign fighters and suicide bombers in 
Iraq come from a third neighbour, Saudi Arabia, according to a senior US military officer and Iraqi 
lawmakers. About 45% of all foreign militants targeting US troops and Iraqi civilians and security forces 
are from Saudi Arabia; 15% are from Syria and Lebanon; and 10% are from North Africa, according to 
official US military figures made available to The Times by the senior officer. Nearly half of the 135 
foreigners in US detention facilities in Iraq are Saudis, he said” (Parker in Los Angeles Times, 2007). 
131 “Iranian leaders have characterised the United States as the Great Satan - an evil corrupter that 
pollutes society and destroys personal morality” See The Great Satan vs. the Mad Mullas by Beeman 
(2005).  
132 For example, “CNN is often “domesticated” to serve the interests and address the concerns of 
particular culturally and politically aligned audience members rather than the general interests of the 
global audience at large” (Hafez, 2007 as cited in El-Nawawy, 2010, p. 6).  
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fixed. In Kai Hafez’s words (2007), “The media follow rather than read”133 (Hafez as cited in 
El-Nawawy, 2010, p. 6). Based on this view, the reporters are inevitably bound with clichés 
which have been taken for granted in the society for so long, as a result of a dominant policy. 
Every reporter is under some sort of pressure, Said continued, and this pressure is of 
“standardizing and stereotyping” (1997, p. 51). The reporters actually “bring more to the 
events they cover than they take away from them” (p. 51). This issue has ever been under 
dispute - that “journalists frequently construct the news rather than reflect it” (Roberts, 2013, 
p. 30). Based on the orientalist discussions, journalists’ knowledge is more inclined to be 
assumed or constructed from the public norms. The rules that are restricting the reporting 
systems according to Hachten and Scotton, are either wrongly stereotyped by general 
conventions or are imposed by the “ruling government” (2013, p. 26). In a similar way, 
Mohammadi believes, “Media can be used by states to establish their definitions of the 
political, their versions of history; they are part of the ideological state apparatus, the force of 
repression” (Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 1994, p. 20).  
Apart from the control of the ruling system, Alexandra Kitty (2005), in her Don’t 
Believe it! How Lies Become News, states that “problems with news reporters don’t just stem 
from their normal, everyday way of doing business – it’s also the journalists’ constraints that 
make them vulnerable to lies” (p. 43). Later on, she names a list of possible constraints, such 
as money, for example. According to Kitty, the media are a kind of business and “its survival 
depends on both consumers buying and using its services and its ability to generate profit” (p. 
44). According to Levin, “the media, with a few exceptions such as national broadcasters, are 
first of all businesses that have to generate income, which requires producing stories that 
people want to read, watch or hear. Viewer interest is a first requirement” (2004, p. 273). Time 
is another constraint. New information never comes pre-packed, and it is never easily 
accessible. News need time to be investigate and shaped. Broadcasting the message of Islamic 
extremism which has already filled the minds of the general public might hasten the process 
of money making for media owners,134 rather than the mere ‘love and humanity’ message (in 
case of Satrapi’s work). Among all the aforementioned constraints, the most prominent one is 
the authority figure. The media, as it is argued by Errington & Miraglitta (2007), of a country 
is under the direct control of political authorities, or agencies associated to them. The mutual 
relationship between the media and government is not symmetrical according to Errington and 
Miraglitta. They believe that the government has “the whip hand” in such a relationship; 
                                               
133 According to Dorman and Farhang, “the press as a factor in foreign policy usually rates only passing 
mention, and discussions are more often characterised by rhetoric, platitudes, clichés, and unsupported 
generalizations than by thoughtful analysis” (1987, p. 14).                              
134 There are many other factors such as: convergence, circulation ratings, advertising, competition, 
story structure, uncooperative or difficult sources, lack of knowledge or training, focus groups or 
consultants, etc. (Kitty, 2005, pp. 46-49). 
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“government communications strategy includes everything from timing announcements to 
maximise (or minimise) coverage to the expensive advertising campaigns that now accompany 
major policy changes” (p. 82).  
On the other hand, regarding the impact of politics on the press, Ben Levin talks about 
the suspicion between media and government as a prominent factor in “declining the 
credibility of both parties” (2004, p. 273). Levin states that some politicians may not have a 
favourable view of what media do in that they believe they “cannot get fair coverage of their 
work because the media are biased against them, either on partisan grounds or out of a simple 
dislike for anything to do with government” (Levin, 2004, p. 272). Obviously governments 
and politics provide stories and news for the media and are considered as the main sources of 
news for the media. Governments are relying upon media to make their information public. 
This does not necessarily confirm the mutual relations of the two. Media are often critical of 
the governments. “Media coverage thrives on wrongdoing, whether real or alleged. People 
seem to like to hear about crimes and misdemeanours of whatever kind. Scandals are also a 
subject of great public interest, and, therefore, of media coverage” (Levin, 2004, p. 279). This 
critical eye of the media has often forced the governments to be more cautious of what they 
say or do. John Pilger, an Australian film director, war correspondent and commentator made 
a documentary in 2010 about the role of the media in devastating wars like Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The case of Pilger clearly shows that “indeed, the exposure of wrongdoing and 
scandal is an important role of the media” (Levin, 2004, p. 279). In case of a problem, the 
media coverage focuses on who to blame as a solution to the problem. 
 In his documentary, The War You Don’t See, he investigated the reporting and 
justifying methods of war crimes by the media. In his documentary, he quoted from a 
government official talking to a media agent, saying “if the people really knew the truth, the 
war would be stopped tomorrow, but of course, they don’t know and they can’t know” (Pilger, 
2010). He believes that the creation of illusion has come a long way since Edward Bernays, 
the founder of modern propaganda - which was called the “invisible government” (Pilger, 
2010). In this documentary, Stuart Ewen, a media historian, declared that “when you start 
using symbols that have been separated from their meanings, the facts don’t mean any more” 
(Ewen in The War You Don’t See, 2010). Thus, there can easily and simply be a link between 
Saddam and the 9/11 attacks, despite the fact that he did not have anything to do with it. In 
this documentary, Melvin Goodman, the former CIA analyst, explained how the news can be 
manipulated to shape public opinion. Moreover, David Rose, the former journalist of The 
Observer, wrote in one of his articles that he was ashamed about what he wrote. He declared: 
“the facts that I believed to be the truth, were not true. They were a pack of lies fed to me by 
a fairly sophisticated disinformation campaign” (Rose in The War You Don’t See, 2010). Fran 
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Unsworth, BBC head of newsgathering, is another important figure who was interviewed by 
Pilger. When she was asked by Pilger whether the facts reported by BBC regarding the 
existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq were not really facts, and whether it was the 
reporter’s duty to find out the truth and transfer it to the public, she explained that this 
happened primarily because of lack of access to first hand reporting.135 Secondly, “what BBC 
does or has as its duty, is to report what the government or their representatives saying, which 
of course BBC did”. She continued: “we were reporting quite legitimately the claims that the 
people of the time were making, even if they weren’t legitimate claims, they were in the mouth 
of legitimate leaders and we had the duty to report that” (Unsworth in The War You Don’t See, 
2010). The above example serves two simultaneous purposes. The first shows how politics are 
manipulated by the media in reflecting the war news; and the second focuses on the pivotal 
role of the media as a critic of government.  
Iran and Islam in media and memoir 
The Islamic Republic and Islamic rituals have often been demonised in the media. 
According to Royston (2010), who has been living in the Middle East and has mingled with 
both sects of Muslims, everything about Islam reaches the “West” via the media:   
Images of Islam reach the West via TV, YouTube and the print media - the Haj, 
Ashura and Ramadan. Historical and current events frame our picture of Islam 
- the Muslim conquests, the Golden Age, the Crusades, the fall of 
Constantinople, the Ottoman Court, and today, jihad, terrorism, the Taliban, 
veiled women, Iran, sectarian strife and Iraq. In the West, we fuel our paranoia 
by seizing upon messages of hatred rather than love (Royston, 2010). 
Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery also note that: “the media control and filter 
information, selectively determining what Westerners learn about Islam” (2013, p. 17). Before 
the 1979 Revolution in Iran, most “Westerners” especially Americans had little or vague 
knowledge of the Middle East. The image of Islam in the news media was equal to the popular 
arts and stereotypes of the religion i.e. tantalising harems, tough punishments, oil and 
backwardness. Iran as a non-Arab country was lost in this hazy picture. Following the Islamic 
Revolution, the hostage crisis and Iran-Iraq war, the world attention was riveted to Iran mostly 
and it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the Islamic world came to be known 
through Iran’s affairs. In 1991, as mentioned in the introduction, Robin Wright, an expert on 
Islam and a senior advisor of the Bush administration, stated that the American government 
“has to be smarter in dealing with Islam than in dealing with communism 30 or 40 years ago” 
(Robin as cited in Said, 1997, p. 7).“The danger of simplifying a ‘myriad of countries’ was 
noted, but the only picture in the five column piece was of Ayatollah Khomeini. He and Iran, 
                                               
135 Second-hand information, rather than day-to-day developments and eye-witness information can be 
a main source of biased reporting as the reporter is mostly relying on stereotypes.  
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embodied all that was objectionable about Islam, from terrorism and anti-Westernism” (p. 7). 
Also, as Baker, Gabrielatos & McEnery (2013) concluded in Discourse Analysis and Media 
Attitudes, the research has shown that the representation of Muslims and Islamic norms in the 
UK media for twelve years till 2009 “was predominantly carried out in a context of conflict, 
and the religion and its faithful were frequently portrayed as causes for concern, if not sources 
of threat” (p. 65).136 Edward Said in his Covering Islam states that the Islam introduced by the 
media is a certain picture with a set of feelings that “goes with the over-all context” (1997, p. 
47). According to Said, the media “are corporations serving and promoting a corporate identity 
–‘America’ and even ‘the West’- they all have the same central consensus in mind” (Said, 
1997, p. 52). In Said’s opinion, although there is a vast variety of newspapers, TV, radios and 
news channels, “there is a qualitative and a quantitative tendency to favour certain views and 
certain representations of reality over others” (p. 49). In the case of Iran, the news is shaped 
with such a mentality in advance. Burke (2013) notes in The Observer that: 
Our collective image of Iran and Iranians has been constructed by images that 
are almost always terrifying (the finger-waving bearded cleric addressing the 
crowd, the gun-toting extremist, the ranks of identical veiled women), by a 
small selection of high-profile and dramatic events involving animosity towards 
the West (the 1979-81 Tehran hostage crisis, the fatwa against Salman Rushdie 
of 1989, more recent “meddling” in Iraq) and by an evolving perception of 
immediate threat. (Burke in The Observer, 2013).  
To this one should add that “a combination of a sustained policy of Iran phobia and 
demonization against the regime, and relentless unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions, 
has isolated and alienated Iran in its entirety” (Honarbin-Holliday, 2008, p. 6). This situation 
is not new. As discussed before, Shi’as have been historically victimised by both Muslims and 
non-Muslims. Symbolic in a similar way, after the event of the hostage crisis in Iran, almost 
every aspect of the history of Shi’a Islam appeared to be illogical or strange. According to 
Rizvi, in the study of Shi’ism, “the word misunderstood is not strong enough, rather it is an 
understatement. Not only is Shi’ism misunderstood, it has been ignored, misrepresented and 
studied mostly through the heresiographic literature of its opponents” (2007, p. 113). 
Modarresi137 in his ‘World’s Biggest Pilgrimage Now Underway, And Why You’ve never 
Heard of it!’ writes about the world’s biggest gathering of Shi’as every year and the reason 
why this event has never been reflected in the media. He believes: “it probably has to do with 
                                               
136 “It is notable that the term terror* occurs more often than Islam* in a corpus in which Islam* was 
one of the search query terms” (Baker, Gabrielatos & McEnery, 2013, p. 65).  
137 Sayed Mahdi al-Modarresi (b. 1977) is a prominent Shi’a scholar who studied in the Islamic 
seminaries in Syria, Iran and Iraq. “He undertook his early academic education in the United States of 
America, finally studying sociology, politics, and philosophy at tertiary level in Australia” 
(modarresi.org, n.d.). He is famous for his English and Arabic speeches and articles. He is the author of 
Say; He is God – Allah the God of Islam and Why Muslims Are Weird - And Some Downright Crazy! 
Both of which are under publication.  
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the fact that the press is concerned more with negative, gory, and sensationalized tabloids, than 
with positive, inspiring narratives, particularly when it comes to Islam” (2014).138 Said 
examines the case of Muharram, the month of grief and mourning for the martyrdom of the 
grandson of the Prophet, Imam Hossain, by some orientalist writers and journalists. In his 
example, Randy Daniels in Nightly News wrote a nonsensical statement about Muharram. He 
wrote that Muharram is a period for Shi’as in which they “celebrate Mohammed’s challenge 
to world leaders” (1997, p. 88). In another example, David Jarvis and Shekhar Bhatia in the 
Sunday Express (2010) in their article entitled “Muslims cut bodies for faith”, tried to explain 
the Muharram event that happened for the first time in Britain:  
ISLAMIC fanatics are mutilating themselves at a British mosque in a bloody 
ceremony carried out only yards from a busy high street. Shi’a Muslims use a 
five-bladed chain called a Zanjeer to whip their own backs and make cuts in 
their foreheads with razor blades in homage to their faith. Bare-chested men 
were left bleeding heavily during the ritual known as Matam – self-flagellation 
– which a witness described as being “like a scene from a horror film”. The 
Sunday Express found that up to 800 men performed the bloody ceremony in 
secret at the Imamia Mosque in Forest Gate, East London, last year. The Matam 
takes place during the annual Shi’a Ashura ceremony and commemorates the 
death of Hossain, a grandson of the prophet Muhammad. It is practised largely 
in Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and India as well as Yemen and Afghanistan but this is 
the first time it is known to have taken place in Britain. Huge wooden screens 
were put up around the mosque to keep the event secret and prevent passers-by 
on busy Romford Road seeing the bloodletting (Jarvis & Bhatia, 2010). 
The Ashura and azadari (religious mourning) were witnessed by an English man who 
then interpreted it as a horror movie.  He said: “I was told it was part of a religious ceremony 
but the anti-Western sentiment was clear. If the public had seen what was going on they would 
have reported it to the police. It was a scene from a horror film” (Jarvis & Bhatia, 2010). How 
this religious programme looked like a horror film is not mentioned. Interestingly, at the end 
of this description, the writers mentioned that: “Newham Council said it had no knowledge of 
the Matam taking place and the Ministry of Justice said self-flagellation was not an offence” 
(Jarvis, Bhatia, 2010). According to Sardar (1999), “a discussion of what happened in the past 
is also an attempt at representing the past” (p. 54). Personal representations are biased to some 
degree and thus can come to make orientalism possible. Needless to say that “bias comes 
especially in the questions one poses and in the type of category one uses, where indeed, bias 
is especially hard to track down because it is hard to suspect the very terms one uses, which 
                                               
138 Modarresi continued: “If a few hundred anti-immigration protestors take to the streets in London and 
they will make headlines... The same level of airtime is awarded to a pro-democracy march in Hong 
Kong or an anti-Putin rally in Russia... But a gathering of twenty million in obstreperous defiance of 
terror and injustice somehow fails even to make it into the TV news ticker! An unofficial media embargo 
is imposed on the gargantuan event despite the story having all the critical elements of an eye-catching 
feature; the staggering numbers, the political significance, the revolutionary message, the tense 
backdrop, as well as originality. But when such a story does make it through the editorial axe of major 
news outlets, it creates shockwaves and touches the most random people” (2014).  
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seem so innocently neutral” (Hodgson, 1974, p. 27). The events may have not been omitted or 
even distorted, but not being analysed properly can also lead to misinformation. Given the 
thematic focus on essentialist representations of Islamic rituals by media or orientalists, I 
hereby examine the depiction of Iranian culture and Islamic rituals by diaspora Iranians to 
explore how these works contribute to a broader understanding of Islam and Iran.  
On the basis of what discussed in the previous sections on autobiography, Persepolis is 
presented by “Western readership” as authoritative. In Persepolis in the chapter “The Key” 
Satrapi asserts that: “hitting yourself is one of the country’s rituals. During certain religious 
ceremonies, some people flagellated themselves brutally. Sometimes even with chains. It 
could go very far. Sometimes it was considered a Macho thing” (Satrapi, 2003, p. 96). By “it 
could go very far”, she is actually referring to the issue of qame zani,139 an act of mourning for 
the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet on the day of Ashura (10th day of Muharram, 
the first month in the Islamic calendar). This includes striking the head with a sword in 
remembrance of what happened to Imam Hossain and his companions on the day of Ashura. 
Out of context and with no former background for non-Muslims, such rituals are likely be 
dreadful and horrifying, and just illustrate the unreasonable extremism. However, considered 
in the proper cultural and religious context, they might not seem as such. It is noticeable that 
a large number of Shi’a olama140 have forbidden the act of qame zani as it is likely that those 
practising it will hurt themselves, and might lead to loss of life and create instability in religion. 
According to Sardar, “there is an obligation to state Muslim beliefs and views in their ‘entirety 
so fully and clearly as to leave no room for complaint of misinterpretation’” (Sardar, 1999, pp. 
56-57). One should possess proper knowledge and skill to decipher the Islamic documents and 
“integrate the material culled therefrom into an historical contribution in the accepted 
professional sense” (Tibawi as cited in Sardar, 1999, p. 56). Barzegar, in her Persepolis and 
Orientalism, stated that Ashura and its related rituals - beating the chest, chaining the back and 
even qame zani - “can be compared to some Catholic religious practices” (2012, p. 42) and 
                                               
139 Tatbir or qame zani is a mortification ritual practised by some Shi’as on the tenth day of Muharram 
in commemoration of the third Imam of Shi’as, “which consists of making an incision in the crown of 
the head, and as they walk along, beating it with their hands or the flat part of a sword to make the blood 
flow” (Mervin, 2007, p. 139). “Some Shiite clerics forbid the tatbir, because they consider it self-
damage (darar) and haram in Islam. Hizbullah does not allow his members to practice the tatbir, 
because Khomeini, and later Khamenei, forbade it” (Mervin, 2007, p. 146).  
140 For example, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has announced that tatbir is a 
wrong action. “Of course some forms of mourning are unacceptable. For instance, ‘qame zani’ [a 
religiously prohibited ritual in which people cut their foreheads] has been declared haraam, and it must 
not be practiced. That is because qame zani will make the enemies more insolent and will give them an 
advantage over those who love the members of the Holy Prophet's household. But the common 
mourning rituals can increasingly strengthen one's emotional connection to the infallible Imams. These 
rituals are very good. Tatbir [qame zani] is a fabricated tradition. It is among the issues that do not 
belong to the religion and undoubtedly God is not also pleased with such a practice” Said Khamenei 
(2009). 
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therefore is nothing rare nor new from a religious point of view. As mentioned earlier in this 
research, Ashura is rooted in a dispute following the split between Shi’a and Sunni Islam and 
therefore is of great importance to the followers of Ahlulbayt, the progeny of the Prophet. 
According to Barzegar, “such rituals are not practiced for male confirmation, but have a much 
more devout, religious meaning that is not shared only by the male gender, but is practiced by 
women as well” (2012, p. 43). In a similar way, Axworthy compares the Muharram funeral 
processions to “traditional Good Friday processions in many Catholic countries” (2013, p. 23).  
He later states: 
The Ashura processions in particular made a template for the public expression 
of collective solidarity and moral feeling that was significant in the revolution - 
as well as reinforcing the common understanding among all classes of Shi’a 
beliefs about the Emams. The processions reconfirmed and reinforced ideas 
about the arrogance and corruption of power and wealth, and the virtue of 
modesty and poverty, that run deep in Shi’ism and in Islam more generally (p. 
24). 
Likewise, Steve Royson (2010), an English writer of the MidEast Posts, comments on 
the Shi’a rituals which he observed in Bahrain during Muharram. He describes the mass 
marches on the day of Ashura in Bahrain, a country with a population which is nearly 65% 
Shi’a. Royston’s account of religious ceremony although he is a “Westerner” and a non-
Muslim - seems to be realistic and positive. His point of view towards Shi’a rituals is a 
respectful look at differences in people’s beliefs. Even though he is not a Shi’a and has never 
observed the mournful scene of the ceremony before, he abstained from presenting a 
stereotypical representation of Ashura. As Jonas Slaats (2007), the author of Yunus News, 
argues: the bias or subjectivity is inevitably creeping into media reports, however, responsible 
media should be aware of the “limit to what is inevitable. It is, for example, not allowed to 
invent or distort facts or to take them so much out of context that they are doomed to give a 
wrong idea to the public” (Slaats, 2007). In this article, Slaats reflects upon the Ashura 
ceremony and its representation in BBC and CNN reports. By stating the way this religious 
ritual has been portrayed in the media, Slaats condemns the BBC’s choice of words for 
describing this Islamic ceremony. He believes that the linguistic technique which the BBC 
used to represent Ashura is absolutely wrong from an ethical and journalistic point of view 
(2007). He then asserted that “there is no real excuse” for such wording, even if it was just a 
misplacement.  
Through ignorance and prejudice, Islam is ‘demonized’ and ‘barbarized’ 
enough all over the world. We do not need the media to add to that any further. 
[…] but to simply copy-paste information about a ritual, without really checking 
or contextualizing it, certainly in such sensitive issues, is plain wrong from both 
a journalistic and an ethical point of view (Slaats, 2007 as cited in Barzegar, 
2012, p. 46). 
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Arguably, the worldwide negative reception of Islamic rituals represented in Persepolis 
depends upon the fear of Islam as an unfamiliar and exotic culture; especially because of the 
fact that Satrapi, due to her personal account, was not able to provide her non-Muslim 
audiences with the full historical, cultural and religious background. According to Alexandra 
Kitty (2005): 
The less we know about a group, the more mysterious, unpredictable and 
dangerous they seem. We don’t know their weaknesses, their fears or even their 
humanity and kindness. […] because we don’t have enough information to 
make a decision, it just seems safer to hate and fear outsiders (p. 123). 
In Satrapi’s case, it could be said that she left Iran because she could not live as an 
individual and support the regime which she believed had restricted her individuality. As a 
“Western” educated and a member of elite upper-class, Satrapi’s lifestyle contrasts that of the 
majority of Iranians. Her secular lifestyle fits the “Western” individuality and freedom which 
is in contradiction with solidarity and fraternity of Muslim communities. Her royal family has 
never lived according to the rules of Islamic social and moral norms. According to Theodore 
Gabriel, the notion of ummah exists at different levels in an Islamic community (Gabriel, 2004, 
p. 15). This not only refers to the whole nation but to any group such as a family or a village 
at smaller levels. What is important is the group not just the individual. This can be referred 
to another sharp contrast between the “Western” and Islamic countries. In the case of Iran, 
religion is the foundation of society and the social rules and orders are derived from the context 
of the sacred texts. Religion and state are hand in hand in almost all aspects of life. The 
separation of the two is explained in Iran as the propaganda of the enemies of Islam, namely 
imperialists and orientalists.141 The imperialists according to Khomeini began their 
“penetration of the Muslim countries about three hundred years ago, and they regarded it as 
necessary to work for the extirpation of Islam in order to attain their ultimate goals” (1970, p. 
7). In general, the apprehension of some Muslims to the idea of individuality or separation of 
politics from Islam might be owing to the fact that they believe “their traditions and values can 
be infected by Western individualism and liberalism and thus jeopardised. Western culture is 
therefore commonly seen to be a threat to the Islamic way of life and a force that erodes […] 
social norms of Islam” (Gabriel, 2004, p. 16). As Khomeini put it, Islam is not just limited to 
individual stances or needs; rather, it is the political and social aspects of Islam that determine 
the destiny of a nation and will guarantee the omat-e Islami’s salvation. The rules and 
                                               
141 Islam is the religion of anti-imperialism. The nature of Islam is based on freedom and independence 
but the imperialists with the help of orientalists are trying to make Muslims dependent upon them 
(Khomeini, 1970, p. 14). In Khomeini’s words, “they felt that the major obstacle in the path of their 
materialistic ambitions and the chief threat to their political power was nothing but Islam and its 
ordinances, and the belief of the people in Islam. They therefore plotted and campaigned against Islam 
by various means” (Khomeini, 1970, p. 7). 
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regulations set by Islam are intended to design a holistic way of life for every individual in the 
community of believers. The hejab issues, as will be discussed in the following chapter, have 
many political, anti-imperial and anti-colonial implications, and also national significance 
inside Iran. To many Muslim Iranian women, the veil has an “anti-Western” capacity in its 
nature. The hejab is also looked at as the main barrier to the corruption of the nation and its 
political and cultural dependence. It is considered as a “social vaccination of [women’s] purity 
and virtuousness” against sickness of imperialist penetration; “As vaccinations are compulsory 
for the sake of public health, so veiling is enforced and is not a matter of individual choice” 
(Haddad & Esposito, 1998, p. 61). The “Islamic dress is also used as a sign of protest and 
liberation. It has developed political overtones, becoming a source of national pride as well as 
resistance to Western” (cultural as well as political) dominance and to authoritarian regimes 
(Esposito, 2002, p. 132). From this point of view, disregarding the rule would foster further 
imperialist or orientalist discourses about religion in Iran.  
Conclusion 
Whilst providing an historical overview focusing on the relationships between the 
religious leadership and political authority in pre and post-revolutionary Iran, this chapter 
explored the attitudes towards democracy at a global, Islamic and Iranian level, assessing how 
these attitudes give rise to different interpretations of human rights. As argued, democracies 
range from liberal to social and can be very collective or individual oriented. Different regimes 
can be considered differently democratic as long as they stretch between these two extremes. 
Therefore, there is no fixed definition or position for democracy. Based on the general 
common features of democracy discussed so far, democracy and non-democracy are 
distinguishable on the account of the conditions of coming to power and being accountable for 
the actions of those in power. The Iranian system with its unique definition of velayat-e faqih 
and application of shura and different elected bodies can still be considered a democracy as 
long as it is within the above mentioned extremes.  
Analysis of Satrapi’s views suggested that her perception of democracy focuses on the 
substantial body of a universal definition of human rights. However, as Namli critiques the 
monopoly of liberal, individual and universal understanding of human rights, both democracy 
and human rights must be defined in a social, political and national framework and therefore 
must be contextualised. This is quite necessary to reject the monopoly of liberal individualism 
as a colonial legacy. The concept of human rights itself suggests complexity, pluralism, 
contextual evaluation and interpretation far from an absolute fixed framework or a positive 
law. In this regard, Satrapi’s concept of human rights which is based on individual freedom 
and “Western” liberalism seems to contradict her intentio auctoris which is very much 
inclusive in nature and is the main source of her dissatisfaction with feminist circles. As 
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discussed in the introduction, Satrapi’s rejection of being a feminist and her claims over 
democracy’s failure in both Iran and the “West” is in line with her intentio auctoris, while her 
belief in individuality seems to contradict her intentio auctoris. According to Namli, there is 
no international universal concept of human rights and the secular, liberal and individual 
concept of human rights is a wrong reductionist approach. Religion as well as politics are 
inevitable in any legitimate discourse on human rights.  
Namli’s argument can be applied to the dynamic nature of democracy. In an ideal model, 
democracy is largely based on the notions of basic human rights, equality and individual 
freedom (Blaug and Schwarzmantel, 2004, p. 4). However, according to Blaug and 
Schwarzmantel “in a new millennium it is more difficult than ever to put into practice the core 
values of democratic theory, even assuming there could be agreement on what they are” (2004, 
p. 2). In terms of investigating the compatibility of democracy with Islam, one should be aware 
of the fact that the democratic ideals should not merely be considered as “a product of a 
particular civilisation, that of Western Europe and North America, one which commands no 
validity in other cultures, say those of Islam” (Blaug and Schwarzmantel, 2004, p. 4). The fact 
is that democratic values are not confined to certain cultures. In a democratic system, 
differences and multiculturalism are to be respected. Democracy, according to Blaug and 
Schwarzmantel, “may be based on certain values, of secularism and willingness (and ability) 
to compromise, which in turn depend on a particular history and set of social conditions which 
suit Western society” but is definitely not practical in other parts of the world today i.e. the 
Middle East (2004, p. 5).  
Consequently, human rights just like democracy cannot and should not have a fixed 
definition and the need to contextualisation seems quite necessary in understanding and 
justification of human rights in different contexts. Moreover, Satrapi’s individuality is the one 
that is not appreciated by the Islamic Republic which is more public oriented. In such a context, 
one would not expect Satrapi or others to support a regime which they believe has limited their 
individuality. This will justify Satrapi’s representations of Islamic rituals in Iran in almost the 
same way as the orientalist accounts, although she repeatedly announced her dissatisfaction 
with the biased media representations and journalistic reports on Iran, there is a tension in her 
approach. While her intentio auctoris attempts to be nuanced, her depiction of Shia rituals 
plays into the agendas of some of her “Western” readers.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE HEJAB IN AND BEYOND PERSEPOLIS 
Introduction 
In the opening chapter of Persepolis, “The Veil”, Satrapi presents the Iranian policies 
of the hejab. “The Veil”, in addition to being the first chapter of her graphic novel (2003, pp. 
3-9), is the title of another chapter in the second part of the book (Satrapi, 2003, pp. 233-245). 
The first page begins with a primary school picture of Satrapi in 1980. Little Marji142 wears a 
veil just like all her classmates. One cannot see Satrapi (“You don’t see me”); She is only 
partially visible at the far left of this picture until she notes that “this is me” (Satrapi, 2003, p. 
3). In this first frame, Satrapi depicts herself as “fragmented, cut, disembodied, and divided 
between frames. [This] indicates the psychological condition suggested by the chapter’s title, 
‘The Veil’” (Chute, 2008, p. 96). Satrapi says that she did not really like to wear the veil as 
she did not understand why she had to do so (2003, p. 3). In The Guardian (2003), Satrapi 
wrote: “I have worn a hijab, and it was a question of survival. When I was 10 the revolution 
happened in Iran, where I lived, and from that point I was forced to wear the veil. If I hadn’t 
done it, I would have been jailed” (Satrapi in The Guardian, 2003). The arrangement of 
Persepolis clearly confirms its author’s concerns. The imposition of the hejab as an Islamic 
rule applied by the Iranian government is one of Satrapi’s main concerns in Persepolis. The 
debate on the hejab is neither new nor unique to Persepolis. The veil, in Islam, is generally a 
continued discourse initiated with the projection of “Western” system of citizenship and rights 
on Muslim societies in general while focusing on the oppression of women by Muslim men 
(Nash, 2012, p. 50). There are numerous examples of the hejab in Persepolis as the sign of 
Satrapi’s oppression, segregation and subordination as a woman in the ‘patriarchal’ society of 
Iran. For example, upon her return to Iran or when studying at the university in Tehran, she 
condemns the restrictions applied to women in terms of their outfits while men remained 
relatively free (Satrapi, 2003, p. 298).  
The author of Persepolis openly criticises the totalitarianism of the Iranian Islamic 
regime and discusses the veil as the symbol of the oppression of women. Satrapi’s Persepolis 
is largely represented by intentio lectoris as “the autobiographical story of living under the 
repressive Iranian government” (Mpottash, 2008). According to Tully, Satrapi’s agenda has 
the outspoken aim of signalling to a “Western and non-Iranian audience” the problem of 
women’s oppression under the current Islamic government (Satrapi in Tully, 2004). The veil 
                                               
142 “Throughout Satrapi’s narrative, the protagonist is a child (the young Marjane, called Marji)” (Chute, 
2008, p. 94).  
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seems to be unequivocally associated to darkness, just like the narrow-minds of those who 
support its implementation. This association is rendered in an exemplary manner by a series 
of highly evocative vignettes in which fully veiled women shout their support for the hejab 
with closed eyes (Satrapi, 2003, p. 60). It seems as if, in Mahmood’s words, their participation 
in the demonstration for the veil are “more prone to inculcating mindless and habitual 
submission to authority” in Iran (Mahmood, 2011, p. 83). Also, Satrapi’s awareness of gender 
inequality and elaborating on feminist agendas led to confirm her position as a feminist, which 
she clearly denies to be. Moving from this premise, I will explain the irreconcilable differences 
between Satrapi’s intentio auctoris and that of the intentio lectoris i.e. “Western” media and 
the Islamic Republic.   
In an interview with Asia Society, she declares that her position towards the hejab is a 
dual one and what she actually opposes is the language of force not the idea of veiling itself 
(Satrapi in Shaikh, Asia Society, n.d.). According to her public declarations, the veil is an 
instrument of rebellion for Satrapi,143 and often aids her in this rebellion. At times, even while 
wearing the veil, she rebels against other societal restrictions (Mpottash, 2008). Frequently, 
Satrapi mentioned: “I really believe in a society where if someone wants to walk in the street 
completely naked they will be able to, and if someone wants to wear a veil they will also be 
able to” (Satrapi in Hattenstone, 2008). The goal of the current chapter is to create an informed 
discussion regarding Satrapi’s dual position towards the hejab- she is against the ideology of 
imposition and/or banishment of the hejab- while her ideology has been used merely as the 
representation of Iran as a patriarchal and “fundamentalist” nation. My argument thus revolves 
around the establishment and confirmation of these orientalist representations and Satrapi’s 
dissatisfaction with the current representation of Iran as a terrorist nation or her work as a 
feminist art. This chapter is an attempt to analyse Satrapi’s position towards the hejab along 
with her intentio auctoris to challenge the stereotypes set against her country. 
 In light of the above, I will discuss how a simplistic reading of ‘the veil’ has contributed to 
the perpetration of clichés by means of a campaign constructed against the hejab, which frames 
it as a symbol for women’s oppression. According to Hirschkind and Mahmoud (2002): “The 
veil has been freighted with so many meanings in contemporary social and political conflicts 
that any ascription of a singular meaning to it – such as a ‘symbol of women’s oppression’- is 
unconvincing” (p. 352). It so emerges that the hejab is not just a piece of cloth for covering 
women’s hair. It is (and as I will show, always has been) a political signifier, especially in 
Iran. Jennifer Heath, in her recent study on Iranian women writers, noted that: “The social 
meanings of head coverings worldwide are as diverse as the cultures they come from. In Iran, 
                                               
143 In one of her interviews with The Guardian (2003), Satrapi said that wearing the veil in Iran was a 
symbol of rebellion for her. 
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the social meaning of the veil is a contested one and continues to be the subject of religious 
and political disputes” (2008, p. 252). For many, the veil carries different connotations. It 
could range from repression and patriarchal fundamentalist Islamism to adherence to the 
sacred laws of Islam.  
In the final section of this chapter, the social meaning of the hejab in Iran as defined by 
the Islamic Republic would be useful in considering Satrapi’s concerns. The hejab rules in 
Iran are shaped by ethos that privilege communal health over individual liberty. The outspoken 
rationale of the contemporary government in Iran is to implement a public ethos, i.e. a way to 
protect (the women of) a minority faith community, as well as all other Islamic values in a 
community that has historically shaped its identity on notions of resistance and struggle against 
the threats posed by orientalists and imperialists.144 The community ethos set by the 
government in Iran is argued (by Iranian officials) to establish a social order,145 that is 
beneficial to everyone. Therefore, the commitment of the government to Shi’a Islam is not just 
to legitimise the power and authority of ruling system, but to keep this social order in place 
and to help solve social problems with reference to the Qur’an and ahadith. The current 
policies of the hejab are thus a way to enforce an historical notion of community identity146 in 
Iran, and to give Iranian women the freedom to be functional social beings inside the omat-e 
Islami.147 Needless to mention that, these are the views of olama and public officials to justify 
their policies. Satrapi’s concern in terms of the hejab originates from her individuality which 
is rooted in her “Western” upper-class secular background (which is different from those of 
the majority of Iranians and the government) as well as her belief in “freedom” and “choice” 
over women’s body and clothing.  
An introduction to other memoirs 
Satrapi is not an isolated case in this research. In contemporary Iran, many intellectuals 
share the same views on Iranian policies, especially as far as women’s issues are concerned 
                                               
144 This is confirmed by Sedghi, “The hijab (cover or modesty) and reveiling became one of the most 
pervasive symbols of the revolution, standing for Islamism, anti-imperialism and anti-Westernism” 
(Sedghi, 2007, p. 199). 
145 The hejab “fosters social order by regulating women’s sexuality […] veiling guarded Islam, but 
significantly, it hid women’s sexual power/energy from eliciting public disorder by distracting and 
arousing men sexually”. Also, the hejab “is an institution with its own set of rules regarding women’s 
conduct and their actions and interactions, in particular with men” (Sedghi, 2007, pp. 212-213). 
146 “Veiling is believed to signify the identity of the nation, and of Islamic society, fighting against the 
West for independence” (Semati, 2008, p. 219). 
147 See Bullock’s debate on the hejab, which relies on interviews with a group of Muslim women to 
discover the meaning of the hejab and also “to add a perspective that has hitherto been marginalised, 
namely the point of view of the believer” (2002, p. xxix). In her Rethinking Muslim Women and the veil, 
Bullock presents the ideas of a group of women who believe that the hejab means “to give back to 
women ultimate control of their own bodies”, and “to give them freedom from constant attention to the 
physical self”. It “is one of the most fundamental aspects of female empowerment” (2002, pp. 184-185).  
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and have expressed them in best-selling memoirs. Just like Satrapi, they live as 
exiles/expatriates in Western Europe or the USA after being expelled from or leaving Iran. 
The three authors I will discuss in this chapter are: Betty Mahmoody’ Not without My 
Daughter,148 1987 (b. 1947, Alma, Michigan); Azar Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in Tehran, 2003 
(b. 1955, Tehran); and Shirin Ebadi’s Iran Awakening, 2007 (b. 1947, Hamadan). The 
rationale of this choice is based upon the popularity of their memoirs, their condemnation of 
Iran, the historical period they all represent, i.e. the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, and 
finally their ostracism from Iran. Further to that, such narratives are personal stories of women 
whose traumatic experiences in revolutionary Iran are turned into the possibility to give voice 
to individualist claims of agency in a country, where the idea itself of personal freedom is one 
subordinate to Islamic social obligations. Just like Satrapi, their dramatic experiences have 
influenced an increasingly popular genre, thus providing the background for a new 
consolidated trend in contemporary literature, i.e. the courageous independent woman 
resisting Islamic oppression. Although there are several similarities i.e. the role played by the 
hejab policies and, in general, gender inequality is central to most discourses between the 
aforementioned works, Satrapi’s intention stands out as unique.149 A comparative literary 
analysis of Persepolis and the works of Mahmoody, Ebadi and Nafisi – I argue – will provide 
the empirical terrain for a more nuanced discourse on Satrapi’s intention, and contemporary 
representations of Persepolis in terms of gender, the hejab, Iran and the Islamic Republic.  
Not without My Daughter, 1987 
An American citizen who was married to an Iranian doctor, Betty Mahmoody narrates 
her short sojourn in Iran soon after the Islamic Revolution. The story begins when Betty, her 
husband, Sayed Bozorg Mahmoody (1939-2009), and their little daughter Mahtob leave US 
for a short vacation in Iran. Back then, Iranian society was facing a difficult time, being just 
out of the revolution and in the middle of the Iran-Iraq war. After two weeks in Iran, Bozorg 
(“Moody”) reveals to Betty that he has lost his job in the USA. He therefore wishes to stay in 
Iran and help his country during the war. Betty disagrees and insists on going back home. After 
a series of dramatic experiences and the quite likely possibility of being separated from 
Mahtob, the protagonist manages to escape with her little daughter, and to reach the US 
embassy in Turkey. Upon her return to America, Betty obtains a divorce from her husband. 
                                               
148 Betty Mahmoody’s Not without My Daughter (1987), though antecedent to all the other memoirs, is 
different. The author is an American citizen whose position is that of an outsider with privileged 
knowledge. 
149 As mentioned before, she has declared on a number of occasions, including upon acceptance of major 
awards, that Persepolis is dedicated to all Iranians and that her graphic novel is a ‘love letter to Iran’. 
In other words, Satrapi is proud of being Iranian, and loves Iran.  
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She meets William Hoffer who helps her to write her memoir. Betty Mahmoody has since 
become a public speaker, and is the president and co-founder of One World for Children, a 
NGO that offers protection to children of bi-cultural marriages. 
Not without My Daughter was released in a time in which Iran faced the toughest period 
in its history, i.e. after the 1979 Iran hostage crisis, the sanctioning of an international embargo, 
the war with Iraq, the 1983 Hezbollah bombings and the 1986 Iran-Contra Affair. None of 
these affairs have been easy or without any costs for Iran. Its launch and – just like Persepolis 
– its successive rendering into a movie, occurred in 1991, after the 1988 US launch of an 
Operation Praying Mantis against Iran and the shooting down of Iranian Airbus A300B2 in 
Iranian airspace by the US Navy. Such events have accustomed “Western” readers to the 
public slandering of Iran. These are inevitably built on traumatic personal narratives that 
reduce complex political and cultural situations into basic structural opposites such as, for 
instance, freedom and oppression, religion and fanaticism, man and woman, etc. Dramatic 
events that Mahmoody experienced had a major impact on the emotional and material life of 
the author. The common language of Mahmoody is rooted in the anxious reaction to personal 
experiences of oppression and abuse, the Islamic Revolution generates anti-Islamic 
sentiments. Mahmoody is concerned with phenomena of gendered discrimination and/or 
oppression in Iran. The only means of liberation she envisages is one that annihilates the values 
of Iran and aggressively dismisses its culture. Some critics believe that the book is a way to 
deliver not just Mahmoody’s concerns, but also seems designed to reinforce negative 
perceptions of Iran among “Western” readers. According to Bahramitash, “The book helped 
to incite anti-Iranian feelings across Europe and North America and, in the aftermath of 11 
September, when this genre was gaining new momentum” (2005, p. 227). This can be evinced 
from its recent (i.e. post-9/11) edition, where a woman wearing a black niqab occupies the 
whole cover. While veiling (the hejab) is compulsory in Iran, the burqa or niqab is an Arab 
garment that is not popular in Iran. Mahmoody herself gives a completely different description 
of the Iranian veil: “a chador150 is a large, half-moon-shaped cloth entwined around the 
shoulders, forehead, and chin to reveal only eyes, nose and mouth” (Mahmoody, 1998, p. 5).  
The global advertisement of the book and the movie which speaks with the language of 
essential views, i.e. the hejab equals oppression, can easily promote orientalist stereotypes. 
Freedom and liberty for Muslim women, and the quest for gender equality, have become the 
                                               
150 In Iran, chador is the most popular women’s choice of the hejab, especially among highly religious 
ladies. Further to that, Mahmoody continues: “What intrigued me most was that the chador was optional. 
There were other garments available to fulfil the harsh requirements of the dress code, but these Muslim 
women chose to wear the chador on top of everything else, despite the oppressive heat. I marvelled at 
the power their society and their religion held over them” (Mahmoody, 1998, p. 5). 
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core argument in many agendas. Keddie observes that nineteenth and early twentieth century 
“Western” stereotypes of Muslim women term them “as little better than slaves, either totally 
repressed or erotic objects, and as needing Western control or tutelage to gain any rights” (p. 
52). Talking about the “Western” stereotypes of Muslim women, Keddie claims that “many 
Westerners see women’s bad conditions as stemming directly from Islam” (Keddie, as cited 
in Nash, 2012, p. 52). According to Kandiyoti, “orientalist depictions of subjugated women 
entrapped in the fast-frozen relations of an atemporal Islam still persisted” (as cited in Nash, 
2012, p. 52). In Bahramitash’s words, books like Not without My Daughter, with the image of 
Muslim women as victims of Islamic tradition, are examples of “feminist Orientalism” (2005, 
p. 221). One of the significant characteristic of this type of orientalism, which is neither new 
nor rare, is that “it regards Oriental women only as victims and not as agents of social 
transformation; thus it is blind to the ways in which women in the “East” resist and empower 
themselves. Therefore Muslim women need saviours, i.e., their Western sisters” (2005, p. 
222). According to many feminists, “this book has hijacked the issue of women’s rights from 
them, and it helps to prepare broad acceptance for the neo-conservatives’ Greater Middle East 
Initiative agenda- a Middle East dominated by US economic and political interests” 
(Bahramitash, 2005, p. 234). The possibility of military confrontation against Iran, 
Bahramitash argues, is inspired through publication of such books. Thus, “the situation calls 
for a reconsideration of the reasons why gender rights advocacy, anti-war activism, and anti-
racism have failed to come together in this case” (Bahramitash, 2005, p. 234).   
Reading Lolita in Tehran, 2003 
This book is the memoir of a lecturer of English in a major university in Tehran. The 
experiences of Azar Nafisi, and the challenges she had to go through with the success of the 
Islamic Revolution, have resulted in an outspoken attack directed towards an aggressive 
patriarchal society. The book conferred immediate success on Nafisi (by then living in the 
USA), and cemented her reputation as one of the most influential authors and public speakers. 
Reading Lolita in Tehran remained in The New York Times bestseller list for more than 117 
weeks. It has been translated into thirty-two languages and has won major literary awards. As 
Mahmood states, Nafisi’s book “has also been promoted as a cultural icon by corporations 
eager to showcase their socially responsible side” (Mahmood, 2011, p. 87). For example, 
Nafisi’s appeared in automobile advertisements for the Audi car manufacturers, who sold their 
brands to many “affluent and educated potential buyers as a part of ‘Audi of America’s Never 
Follow Campaign’” thus, revealing their concerns over the situation of Muslim women that 
“has been evacuated of critical content and whittled down to a commodified token of elite 
chic” (Mahmood, 2011, p. 88). According to Bahramitash, Reading Lolita in Tehran became 
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a major success “because it is regarded as a book that supports the women’s cause. But it is 
infused with feminist Orientalism” (2005, p. 230).   
From the very beginning of her book, Nafisi shows her discontent with the Islamic 
Revolution, and the limits imposed on her professional life by public policies derived from 
religious dogma. Opposition to the regime in Nafisi’s words has made her name (2007, p. 
181). Her analysis is conducted through a comparative study of literature selected as symbolic 
of the endemic problems of Iran. Moving from Nabokov’s Invitation to a Beheading (Russian 
edition 1935-1936; English edition 1959) and Lolita (1955), Nafisi reflects on her traumatic 
experiences caused by criticising the Islamic Republic and religious dogmatism. 
“Provocatively re writing Austen, she angles her satire against the mullahs: ‘It is a truth 
universally acknowledged that a Muslim man, regardless of his fortune, must be in want of a 
nine-year-old-virgin wife’” (Nash, 2012, p. 57). Nafisi associates the “Ayatollah’s victory” 
and “implementation of Islamic” dogmas with anti-human practices within Iranian society 
(Nash, 2012, p. 57). Although Nafisi has said that she neither considers the character of Lolita 
to be the epitome of Iranian women, nor intends the book to be a metaphor for the Islamic 
Republic, however, according to Keshavarz, every episode of Nabokov’s Lolita is tied in with 
the lives of Iranians, especially women, and “sometimes the readings are sidestepped entirely 
and replaced with the author’s personal observations on the Revolution or on extended 
political commentary” (2007, p. 17). The pessimistic tone of Nabokov’s novels suits Nafisi’s 
agenda, i.e. an open critique of the new Islamic Republic of Iran and its Islamic ethos. 
Nabokov’s narratives serve a twofold purpose of giving voice to dissatisfaction with politics 
and towards Islamic rules, especially in matters of gender and the issue of veiling in Iran. The 
public policies of the Iranian government, she argues, have enforced a strict set of laws that 
have contributed to subjugating vulnerable people, chiefly women. She thus advocates 
individualism as the sine qua non of women’s freedom and emancipation, and her objections 
toward public policies criticise a system whose rationale is entirely built on the social 
construction of omat-e Islami (the community of believers). This is exemplified by means of 
a detailed exemplification of various restrictions, however trivial, imposed by the Iranian 
government:  
The joy of teaching was marred by diversion and considerations forced on us 
by the regime - how well could one teach when the main concern of university 
was not the quality of one’s work but the colour of one’s lips, the subversive 
potential of a single strand of hair? (Nafisi, 2004, p. 11).  
Her response to such humiliation “is mediated through literary discussions of the novels 
of Nabokov, Fitzgerald, James and Austen” (Nash, 2012, p. 57). This is confirmed in 
Mahmood’s analysis: 
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She [Nafisi] paints a stultifying picture of life in post-revolutionary Iran – a life 
devoid of any beauty, colour, inspiration, poetry, debate, discussion, and public 
argumentation. In this suffocating environment, it is only the Western literary 
canon that offers any hope of redemption in its irrepressible power to foment 
rebellion and critique and its intrinsic capacity to incite critical self-reflection 
(Mahmood, 2011, p. 85). 
For Nafisi, the literary texts became a means “of exposing the ‘false dreams’ of 
totalitarianism” (Nash, 2012, p. 58). Along with other post-revolutionary memoirs, Nafisi’s 
literary work represents the “dominant metaphors” of her time (Talattof as cited in Nash, 2012, 
p. 58). According to Talattof, this mode of reading is a desired way for promoting subjectivity 
among readers and perfect enough to interpret a text, “and establish a set of criteria for 
evaluating literature. Such an enterprise shapes the readers’ literary tastes and teaches them to 
value political meaning rather than literary form” (Talatoff, 2000, pp. 15-16).  
Unlike Mahmoody, who is neither an Iranian nor an intellectual or artist, Nafisi’s 
stances have the benefit of the authority of a woman who is a native Iranian (i.e. with “insider’s 
knowledge”), an esteemed lecturer and an affirmed writer educated in “Western” institutions 
(Swiss and American universities). Therefore, because of her “insider knowledge”, the reader 
is led to sympathise with the author’s feeling when she learns that the career of an independent 
and bright woman, though a promising one, was stopped by the public policies of the Islamic 
Republic when she finally decided to give up and resign in 1995. According to Marandi, “from 
political as well as literary perspectives, […] memoirs are widely regarded as truthful 
representations of Iran in the Western media and among many Western intellectuals who are 
considered to be experts on Iran” (Marandi, 2009, p. 24). Their success depends in vast 
measure on the nature, i.e. first-hand personal narratives built on “true” events. Usually, he 
continues, they reflect, in emotional terms, on traumatic experiences perpetrated by the Iranian 
government through its policies. These works – irrespective of their actual motivations – 
legitimise the perspective that Islam is indeed an oppressor of women. Even more radically, 
Marandi refers to such writers as “captive minds,” “brown sahibs,” or what Malcolm X would 
call the “house Negro” (Marandi, 2009, p. 23). Nash argues that the narrative techniques used 
by post-revolutionary memoir writers in discussions of gender policies - notably veiling issues 
- in Iran have used a similar language to that of the orientalists. Their language, whether 
fictional, critical or revivalist, is identifiable with hegemonic feminist discourses, values and 
culture, and consequently it is not entirely compatible with revolutionary Islamic viewpoints. 
In his words, “the fault-line between Islam and the West is often articulated by the projection 
of the Western discourse of rights on to Muslim societies” (Nash, 2012, p. 50). Dabashi also 
believes the hegemonic nature of these works does not let the “native informer” speak within 
her local culture (Dabashi, 2006). According to Dabashi, the neo orientalist writer tends to 
describe the problems of a sector of the population (here, most Iranian women) from a superior 
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viewpoint (This fits Satrapi and other’s background; that is, liberal, wealthy and upper middle 
class). It continues presenting the disadvantaged women on the basis of the fact that they 
cannot be represented. In fact, this group, in this case the majority of Iranian women, has been 
presented in terms of: 
[…] their feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and [their] being ‘Third 
World’ (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-
oriented, victimised, etc.) in contrast to the (implicit) self-representation of  
Western women as educated, as modern, as having control over their own 
bodies and sexualities and the freedom to make their own decisions (Mohanty, 
2007, p. 22). 
The accusation of neo orientalism against Reading Lolita in Tehran, just like in the case 
of Mahmoody’s Not without My Daughter finds its confirmation in terms of the commercial 
issues. For example, Nafisi’s book cover shows two young college students looking with 
marvel and enthusiasm at a piece of writing with their scarves improperly fixed. Dabashi states 
that the use of this image is an “iconic burglary from the press, distorted and staged in a frame 
for an entirely different purpose than when it was taken” (2006, p. 7).151 The orientalist cliché 
is further charged by the ambiguity emerging from the public presentation of Reading Lolita 
in Tehran. The book cover places the two young ladies in the context of “Nabokov’s celebrated 
novel about paedophilia”, and thus “re-enacts an old orientalist fantasy about the incestuous 
character of the East, simultaneously repulsive and tantalizing in its essence” (Mahmood, 
2011, p. 88). Nafisi’s book cover, as Bahramitash put it, is a perfect example of an orientalist 
illustration of Muslim women “as victims of the cruel patriarchal practice” especially with 
their hejabs on (2005, p. 224). At the same time, the two Muslim girls seem to respond to 
Nafisi’s idea of insubordination i.e. showing a few strands of hair. Nafisi’s position becomes 
clearer when one focuses on the actual trigger for her denouncement, i.e. the denial of women’s 
rights and the imposition of the hejab.  
In a similar way to Dabashi, Marandi also believes that Nafisi’s bias is illustrated 
through her disrespectful remarks on one of the biggest and most reputable universities of Iran, 
Al-Zahra University, which is open to women only. According to Nafisi, the entire teaching 
staff of the university are “utterly ignorant” and the girls there are disturbed young women 
                                               
151 According to Dabashi (2006): “In its distorted form and framing, the picture is cropped so we no 
longer see the newspaper that the two young female students are holding in their hands, thus creating 
the illusion that they are “Reading Lolita” – with the scarves of the two teenagers doing the task of “in 
Tehran.” In the original picture the two young students are obviously on a college campus, reading a 
newspaper that is reporting the latest results of a major parliamentary election in their country. Cropping 
the newspaper, their classmates behind them, and a perfectly visible photograph of President Khatami-
-the iconic representation of the reformist movement--out of the picture and suggesting that the two 
young women are reading “Lolita” strips them of their moral intelligence and their participation in the 
democratic aspirations of their homeland, ushering them into a colonial harem” (Dabashi, 2006, p. 7). 
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“who never had anyone to praise them for anything” (Marandi, 2009, p. 32). Nafisi’s position 
as a member of elite is essential in nurturing her sense of superiority. According to Marandi, 
Nafisi was proud of her immediate family, i.e. her parents- her father was the Mayor of Tehran 
and her mother was a Member of Parliament- due to their “affiliations towards the Western 
culture” (2009, p. 30). This is considerable in dismissing the voices of Al-Zahra university 
students because they “never knew any family members who had been raised abroad and/or 
were bilingual in English and Persian” (Bahramitash, 2005, p. 231). Nafisi admits that she 
does not have any patience towards these girls and in her opinion, they are all living in 
darkness. She also promised herself not to go back to that “college”, she does not even call it 
a university (Bahramitash, 2005, p. 231). “These qualifications”, as Nash argues, “align Nafisi 
with the bourgeois nationalist phase of Iran’s political and cultural development, in addition 
to registering disdain for anti-hegemonic positions such as that of Said (which she contends 
play into the hands of Islamists), alongside an overtly pro-Western feminism” (Nash, 2012, p. 
58).  
Apart from Dabashi and Marandi, Keshavarz argued that Nafisi operates in a way which 
sketches those who distance themselves from her as “fanatical, senseless, hypocritical and 
cowardly persons” (Keshavarz, 2007, p. 19). As Keshavarz shows Iranian male characters in 
the eyes of Nafisi are as follows: 
Cinemas had been burnt, professors expelled students who disagreed with them, 
uncles who considered themselves ‘pure and chaste’ Muslims molested their 
nieces, and every twelve-year-old girl was ‘considered long ripe for marriage.’ 
A blind censor decided the fate of Iranian cinema, the Revolutionary guard who 
came to arrest a member of the armed position hid behind a woman servant in 
the author’s house for fear of being shot. Stern husbands and obnoxious brothers 
looked particularly deprived of humanity (Keshavarz, 2007, p. 19). 
Nafisi’s position and authority is not welcomed in the Islamic Republic. The problems 
of Iran and its religious background, it is argued by the anti-orientalist scholars, are presented 
as failures because they do not allow the primacy of the individual. In holding individualist 
stances, Nafisi sees in public policies the cause of her disillusion with the Islamic Revolution 
and concludes that: “the Islamic Republic was a betrayal of Islam rather than its assertion” 
(Nafisi, 2004, p. 31). The implementation of rules derived from the Qur’an and hadith is 
pointed to as non-democratic, i.e. not favouring individual freedom. The first layer of Nafisi’s 
dissatisfaction with the rules restricting her individuality goes back to the Iranian government; 
and in the second layer her real problem is with application of Islamic rules by extremists in 
Iran. According to Keshavarz,  
The book [Reading Lolita in Tehran] can be many things to many people. To 
some, it is a memoir, the personal encounters between a teacher and her students 
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in a classroom that is her own living room. To others, it is an episodic encounter 
with the evils of extremist Islam (Keshavarz, 2007, p. 18).  
Nafisi’s conclusion is bitter: “We are living in the Islamic republic of Iran grasped both 
by the tragedy and absurdity of the cruelty to which we were subjected” (Nafisi, 2003, p. 23). 
She has clearly perceived the new system as a violent imposition and an oppressive, unwanted 
reality. According to Bahramitash, Nafisi’s representation expresses the Iranophobia and 
panders to liberal and orientalist feminism at the time of American’s foreign policies against 
Iran (As cited in Nash, 2012, p. 59). 
Iran Awakening: A Memoir of Revolution and Hope, 2006 
The analysis of the autobiography of acclaimed Iranian lawyer and human rights activist 
Shirin Ebadi concludes this comparative overview of contemporary memoirs on Iran. In the 
case of Iran Awakening, there is more than one controversy. Just like in the cases examined 
above, the author, Shirin Ebadi, operates from a position of great authority. A former judge 
and the founder of the Defenders of Human Rights Centre in Iran, she was projected onto the 
international scene when she was awarded in 2003 the Nobel Peace Prize for her commitment 
to the cause of women and children in her native country. It should be added that she is to date 
the first Iranian woman to receive the prize. Ebadi’s position gained increasing credibility with 
her frequent public appearances, including the advertisement of her opinions on issues such as 
Iranian domestic and international policies, including the controversial – yet secret – uranium 
enrichment programme (Gladstone, 2012). Iran Awakening was published in response to the 
hejab policies in Iran which, in turn, becomes symbolic of the lack of individual freedom. 
According to Ebadi, “the head-scarf ‘invitation’ was the first warning that this revolution 
might eat its sisters, which was what women called one another while agitating for the Shah’s 
overthrow” (Ebadi, 2007, p. 39). Moving from family stories and personal, dramatic 
experiences, Ebadi envisages only one conclusion, i.e. to represent Iran and Iranians as 
patriarchal and extremist agents. She uses her dramatic experiences to present as wrong both 
the revolution and Islamic laws. “In Iran Awakening, she writes about Iran from within Iran 
and speaks eloquently about her deep disillusionment with the 1979 Islamic Revolution and 
of the direction that Iran has taken under the guidance of the mullahs” (Swapna, 2013, p. 1).  
It was becoming apparent to educated Iranians that the revolution was veering 
in a vicious direction. Not only were the sympathies that had brought us out into 
the streets absent in many of the revolutionary processes under way, but there 
was an appetite for violence that seemed only to grow. (Ebadi, 2007, p. 51) 
She believes that the Islamic government of Iran is a “just system in name only” (Ebadi, 
2007, p. 110). In fact, the whole system is tainted by corruption and aggressiveness toward 
women and their bodies, particularly where bi hejabi – not wearing the scarf properly – is an 
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issue, as in her case.152 Once again, just like Nafisi, Ebadi’s problem is the Iranian government 
and the implementation of Islamic rules at public level. She declares that she has realized that 
Islamic rules are discriminatory and against women in Iran, and recites a “litany of 
objectionable laws”153 (Ebadi, 2007, p. 111). The political system envisaged by Ebadi is one 
in contrast with that of the Islamic Republic. The ‘democracy’ discussed in Iran Awakening is 
essentially built on a balance of rights and duties aimed at the fulfilment of individual 
contingent and contextual needs. In Ebadi’s language, “democracy works when people claim 
it as their own” rather than being compatible with shari’ah (Ebadi as cited in Swapna, 2013, 
p. 1).  The subject of the book is the public and private life of a young lady whose individual 
voice and desires have been dramatically halted by the enforcement of religious policies. The 
hejab – as this (yet another) book cover shows – is once again at the centre of an impossible 
conversation between individual positions, and a social structure whose very nature and core 
principles is the lack of any individual push.  
The works examined so far have been chosen because of their visibility and appreciated 
commercial market in the “West”. They are all best-selling memoirs telling the story of 
courageous women in Iran and the consequences of its public policies. Autobiographical 
narratives are quite popular among immigrants, especially Muslim women. As a matter of fact, 
the Muslim autobiographical writing became especially popular post 9/11 due to “the politics 
of marketing and publishing Muslim autobiographies” in the “West” (Chambers, 2013, p. 6). 
Although every person and culture is different and the accounts of the fellow citizens “tend to 
conform to certain recognizable templates”, but, “we are witnessing a fascination with Islamic 
life stories and with the longer United States history with Iran” (Miller, 2007, p. 541-542). 
This scenario, as I have illustrated in the above discussion, is the privileged arena for popular 
autobiographic narratives set against the background of revolutionary Iran. According to 
Miller, the stories of women under the veil and oppression of Islamists “seem to fascinate huge 
numbers of Western readers” (2007, p. 542). This fascination could be related to what 
Chambers (2013) mentions as the characteristic of most of Muslim writings especially post 
9/11 as “part fiction, part ideology, and rarely descriptive or evaluative” (p. 8). Generally, this 
literary genre became increasingly popular in the 1980s, in the aftermath of the Islamic 
Revolution. Writing an autobiography in Iranian culture is “taboo”. According to Goldin, 
                                               
152 Ebadi describes her experience of stripping of her judgeship. “The meeting in which I was stripped 
of my judgeship took place in a large room in the district court, in the final days of 1980. It was more a 
dismissal, really, than a meeting, because the men on the purging committee didn’t even offer me a seat. 
They sat behind a wooden table. Two of them were judges I knew well, one of whom until the previous 
year had been my junior. I stubbornly kept standing, my hands grasping a seat back; I was six months 
pregnant, and I wondered whether they would at least be decent enough to suggest I sit down. One of 
them picked up a sheet of paper and rudely tossed it toward me across the table”. (Ebadi, 2007, p. 48) 
153 “She defends individuals and groups who had fallen victims to a powerful politico- legal system that 
has been legitimized through an inhumane interpretation of Islam” (Swapna, 2013, p. 1). 
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“writing of self is frightening” (2004). The “modesty and secrecy inherent within Iranian 
culture has deterred the composition of female self-writing within the country until recently” 
(Goldin, 2004). In fact, the production of autobiographical narratives has been moved “beyond 
Iran’s borders, free from the punitive fundamentalism of the Iranian regime, to enjoy the 
freedom of expression provided in the West” (McIntosh, 2013, p. 2). “In many of the ‘misery 
memoirs’, Islam is presented as an undifferentiated monolith” (Chambers, 2013, p. 15). 
Chambers believes that all these memoir writers talk about Islam in a way that it seems that 
they have a very clear and fixed concept of Islam in their mind. Their image of Islam is mostly 
anti-women. When criticising Islam, one should be aware of the stereotypes of the religion 
and “recognises that patriarchal structures are common to most, if not all, religious traditions” 
(Chambers, 2013, p. 15).  
The victims in autobiographies are mostly women. Mahmood also believes that “since 
the events of 9/11, this vastly popular autobiographical genre has played a pivotal role in 
securing the judgment that Islam’s mistreatment of women is a symptom of a much larger 
pathology that haunts Islam - namely, its propensity to violence” (2012, pp. 78-79). She also 
observes that autobiographies, with their tendency to embody the critical experience of the 
victim, eventually portray a situation that is acknowledged as pan-Islamic. It might be 
contended that memoir writers are “condemning Islam as deficient in so far as the arrangement 
of gender relations is concerned” (Nash, 2012, p. 60). In other words, “the uncertainties of the 
men, who are mostly, after all, products of a Muslim culture, might suggest that that culture 
has left their humanity, at least partially, intact” (Nash, 2012, p. 60). 
There are issues of violations of human rights especially in the case of women in Islamic 
world as surveyed above. Regardless of the criticism of orientalism raised against many of 
these memoirs, it can also be said that their authors may well have tried to argue that the 
patriarchal or misogynist interpretations of the Qur’an is oppressive to women. Emphasising 
that there is no homogeneous set of Qur’anic interpretation, Nawal El Saadawi believes that 
the Qur’an can be interpreted from different standpoints (as cited in Chambers, 2013, p. 15). 
Misogynist or feminist interpretations of the Qur’an are just two ends of a spectrum and there 
are many other considerable positions in between. However, what the critics try to object to is 
the absorption “into an anti-Islamic discourse fronted by Muslim [immigrants], privileged as 
experts and first hand reporters, who lay open Muslim’s mistreatment and abuse of human 
rights” (Nash, 2012, p. 68). These memoir authors, as Nash stated, “repeat platitudes about 
Western democracy and human rights without speculating too deeply on the negative aspects 
of life in the West (such as its racism or anti-immigrant behaviours)” (2012, p. 68).  
They ignore how Western states’ foreign policies impact on Muslim nations, 
such as their double-standards of supporting or ignoring ugly regimes, they 
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suddenly turning volte-face and furiously discovering and condemning human 
rights abuses in them, especially ill-treatment of women. They dismiss criticism 
of such inconsistencies as joining the ranks of Muslim sympathisers and fellow 
travellers like Said. (Nash, 2012, p. 69) 
Not all of these memoirs “are mere stooges of Western anti-Muslim propaganda; but 
taken together they clearly demonstrate a discourse nurtured and disseminated by an ideology 
much more powerful” than the individual stances I have been discussing in this study (Nash, 
2012, p. 69). A still further explanation might lie in the fact that, Muslim’s accusation of 
violating human rights and democracy might be due to “not sharing the universal experiences 
in a language and context that everyone can relate to” (Janmohamed as cited in Chambers, 
2013, p. 14). This will be examined in the third chapter of this study.  
Contextualising the position of Satrapi 
According to Scharff, “In the cultural era of postfeminism, neoliberalism and 
individualisation, feminism is not an identity easily claimed” (Scharff, 2011, p. 2). Research 
has shown that “feminism is overwhelmingly unpopular, indeed almost hated” (McRobbie et 
al. as cited in Scharff, 2011, p. 2). As mentioned before and in line with her intention to write 
Persepolis, Satrapi’s rejection of being a feminist can be due to a number of reasons. Many 
scholars such as Nadia Sarria (2012) believe that Satrapi’s objection to gender policies in Iran 
demonstrates that a “feminist agenda” can be attributed to her. Sarria also alludes to 
ambiguities in Satrapi’s work and suggests that besides portraying Iranian society as stifled 
and oppressed by patriarchy, “it seems that her thoughts on Western feminism doesn’t [sic] 
give credit where credit is due, but rather, dismisses its importance” (Sarria, 2012). Satrapi, 
Sarria argues, seems to give importance to “female agency – something that is very feminist 
in nature” (Sarria, 2012). The evidence offered by Sarria is that while in Austria, Satrapi gets 
to know herself as a female by reading and studying “her mother’s favourite book, The Second 
Sex by Simone De Beauvoir” (Sarria, 2012). Sarria believes (and shares her opinion with her 
readers) that Satrapi was aware of feminist discourses when she was a teenager “in the West 
and her stance on some issues in Iran seems to reflect that” (Sarria, 2012). An example is 
Satrapi’s early “objection” to the veil (Satrapi, 2003, p. 3).  
Firstly, as it becomes clear throughout the book, Satrapi “shows awareness of gender 
inequalities” in the Iranian system (Scharff, 2011, p. 2). Her self-presentation as an empowered 
woman is to confirm her position as an Iranian woman who is far from the stereotypical views 
of Iranian women as “downtrodden weeds” (Satrapi in Kutschera, 2002). In fact, Satrapi’s 
rejection of the gender policies in Iran, mainly the hejab, is due to her individual approach to 
religion. She believes in uniqueness, and the hejab equals sameness to her. According to 
Stuart: 
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the hijab did the opposite, it took all that was special about each female and 
conformed them to be less than the perfectly distinct individuals they were; the 
scarf made them nothing more than a face in a crowd.  Marjane saw the veil as 
something that not only hid her body, but her originality.  In efforts to avoid 
suppressing her uniqueness Satrapi does everything she can to avoid 
conforming to the new Iranian law (Stuart, 2011). 
The first encounter with little Marji is a compelling one. A cheerless ten-year-old girl is 
forced to wear the veil at school, a topic that aims to capture the sympathetic feeling of readers. 
As Hwink comprehensively expresses, the first immediate picture of the first chapter of 
Persepolis confirms this. In this picture, Satrapi draws attention to the sameness of the girls in 
her classroom (Satrapi, 2003, p. 3). According to Hwink, “the girls’ expressions range from 
neutrality to discomfort, negativity, or distress” (Hwink, 2012). Furthermore, we only know 
that it is Satrapi at the sharp left of this picture because she explicitly states this; this illustrates 
the point that because of their hejabs, she has to draw herself separately in order to be 
distinguished from the others. This emphasises the sameness created by their manner of dress 
- most notably the veil. As a “Westernised” woman who values individuality, this is 
immediately off-putting; framed like this, the rejection of the veil comes naturally to one who 
holds individual expression as synonymous with freedom (Hwink, 2012). In Scharff’s words, 
Satrapi “uses individualist rhetoric to portray herself as autonomous individual who is not in 
need of feminism” (2011, p. 2). In the case of Satrapi, her feminism “has been replaced with 
aggressive individualism” (Scharff, 2011, p. 5). Referring to France, Satrapi believes that 
women should have control and choice “over their bodies and lives” (Humm, 2003, p. 231). 
Based on one of her interviews, Hattenstone states that “she is not critical of the veil per se, 
she is critical of its imposition” (2008). Satrapi said: “I really believe in a society where if 
someone wants to walk in the street completely naked they will be able to, and if someone 
wants to wear a veil they will also be able to.” (Satrapi in Hattenstone, 2008). These 
“individualist discourses of ‘empowerment’ and ‘choice’ are deployed as a kind of substitute 
for feminism, rendering feminism redundant” (McRobbie, 2009, p. 1). Satrapi’s individualist 
orientations are originated from her liberal “Westernised” background as bearer of rights vis-
à-vis the communal identity and responsibility.  
Secondly, Satrapi’s dis-identification with feminists and her individual identity “is 
intertwined with the othering of Muslim women” in this case other Iranians (Scharff, 2011, p. 
2). Satrapi’s repudiation of feminism is very much engaged with her purpose of writing her 
autobiography. Satrapi’s Persepolis is a message of “humanity and love” according to her. It 
is a female story of coming of age. She has purposefully chosen the humanistic ideals to escape 
the boundary notions of “East” and “West”, male and female. “The image of feminists as 
predominantly white, middle-class, middle-aged, able-bodied and heterosexual” could be one 
of those reasons for disarticulating feminism by Satrapi (Scharff, 2011, p. 3). Being a woman 
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of colour, Satrapi is indeed supporting the equality of men and women, while “rejecting the 
institutional supports for feminism which may be more appealing or available to white 
women” (Scharff, 2011, p. 4). According to Afshar,  
in the context of violence and Islamophobia in the post 9/11 and 7/7era Muslim 
women have found themselves at the centre of contestations about their 
identities, their nationalities and their faith and their commitment, or lack of it, 
to global feminist movements (2008, p. 411).  
While being an Iranian who is proud of her nationality, it is hard for Satrapi to see her 
country named as the ‘axis of evil’ or to be framed as “terrorist” (Satrapi in Clarke, 2003). The 
view of Iranian women as “black crows” and Iranian men as “having beard with guns” 
embodies a sense of “otherisation” for Satrapi and categorises her as an oppressed Iranian 
woman (Kutschera, 2002). For example, Satrapi shows in the most iconic image a group of 
girls playing at school with their veils. In this picture, the girls reject the veil for different 
reasons i.e. either it is too hot to wear it or they are against it. According to Cawley, “resisting 
wearing the veil in a variety of creative ways runs counter to the images presented in the 
Western media of passive, victimized women who are oppressed and flattened into a 
monolithic group by wearing the veil” (n.d.). Satrapi’s rebellious position towards the veil is 
another subtle indicator to resist against the clichés and the image of an Iranian woman. When 
little Marjane was stopped by the guardians of the revolution for wearing a denim jacket and 
Nike sneakers, this is another attempt to challenge the oppressive image of an Iranian woman. 
As Cawley argues, “an embrace of Western appearance through clothing is shown to be an act 
of resistance for Iranians, particularly Iranians who, like Marjane at this point, have not been 
to the West and experienced alienation or isolation there” (Cawley, n.d.). It might appear that, 
this trope of resistance “through an embrace of Western culture appears to support Western 
liberal feminist ideology, the fact that these women demonstrate agency and independence” 
(Cawley, n.d.). However, “as the veil comes to represent the repressions that exist in Iran – 
not merely the act of veiling but gender injustices as well - it is by protesting the veil that 
Satrapi protests these repressions” (Mpottash, 2008). While Satrapi’s resistance to the veil is 
to escape the stereotypical image of oppressed veiled women and to show Iranian women are 
not passive and oppressed, many “Western” feminists translated her act of rebellion as her 
complete hostility towards the veil itself. Such interpretation of Satrapi’s resistance towards 
the hejab creates blocks in the way of unity among feminists. This can be the reason that so 
many scholars or activists “use a feminist analysis and define their work in a human rights 
framework” among them Satrapi (Seedat, 2013, p. 32).  
In discussions on Islamic feminism, what is at stake is that the gender struggle in Islam 
can be perceived as very much similar to gender struggle by “Western” feminists. Therefore, 
most of the proposed solutions for an Islamic context are the same as those in a non-Islamic 
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one, because “the legitimate articulations of the category of ‘female’ have been discursively 
drawn and mapped in ways that privilege a particular construction of woman hood based on 
Western, liberal, secular notions” (Zine, 2004, p. 167). In this case, the rescue of Muslim 
women from shackles of oppression is normally through “Western” norms of womanhood. In 
such a context, Moghissi believes, “the role and status of Muslim woman would become a 
stick with which the West could beat the East” (Malti-Douglas as cited in Moghissi, 1999, p. 
16). Satrapi’s rejection of feminism could be in line with this viewpoint that some “Western 
feminist articulations of Muslim women’s identities have appropriated colonial discourses that 
construct Muslim women as backward and oppressed” (Zine, 2004, p. 169). Hence, her 
rejection of being a feminist. Furthermore, as Seedat put it “the broad narrative of Islamic 
feminism is of newly educated Muslim women who offer innovative challenges to Islam. This 
is only a slight departure from the historical Western narrative that explicitly associates Islam 
with the oppression of women” (2013, p. 42). Again, this constructed notion of Islamic 
feminism is what Satrapi challenges all throughout her work, and one of the many reasons she 
does not want to be labelled a feminist.  
To confirm Satrapi’s point regarding the gap between feminists, I would like to refer to 
Moghissi and Mojab’s discussions of feminism within Islam which clearly draw a line between 
Islam as an ideology and feminism as a “Western” product. Moghissi proposes that “being a 
feminist begins with the refusal to subordinate one’s life to the male-centred dictates of 
religious and non-religious institutions” (1999, p. 140). This notion can be translated into an 
equal valuation of men and women, not privileging one over the other. This definition is 
diametrically opposed to that of Islam in that women and men’s relationship is not that of 
social equality. She questions the possibility of a religion which is based on gender hierarchy 
“to be adopted as the framework for struggle for gender democracy and women’s equality with 
men” (Zine, 2004, p. 179). In Moghissi’s views, shari’ah “is not compatible with the principle 
of the equality of human beings” (Zine, 2004, p. 179). Therefore, by legitimising the equality 
discourses, “feminism finds it difficult to view equality work in terms not associated with its 
own European intellectual tradition” (Seedat, 2013, p. 35). Remaining dismissive to 
discussions of gender justice under the shari’ah, secular feminists like Moghissi reject “any 
form of epistemological reform” (Zine, 2004, p. 179). As the result, any attempt of interpreting 
the Qur’an with an antipatriarchal lens is futile. According to Mojab,  
It is doubtful whether the discarding of Islamic texts other than the holy Koran 
would lead to dramatic change in the status of women. It is even more doubtful 
that the interpretation of the Koran by women would have a substantial impact 
on gender relations in the Islamic societies. Studies of the Koran show that 
males and females do not enjoy equal status. No amount of feminist 
interpretation of the text can explain or justify this unequal relation. (Mojab in 
Zine, 2004, p. 179).  
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Moghissi or Mojab’s theorizing, as a sample of secular feminists, has actually closed 
the doors of any new and anti-patriarchal interpretation of the Qur’an. Zine believes that 
dismissing the alternative reading of Qur’an “actually reinforces a patriarchal and 
fundamentalist view”, this equals to falling into the “same trap as fundamentalists, who derive 
only static and literal meanings from the Qur’an, and see the human interpretation of laws 
derived from religious texts as inviolable and fixed rather than as the product of historical, 
cultural and gendered attempts” (Zine, 2004, p. 180). Zine argues that “such narrow views 
collapse the broad arena of Muslim women’s religious orientations into a singular, static mold 
and are counteractive to the polyvocality that anti-racist feminist discourses have sought to 
encourage” (2004, p. 180). Satrapi’s intention to show disdain for feminist discourses seems 
to be in line with this notion of fast-frozen “atemporal Islam” (Nash, 2012, p. 52) which 
hinders the possibility of coalition with universal identity of women.  
As the claim of the third wave has always been to respect the pluralities of race, 
ethnicity, colour, nationality, culture, class, autonomy and self-determination, “religious 
identities and experiences are conceived to be in contest with feminism”; or mostly “religious 
identities are presented as part of women’s broader ‘cultural’ identity, which acknowledges 
the influence of religion, but does not examine theology, religious practice, text, dogma or the 
religious as a lived aspect of identity” (Llewellyn and Trzebiatowska, 2013, p. 250). 
Furthermore, religious feminists are seen by secular feminists as traditionalists. In other words, 
as much as the feminist scholarship has been subordinated in academia by males, religion has 
been marginalised in feminist circles (Llewellyn and Trzebiatowska, 2013, p. 245). It is argued 
that, if the mission of third wave feminism is to embrace different ideological frameworks in 
order to make women more empowered,  
Then it is not sufficient for feminism to consider or impose a secular language 
of gender analysis onto the lives of women whose values are framed by religion. 
Instead, secular feminism must learn the language of religious women globally 
through engagement and dialogue to begin to account for women in relation to 
her many identities and experiences (Llewellyn and Trzebiatowska, 2013, p. 
255). 
Secular feminism, which is not flexible, “goes hand in hand with anti-Islamic and 
xenophobic attitudes” (Braidotti as cited in Llewellyn and Trzebiatowska, 2013, p. 252). This 
issue is of great importance in discussions of secular/religious disarticulation especially in the 
third wave, with its claims on the inclusive and pluralistic nature of feminism (Snyder-Hall, 
2010, p. 255). This logic could be applied to the act of wearing the veil “where Muslim women 
who choose to veil […] treated as victims of false consciousness, and those who speak out 
against veiling and abandon the practice themselves are applauded by secular feminists as 
enlightened and on the right side of the fence” (Llewellyn and Trzebiatowska, 2013, p. 253). 
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Satrapi’s dual position towards the hejab, against its imposition and its banishment, clearly 
confirms Llewellyn and Trzebiatowska’s point. By showing her opposition to the oppressed 
policies of the Iranian government, Satrapi does her best to delete the idea of 
“Eastern/Western” woman. Anne Kingston (2012), a “Western” feminist, believes “it is 
natural for a Western feminist such as myself to read oppression into the images of women 
covering themselves, either with a full body covering, a full face covering, or a veil that covers 
the hair” (as cited in Hwink, 2012). Although, rejecting the veil seems to confirm the 
essentialist notions, Satrapi tries to wipe them out through a different look at hejab (her 
rebellious position). It seems that the hejab is a kind of barrier that separates Iranian women 
from the rest of the world. Her message of love and humanity places her work beyond the 
discussions of Muslim, secular or “Western” feminism. Based on what I have discussed so far, 
Satrapi’s position, in my opinion, is an inclusive one in which she sees no difference between 
women as human beings or feminism of any kind.  
In summary, “when Muslim women articulate a gender consciousness and offer an 
analysis of sex equality, the imperial relationship they occupy under feminism prompts 
feminists to read their consciousness and analysis as a kind of feminism” (Seedat, 2013, p. 
35). Satrapi or other Iranian autobiographers who talk about gender discrimination or 
patriarchy in post-revolutionary Iran deal with feminist topics and agendas. Whether she is 
one or not is not the point here. However, Satrapi’s case is a more nuanced one. The main 
argument here is to show the different viewpoints on the hejab as illustrated in the work of 
Satrapi. It must be acknowledged that Satrapi’s critical position towards the Islamic policies 
of the Iranian state is very unlikely to put her in the box of feminism.  
The hejab in Iran 
In discussions of the hejab, the religion tends to be introduced as a sign of oppression 
and little attention has been paid to the ideology of the hejab or the political historical and 
social background of it. I will discuss in the following section that the hejab in Iranian society 
could be part of general discourses on gender and state. Iran’s enforcement of norms in matter 
of public conduct – e.g. the hejab – is a complex issue that results from the history of Iran. As 
Mohanty argues, Iranian policies on the hejab are different throughout the history. At some 
point, “Iranian middle-class women veiled themselves during the 1979 revolution to indicate 
solidarity with their veiled, working-class sisters, while in contemporary Iran, mandatory 
Islamic laws dictate that all Iranian women wear veils” (2003, p. 34). The result of both 
occasions was the same. Iranian women were all veiled. In the former case, their veiling were 
due to their critical position towards the dictatorial policies of the Shah as well as showing 
their opposition to cultural and imperial domination of foreign powers. In the second case, 
they were forced to wear the veil in line with political Islamization of the country. The meaning 
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attached to each of these events differentiates the historical context with various political 
strategies. The fact is that, politicians have abused religion at times. From the oppression of 
Muslim women in Islamic countries to Islamophobia and discriminatory policies of “Western” 
governments, there are situations in which religion has been misapprehended and abused “in 
service of particular political goals” (Zine, 2004, p. 184). With reference to the political and 
social significance of the hejab, it becomes clear that there is no choice for a woman in terms 
of the hejab in Iran. Therefore, the hejab as the most significant sign of oppression became 
the symbol for women’s critical position towards the state policies. 
Satrapi’s awareness of some gender issues is loaded with many political implications. 
In general, by discussing gender issues within Islamic society, the borders get blurred to 
distinguish between Islam as a ruling system and Islam as a faith or ideology. “Mernissi 
cautions intellectuals not to confuse Islam as belief and personal choice, and Islam as law, as 
state religion” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 138). This is sound advice. Similarly, Ziba Mir-Hosseini 
distinguished between religion as a set of “institutions, practices and laws” and faith as a set 
of “values and principles” stating that the failure in differentiating the two would result in “the 
pervasive polemic/rhetorical trick of either glorifying a faith without acknowledging the 
horrors and abuses that are committed in its name, or condemning it by equating it with those 
abuses” (2011, p. 2). The point is that, the role of the state should not be ignored or remained 
untouched in forming the critical agendas. The post-revolutionary literary and scholarly works 
have largely used feminist agendas as a critical tool, while their main objection is towards 
Islamism or Islam as a ruling system in their commentaries and records. According to 
Moghissi, Islam on its own “cannot be taken as the sole signifier of the situation of women in 
Islamic societies” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 18). The problem arises when cultural or political Islam 
which is regulated by the government becomes “the one size fits all robe that all women (and 
men) are forced to wear” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 135). When the shari’ah acts as a powerful 
ideology for politicians, it equals with patriarchy and authoritarianism rather than sacred 
source of justice. As mentioned in the introduction, the Islamization of the country acted as a 
catalyst in forming feminist movements. The mandatory dress code following the revolution 
as a marker of a nation let many feminists and women activists resort to orientalist clichés to 
attack the Islamist policies of the revolutionary government. As a result, claiming basic human 
rights or speaking against the state policies in Iran became a challenge for many 
secular/Muslim feminists, Iranian expatriates and non-Muslim minorities. 
According to Moghissi, “unlike Muslim reformers, the ultimate goal of [post-
revolutionary authors], however, was not to modify Shari’a, but to do away with it altogether” 
(1999, p. 130). They only wish to “de-Shari’atize their country’s legal and political structures” 
(1999, p. 131). They have actually chosen the “lesser evil” option to “overcome the resistance 
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of conservatives, including Islamic clerics and jurists, who manipulated public sentiments to 
block change and to present modern values and practices as un-Islamic and anti-Qur’an” 
(1999, p. 131). In a nutshell, in Moghissi’s words, these women cannot be called Muslim 
feminists as their main concern is the foundationalism154 of the Islamic Republic of Iran not 
the shari’ah. In authoring their autobiographies, “no need was felt to highlight or emphasise 
the Islamic character of the activities which were carried out for improving women’s lot” 
(Moghissi, 1999, p. 131). Therefore, as Moghissi believes, these discourses should not be 
taken under the banner of Islamic feminism but “Islamic fundamentalism” (1999).  
The positions of scholars on the concept of “Islamic fundamentalism” are different. One 
group totally rejects the possibilities of discussions between Islam as a ruling system and 
feminism. As Moghissi argues “for them, hostility towards feminism and feminist demands is 
inherent in divine laws, and women’s liberation in Islamic societies must therefore start with 
de-Islamization of every aspect of life. Hence, feminism and Islam cannot be reconciled” 
(Moghissi, 1999, p. 134). In Mir-Hosseini’s words, the Islamic feminism in Iran is the 
“unwanted child of Islamic fundamentalism” (2011, p. 6). The state’s emphasis on the 
implementation of shari’ah in the context of the society to provoke women to question the 
base of shari’ah with reference to international human rights. “The Islamists’ defence of 
patriarchal rulings as ‘God’s Law’ and as promoting an authentic and ‘Islamic’ way of life, 
brought the classical jurisprudential texts out of the closet” (Mir-Hosseini, 2011, p. 6). 
According to Mir-Hosseini, it was only after the Islamic Revolution that critical voices and 
feminist scholarships emerged in Iran, aspiring for a more egalitarian interpretation of 
shari’ah. Satrapi’s position in advocating the separation of religion and politics seems to be in 
line with this movement. Calls for reform, liberty and gender equality can be the immediate 
solutions to the problem of women’s oppression under Islam in general. Consequently, a more 
liberal and enlightened version of Islam, one that is more compatible with modern approaches 
                                               
154 According to Poston, “foundationalists maintain that some beliefs are properly basic and that the rest 
of one’s beliefs inherit their epistemic status (knowledge or justification) in virtue of receiving proper 
support from the basic beliefs” (Poston, n.d.). It is argued that foundationalists assume a base for their 
argument. They believe that a finite set of reasons or a linear reasoning should be endorsed in the regress 
argument. For example, one can understand the political theory of Khomeini only if he knows some 
other claims such as the velayat in Shi’ism. The support the belief in velayat provides for his belief in 
velayat-e faqih illustrates that one’s first belief is epistemically dependent on the belief in velayat. I 
consider Ayatollah Khomeini as a foundationalist, who takes as the foundation the allegedly indubitable 
knowledge of the sovereignty of God. This is a foundational belief for Khomeini, “which do not require 
any reason for it, and all the rest of his justified beliefs are based upon it” (Huemer, 2002, p. 370). Every 
other justified belief must be grounded ultimately in this knowledge. Khomeini supported his belief in 
velayat-e faqih by belief in the legislative power of God. The structural conditions for justification of 
velayat-e faqih are not equal among all Shi’i olama. What matters is the proper epistemic structure for 
Khomeini’s belief. This has been argued by many critics as they do not see a proper structure for 
Khomeini’s belief. My main aim in this research is to provide an account of the contours of the doctrine 
of velayat-e faqih and its in/compatibility with democracy or human rights in Iran and to provoke a 
discussion about how we should understand this claim. 
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or “Western” culture, is inevitably recommended. The need to revise Islamic theology and 
reinterpret Islamic values has become indispensable. This is reflected in feminist readings of 
the Qur’an, where two views emerge. Nash has also stated:   
An official, text-centred Islam of the ulema, which coheres around the 
masculine world of the mosque, and a woman’s understanding of Islam, largely 
transmitted orally through female relatives, […] the form of Islam privileged by 
literacy promoted a fixed and authoritarian interpretation identified with state 
power; throughout Islamic history this form was the enemy and oppressor of 
women (Nash, 2012, p. 53). 
According to Moghissi, what these women criticise, is the “misogynist interpretations 
of the Qur’an and the male serving fabrication of the hadith, and attacked the veil, sex 
segregation and the gender-based restrictions that had been imposed on them” (Moghissi, 
1999, p. 128). With a quick reference to Satrapi and other’s background – a privileged one i.e. 
elite intellectuals, “Western” educated, secularised- it can be argued that their objection to the 
degraded situation of women in Iran is the result of a culturally gender-biased interpretation 
of the Qur’an. Therefore, they try to look at the Qur’an and interpret the Islamic texts 
themselves. An example of this is Satrapi’s declaration: 
We need to explain to young women that this interpretation of the Koran [sic] 
is a very masculine interpretation. It is time for women to read the holy book 
themselves, to interpret it themselves and to realise that the holy texts can be 
interpreted in so many different ways. Why has it been interpreted in this way? 
This is what these women need to ask (Cape, 2003).155  
Based on her declarations above, Satrapi’s work can be interpreted in this or that 
direction, but I would associate her gender consciousness more to abuse of power by 
foundationalists in Iran.  
Apart from discussions of “Islamic fundamentalism” and oppression of women under 
Islamists, as Mohanty argues, “to assume the mere practice of veiling [as] the universal 
oppression of women through sexual segregation not only is analytically reductive but also 
proves quite useless when it comes to the elaboration of oppositional political strategy” (2003, 
p. 34). Decontextualizing the study of contemporary Iranian society and the religious 
background could be a step towards orientalism that will lead to biased understanding of this 
culture and religion. According to Abu-Lughod (1998):  
                                               
155 Similarly to Satrapi’s claims on feminine interpretation of the Qur’an, Ebadi has made clear in 
several instances that a more enlightened version of Islam and cultural reform of the Iranian social 
system is long overdue. Iranians, women particularly, should fight for a new interpretation of shari’ah. 
This should promote international human rights, democratic principles, equality before (human) laws, 
and freedom of speech. In particular, she has indicated the solution in “an interpretation of Islam that is 
in harmony with equality and democracy” which “is an authentic expression of faith” (BBC News, 
2009).  
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Women in the Middle East must be studied not in terms of an undifferentiated 
“Islam” or Islamic culture but rather through differing political projects of 
nation-states, with their distinct histories, relationships to colonialism and the 
West, class politics, ideological uses of Islamic idioms (Abu-Lughod, 1998, p. 
5). 
It should be noted here that discussions on “non-Western” politics must be considered 
“within the context of a powerful tradition that, although it systematically oppresses women, 
also contains within itself a discourse that confers a high value on women’s place in the general 
scheme of things” (Narayan, 2004, p. 215). Further to that, “we should all attempt to cultivate 
the methodological habit of trying to understand the complexities of the oppression involved 
in different historical and cultural settings” (Narayan, 2004, p. 216). In a similar way, Scott 
(2007) believes that discussions of the veil cannot be studied without considering their political 
and historical background:  
The study of political discourse is best undertaken through close readings of 
arguments advanced in their specific political and historical contexts. Without 
history we aren’t able to grasp the implications of the ideas being advanced; we 
don’t hear the resonances of words; we don’t see all of the symbols contained— 
for example —in a piece of cloth that serves as a veil (Scott, 2007, p. 8). 
In fact, the various tensions that led to the Iranian Revolution had been in gestation for 
a while when the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980), started meddling with 
peoples’ customs and beliefs (Mir-Hosseini as cited in El Guindi, 2000, p. 174). In 1935 by 
order of the Shah, all Iranian women were forced to take off their hejab. The day is known as 
kashf-e hejab, or the [day of the] removing of the veil.156 This was followed by a public 
appearance of the Shah with his wife and daughters uncovered.157 According to Sedghi: 
“Unveiling edict was implemented ruthlessly” (Sedghi, 2007, p. 87). After kashf-e hejab, 
policemen were under orders to snatch any women who were covering their head or body with 
the hejab in public.158 This was felt as an unfair decree of a secular monarch aiming at 
                                               
156 “Unveiling presented a new image of Iran. For the Shah and modern Iranians, the image of veiled 
women was synonymous with backwardness. This image had to be removed from the Iranian stage. 
Women who wanted to veil, and for whom the veil was part of their identity, were marginalised while 
modern, educated women emerged as a symbol of the new Iran. With their educations and modern 
looks, they were well suited for various governmental jobs. Veiled women, even if educated, were not 
allowed to work wearing the veil, not even the head scarf” (Zahedi as cited in Heath, 2008, p. 255). 
157 “An advance order had been issued to all women teachers and wives of ministers, high military 
officers, and government officials to appear in European clothes and hats, rather than chadors. […] Reza 
Shah admitted to his family that the unveiling decision was ‘the hardest thing I’ve ever had to do.’ He 
then asked his daughters and wife to attend the ceremony unveiled and ‘serve as an example for other 
Persian women’” (Sedghi, 2007, p. 86).  
158 “An eyewitness interviewee from Tehran recalled that even a woman who wore a scarf in public was 
stopped by police who would joke with her and then without explanation, pull off the scarf or tear it 
into shreds. Another eyewitness commented that, without prior notice, officials would sometimes break 
into private homes or search door-to-door and arrest women wearing chadors in the privacy of their 
homes. A report from the city of Tabriz stated that only unveiled girls could receive diplomas or their 
degrees with honour” (Sedghi, 2007, p. 87).  
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attracting the sympathies of the “West”. According to Najmabadi, Reza Shah’s policies was 
not based on social movement but rather on a “military coup, and that he put the army at the 
centre of his political project, provided a weak base for legitimacy which was further eroded 
under the ‘sultanic’ rule of the last Pahlavi” (as cited in Kandiyoti, 1991, p. 5). It was also 
acknowledged as a policy against human rights and religious freedom. Iranians of almost all 
creeds and political colours, from clerics to communists, agreed on this (Salah, 2005). 
The Pahlavis’ “Westernising” policies159 and their capitalist cynicism left the people, 
and women in particular, demoralised. Although this invasion into the religious life of people, 
including folk beliefs and customs, did not last more than a few years, the Shah’s government 
contributed to creating a sense of displacement, and promoted an advancement that was 
possible only to the wealthiest and “Western” educated people. The rest of the population was 
subject to prejudice and discrimination. This was epitomised by the chasm between the regime 
and women, especially those who continued to use the hejab. “For the majority of Iranian 
women, removal of the veil meant committing a major sin and disgrace” (Sedghi, 2007, p. 87). 
These tensions continued to be exacerbated. Women were forced to accept the “Western” dress 
code, with their bodies and hair exalted as their most important contribution to society. As a 
result, dissatisfaction with the Shah’s policies brought women to the scene of politics for the 
first time. Events and ideas that contributed to the creation of compulsory veiling policies in 
Iran after the Islamic Revolution had actually formed as anti-Shah as they were originally anti-
Islamic. As Sedghi (2007) reports: 
Numerous women who had earlier exhibited secular tendencies in their social 
and personal relations, were now increasingly abandoning such Western attire 
[…] gradually they began to cover more and more of their bodies, hiding signs 
of sexuality in protest and solidarity but also as a new way of presenting 
themselves, their identities, and signalling their allegiances. The chador or 
scarves worn with loose shirts and trousers, or other forms of the hijab or 
modesty, forceably taken by Reza Shah Pahlavi were now becoming symbols 
of political resistance. Covering one’s body was now a sign of discontent, even 
a language of protest, power and politics (p. 195). 
The imposition of the veil as a sign of virtue and decency became, thus, the only 
alternative to win the political and ideological battle against the Shah and his secular cultural 
policies. In the case of Iran, the veil-as a sign of religious identity- has been used “as a tool for 
any social, cultural or political machination, be it feminist or not” (Llewellyn and 
Trzebiatowska, 2013, p. 253). Not only before the revolution in Iran, but also after the Islamic 
Revolution, the hejab emerged as a new political discourse under Islamic culture and brought 
                                               
159 “Members of the Iranian ruling class, specifically its shahs, were eager players in the technological 
modernization of their country; they were great admirers of Western gadgetry, quick to see its appeal 
and potential domestic use, especially as instruments of coercion and political control” (Sreberny-
Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 1994, p. 44).  
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a new image of Iran to the scene. The rulings of the new government made veiling mandatory 
(Satrapi, 2003, p. 3).  As it is clear, the veil is not only construed as a sign of oppression or a 
marker of distinction or social prestige. It has major political national meanings and 
implications. Throughout the history, “women have been crucial in establishing and 
maintaining the boundaries of nations and are often made into the symbolic markers of the 
nation itself” (Suad, 1996, p. 6). According to Fanon (1965), the veil is the best way to resist 
colonialism. Scott (2007) states that the veil gained its political meaning for the first time 
during the Algerian War (1954-1962). 
In fact, the battle was more complicated than that […] if the veil has one 
symbolic meaning for defenders of French rule, it had several conflicting 
meanings for the resisters. It was to be sure, a refusal of French appropriation 
of the country, a way of insisting on an independent identity for Algerians 
(Scott, 2007, p. 41). 
Also, Iranian intellectual, Shariati (1996)160 agrees with Fanon:  
The Islamic modest dress is a symbol of opposing Western colonialism which 
has dominated us by force. This is a way to say “no” to fifty years of 
conspiracies, alienation and deceitful-looking Europeans in an Islamic 
community. This is a return to one’s own culture, identity, ideology and values 
(Shariati as cited in Bakhtiyar, 1996, p. 48). 
Jennifer Heath also introduces the veil as a symbol of resistance and believes it is a 
political object, rather than an issue of tradition and oppression: 
The custom of veiling has historically been a source of political manipulation, 
from the British treatment of it in Egypt in the 19th century to Ataturk’s and 
Reza Pahlavi’s forced unveilings in Turkey and Persia in the early twentieth 
century. It was a colonial and imperial football. It still is (Heath, 2008, p. 8). 
Iranian social rules are defined and based on predominant interpretations of Islam. 
Enlivening and protection of social life with Islamic rules is considered as the responsibility 
of the government. Iranian policies on the hejab respond not only to religious and cultural 
notions, but also to national and historical traumas. In analysing the struggle over nationalism, 
cultural affiliations and gender issues in Iran, it is essential to explain the specificities of all, 
while de-essentialsing the notions of religion, state, culture and gender. In fact, gender, 
religion, class, culture and ethnicity are relevant networks that can affect the state policies. 
Therefore, gender issues in Iran, particularly the hejab, are not self-referential categories. 
Religion can be a source of oppression but at the same time it can also “offer powerful spaces 
of resistance to injustice and provide avenues for critical contestation and political 
                                               
160 “Shariati was an influential intellectual, with a doctorate in sociology from France. He was inspired 
by Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism, Frantz Fanon’s anti-colonial writings, and many left-leaning 
thinkers. His important and novel approach brought together Shiism and modernism” (Semati, 2008, p. 
217). 
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engagement” (Zine, 2004, p. 185). For example, the veil is seen as an Islamic identity in many 
anti-colonial movements. It was used “as a symbol of political protest and revolutionary 
struggle in Algeria in the 1950s and in Iran161 in the 1970s, and the hijab was donned by 
women who did not previously wear the Islamic head scarf” (Zine, 2004, p. 185). To neutralize 
or counter-balance the racist imagery of the hejab, Iran advocated anti-representational or self-
affirmative concept of religion and the veil. The hejab has therefore been introduced as 
women’s empowerment, strength and resistance and in this way questioned the orientalist or 
imperialist discourses. Therefore, Iranian state policies on the hejab, which is shaped by these 
historical traumas and anti-imperialist responses, cannot be considered as merely a personal 
issue. It is argued that “privatisation of religion and morality has negative effects upon civil 
society and culture” (O’Mahony, Pererburs & Shomali, 2004, p. 18). A woman must comply 
with the hejab laws when living in Iran. It has already been observed that one cannot just 
observe the physical hejab in Iran without practising the “social prerequisites” (Tabataba’i,162 
1982, vol. 16 [28:26]). According to Ayatollah Javadi Amuli (2003),163 the hejab of women 
(in Iran specifically) is not only their personal duty, but it is the right of the community of 
believers that should be respected. The hejab, therefore, is respecting everyone’s rights, not 
just one’s own. Defining the hejab at a public level, categorises it under the social rules which 
are to be regulated by the government. Muslim duties are therefore defined in the social context 
by “subjecting to the control of a theocratic state” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 138). Mernissi believes 
that in such a context, being a non-Muslim would not keep one free from obeying the national 
laws set by the state (including crimes and the punishments). “Being Muslim is a civil matter, 
a national identity, a passport, a family code of laws, a code of public rights (Mernissi as cited 
in Moghissi, 1999, p. 138). However, growing up in a liberal and individual construct of 
“Western” citizenship, Satrapi believes that the hejab is an individual religious choice and 
therefore the government should not bring it into law. With reference to the history of Iran’s 
victimisation, when someone like Satrapi or other autobiographers express their opposition 
against hejab policies, their accounts would be interpreted as orientalist and imperialist 
representations of the Islamic Republic and Iranian culture. It seems that criticising one’s 
culture, religion or government makes Satrapi a contributor ‘to a pro-Western hegemonic 
discourse’. In Satrapi’s case, her objection is towards the imposition of the veil not the veil 
                                               
161 Under the undemocratic and dictatorial regime of the Pahlavis, women from all backgrounds 
glorified Islamic ideology as the cure to all social imbalances. These women, who could not accept 
being unveiled and treated as individual sexualised units, demonstrated loudly their discontent with the 
Shah and embraced the values of the Islamic Revolution. For them, the veil was a means of resistance 
and the possibility to affirm their rights as members of the community. 
162 Allameh Tabataba’i (1904-1981) is the author of the prominent Shi’a scholarly book of Qur’anic 
exegesis called Tafsir Al-Mizan. This book has been translated into Farsi from Arabic in 40 volumes. 
He was a prominent Shi’a scholar in the fields of tafsir, philosophy and history of Shi’a.  
163 Abdollah Javadi Amuli (b. 1933) is a twelve Imami Shi’a mojtahed and a prominent politician. 
Ayatollah Amuli has studied in the Islamic seminary of Qom, Iran. He is the author of Tasnim tafsir.   
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itself. This means that Satrapi is critical towards the policies of the Islamic Republic (Islam as 
a ruling system), rather than the idea of veiling as an Islamic belief. Her intention and her work 
has thereof been perceived differently. Subsequently, Persepolis, as Mahmood argues, 
reinforces prejudicial impressions of Iran and reiterates the current ideology according to 
which Iran belongs to the axis of evil (2011, p. 87). Nasrin also states that, “if the Orientalists 
of the earlier periods were European and American travellers, the new Orientalists are native 
informers who, speaking from a position of authority and authenticity, dehumanise their own 
compatriots and wall them off from the rest of humanity” (2007). In this way, the neo 
orientalists, as Keshavarz contends in her Jasmin and Stars, fortify the barriers between 
cultures (2007). 
In line with orientalist discourses, it seems as if books like Persepolis hardly create a 
commercial market for the media;164 rather, the dictatorship of Iranian governmental Muslim 
agents and the oppression of women under the state would attract the receiver’s attention. 
Satrapi’s critical position has been analysed according to the politics of commercial marketing. 
The post-revolutionary autobiographical literature is mostly produced by a group of Iranians, 
who are in minority and are mostly “Western” educated and have a hand in academic writings 
i.e. Satrapi and other post-revolutionary memoirists. Iran has been mostly represented by this 
group especially those in exile following the revolution. As Poole and Richardson argue, they 
almost used a similar language165 to criticise their indigenous culture. It goes without saying 
that:  
Muslim sources are overwhelmingly only included and only quoted in reporting 
contexts critical of their actions and critical of their religion. When Muslim 
activities are not criticised - or when reported activities are not labelled as 
Muslim actions - Muslim sources are, almost without exception, absent from 
journalistic texts (Poole and Richardson, 2006, p. 115).  
In discussions on orientalism, what should not be ignored is fighting the problems 
rooted in traditional cultures of Muslims and their struggle for self-definition and human rights 
of individuals. According to Warraq, Said’s Orientalism has emboldened the extremists and 
Islamists in many Muslim countries to “attack their opponents in the Middle East as slavish 
‘Westernists’ who were out of touch with the authentic culture and values of their own 
countries” (Warraq, 2007, p. 49). The problems of Muslims and Arabs in general and 
violations of human rights by the governments in particular are due to this type of “comfort 
and absolution in being told that none of your problems are of your making, that you do not 
have to accept any responsibility for the ills besetting your society. It is all the fault of the 
                                               
164 “The mass media are not in the least oriented towards a ‘world system,’ but in fact concentrate upon 
national markets, whose interests and stereotypes they largely reproduce” (Hafez as cited in El-
Nawawy, 2010, p. 12). 
165 They are overly critical of the absolutism of the Islamic state. 
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West, of infidels” (Warraq, 2007, p. 246). Considering Iran’s relationship with the “West” and 
constructing the Iranian post-revolutionary identity as the “West’s” victim, Iranian officials 
“turn against their adversaries in uncompromising gestures of collective pride and righteous 
anti-imperialist revenge (Occidentalism)” (Huggan, 2005, p. 126). The orientalist critique of 
Iranian officials appears to reiterate the essentialsing discourses they used to attack.  
 In Iran, the status of women and their hejab play a significant role in many strategies 
of the state. As markers of the nation, women and their appearances have been perceived as 
assertions of cultural authenticity and symbolic definition of the nation. However, “when 
women are used as icons of the nation, they often become captive to patriarchal structures and 
ideologies” (Suad, 1996, p. 6). As the hejab of women became nationally significant, the 
compulsory dress code was assumed to assert greater control over women, hence the 
subordination and oppression of women. The findings of researchers have broadly suggested 
that “veiling spread because Islamist male leaders conceived of veiling as strategically 
important to their movement” (Ahmed, 2011, p. 131). The relationship between veiling and 
Islamism is enormously complex. According to Ahmed, “hijab and Islamic attire were being 
quite deliberately, actively, and systematically promoted by Islamists” (2011, p. 151). Firstly, 
as mentioned earlier, with reference to the history of foreign power’s domination in Iran, the 
revolutionary government revitalized Iranian religious commitments with the veil through 
inspiring the concept of nationalism and independence. In the post-revolutionary era, the 
chador became specifically the symbol of anti-imperialism in Iran. Secondly, as the majority 
of Iranian women belonged to the working class and in response to the economic difficulty to 
cope with fashions and buying clothes, chador began to open its space among Iranian women. 
Finally, with regards to the increasing Islamic roles and movements of women during and after 
the revolution especially in politics, the hejab “was therefore important because it defined the 
Islamic movement and gave it an identity distinguishable from the rest of society” (Ahmed, 
2011, p. 140).  
In conclusion, as Moghissi argues, self-apologetic defence of Islamic practices by 
Islamist rulers, should not open the gates of “fundamentalism” as an ideology in opposition. 
According to her, a communal and national identity is needed in countering the anti-Muslim 
prejudices and neo-orientalist representations of Muslim societies, however, the danger lies in 
“in an apologetic or self-denying defence of Islamic gender practices or a justification of the 
oppressive discourses and actions of Islamist ideologues and rulers” (as cited in Nash, 2012, 
p. 54). Moghissi’s argument is significant in analysing the issues of gender and state in Iran, 
where “this intersection of religion, state and patriarchy reinforces communalist views of 
citizenship that tend to diminish women’s roles and rights as citizens” (Suad, 1996, p. 8). 
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Is the hejab a matter of ‘choice’? 
 Leila Ahmed believes that the veil should be seen as “a democratic practice which 
erases class origins, giving women a greater degree of social mobility while preserving their 
native culture and signalling a determination to move forward to modernity” (Ahmed as cited 
in Moghissi, 1999, p. 42). This point of view focuses on choice, a heated debate in feminism 
where the idea of wearing the veil should be considered within the framework of freedom of 
choice. The hejab, like any other women’s issues “requires not a particular set of choices, but 
rather acting with a ‘feminist consciousness,’ defined as ‘knowledge of what one is doing and 
why one is doing it’” (Snyder-Hall, 2010, p. 256). Bringing the hejab under a set of rules 
controlled by the government would not only refute the concept of choice and empowerment 
in women, but also can leave many women undecided about their position towards it. This will 
explain why, whenever Satrapi wants to question the veil and its ideology, she delivers the 
democratisation of the Iranian state as core to the process. In Persepolis, in other words, when 
Satrapi wants to construct her gendered identity, she inevitably points at the imbalances 
generated by the policies of the Iranian government. In fact, Satrapi’s argument is that, the 
hejab rules in Iran stem from the patriarchal interpretation of the Qur’an. Not directly 
questioning Islamic values, Satrapi attributes the compulsory hejab and patriarchy to the 
government. Satrapi’s position on the veil is a dual one. She believes that: “the young women 
who have been expelled from school for wearing a veil should have the freedom to choose. It 
is surely a basic human rights that someone can choose what she wears without interference 
from the state” (Satrapi in The Guardian, 2003). In another interview, she says: “all my life I 
have been against the veil, and now I am the one defending the veil. I hate the veil and what it 
means, I would never put that thing on my head, but I put myself in their place. It’s a question 
of these girls’ identity” (Satrapi in Tully, 2004). 
Generally, “women’s relationship to their own socially constructed desires has been a 
challenge for feminism” (Snyder-Hall, 2010, 255). In fact, Muslim/secular feminism splits 
over issues related to the hejab. Satrapi, as a non-feminist, and other feminists find themselves 
on opposite sides of a contentious debate with one side seeing evidence of patriarchal and 
oppressive dimension of the veil and the other opportunities for resilience, resistance and 
empowerment. A self-defined “humanist”, Satrapi argues that she locates herself in between 
two perspectives, neither for nor against the hejab, without embracing either. As mentioned 
before, Satrapi’s neutral position towards the hejab seems to be in line with this ayeh (2:256) 
of the Qur’an. She believes that compulsion has no place in the hejab rules. Therefore, what 
is important, beyond the discussions of the hejab, is the matter of choice for women. Satrapi’s 
objection to either the Islamic Republic or feminists and media is of this nature. She simply 
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questions that if the hejab is supposed to be making one’s choice, then why the Islamic 
Republic made it mandatory or “Western” feminists recognised it as a sign of oppression.   
The hejab image in Persepolis highlights sharp contrasts between the stereotypical 
representations of the hejab and Satrapi’s views on it. In other words, mostly, women who are 
veiled are perceived by many “Westerners” as being in the general category (i.e. oppressed) - 
while Satrapi is completely aware of the differences between veiled women. She classifies 
herself as a modern, individualistic and avant-garde woman who is rejecting the public rules 
of the society, and showing her individual opposition by her personal way of hejab and 
listening to music on her Walkman, etc. (Satrapi, 2003, p. 148) - whereas the “Western” 
audience might not notice this difference unless the author draws attention to it. What Satrapi 
tries to communicate is the idea that not every woman who is veiled, is oppressed. This can 
clearly be seen in Satrapi’s rebellious position towards the veil. In Persepolis, we see in many 
occasions that Satrapi is rebelling against the social orders with the help of the veil. In the 
vignette she wears “Western” outfit, for example, she mentions that “of course” she wears the 
veil. “The fact that Satrapi writes ‘of course’ indicates the way in which the veil became a part 
of her life. However, even within the confines of the veil, Satrapi rebels against certain 
restrictions of Iranian society and expresses her individuality” (Mpottash, 2008). Upon her 
return from Austria, she tries to reform her position in small social units, i.e. family, friends, 
classmates, university. As an Iranian, Satrapi is very well aware of the consequences of an 
overt violation of the law on the hejab-wearing. Thus, she administers her ability to conspire 
against the veil with the veil. 
This trend continues at school, where Satrapi is the leader of the class and the one 
plotting rebellion against the fully veiled school principal and teachers (Satrapi, 2003, pp. 97-
144); According to Mpottash, “Satrapi rebels against general political restrictions of society, 
but not against the veil itself.  She also rebels while still wearing the veil, illustrating the ever-
present restrictions that the veil represents” (2008). The next example is at university in 
Tehran, where bearded male lecturers were informed of her views on decency, gender and sex 
(Satrapi, 2003, p. 303). In this case, one “must acknowledge that by wearing the veil, Satrapi 
remains within the confines of certain restrictions and shows that she is not completely 
rejecting Islam; thus, wearing the veil protects her and allows her to rebel, again making the 
veil a necessity” (Mpottash, 2008). This also shows the empowerment of women by wearing 
the veil. If Satrapi did not have the veil on, her claims would have been perceived differently 
within society166. In all these examples, the message is clear and that is the fact that Satrapi 
                                               
166 This can be compared to Asma Mahfouz the woman who is believed to have started the revolution 
in Egypt. She came out on Facebook calling for protests on Tahrir square with the hejab. Her veil gave 
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does not want to be oppressed by the veil. She portrays herself in a way that is far from the 
stereotypical representation of veiled women. She does her best to escape this image by 
“designing her own way of hijab” (Sarria, 2012). By staying within the restrictions of the veil, 
Satrapi challenges its imposition. This personal form of rejection of the veil is meaningful for 
Satrapi alone, because it allows her to express her individuality. Especially when she designs 
her own way of veiling, she makes her individual choice. By censoring Satrapi’s position 
towards the hejab ban in France,167 and representing the veil as only a sign of oppression, the 
feminist circles and the media reinforce the mono standard one lifestyle for feminist 
empowerment; while “feminism strives to be inclusive and respectful of the wide variety of 
choices women make as they attempt to balance equality and desire” (Snyder-Hall, 2010, p. 
259). Kingston also believes that:   
When “the road to female freedom [is] measured in media reports in terms of 
women’s access to lipstick and beauty salons,” […] we may sense that there is 
something missing from our definition of female emancipation and our position 
on veiling (Kingston as cited in Hwink, 2012).  
Discussions of the hejab in media have been more nuanced. On the one hand, the veil 
as the individualist ethos of the author signals her discrepancy with the sociality and solidarity 
the hejab promotes. Satrapi’s opposition to the hejab, by means of an advertising campaign, 
is built on the paradigm of courageous women resisting Islamic fanaticism, thus fostering 
stereotypical portrayals of Iran and Islam. In effect, the stereotypical representation of the 
veil168 by the media has its roots in “Islamophobia, xenophobia and racism comparing it to the 
‘minaret ban in Switzerland or the burqa ban in France’” (Lim as cited in Hwink, 2012). These 
representations of veil have actually facilitated the “Western” mission in their “rush to liberate 
Muslim women from the chains imposed on them by their faith. Such an analysis, by its very 
nature, made the mohajabeh, women who cover, into an object of pity if not fear” (Afshar, 
                                               
her religious and social capital to start the protest. “The notable fact is that, the self that Mahfouz creates 
is not a Western one. In each of her videos she appears veiled, an act that the West has consistently 
associated with a lack of agency and evidence of oppression of Muslim women” (Wall and El Zahed, 
2011, p. 1339). Needless to say that Mahfouz’s action has been reflected in political media as a pushed 
activist with “ties to larger networks of other”, many of whom decided to articulate their discontent on 
the streets of Egypt through personal activist (p. 1341).  
167 “[D]uring the veil debates in France, they just wanted to use me as a witness saying, ‘Look at these 
Iranian women, they have suffered so much.’ And that was very funny, because all the Iranian people, 
they were against this law! From Shirin Ebadi to me, to all these people, all of us, we were against this 
law, because we know how it is when they force you to do something. So when they force you not to 
do it, they force you all the same” (Satrapi in Shaikh, Asia Society, n.d.). This is, as discussed, mirrored 
by Satrapi’s public position in matter of public policies both in Iran and in France. Just as she publicly 
disagrees with the rules of her native country, she objects to the hejab ban in her country of adoption.  
168 “Muslim women had already been defined as clear examples of the barbarism of Islam; Kilroy-Silk 
had already announced that: Muslims everywhere behave with equal savagery. They behead criminals, 
stone to death female _ only female _ adulteresses, throw acid in the faces of women who refuse to wear 
the chador, mutilate the genitals of young girls and ritually abuse animals . . . they are backward and 
evil, and if it is being racist to say so then I must be and happy and proud to be so. (The Daily Express 
15 January 1995)” (Afshar, 2088, p. 420).  
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2008, p. 420). According to Afshar, this image of the veiled woman who has been forced to 
wear the veil has fostered the idea of liberating them “even if this had to be done at the expense 
of closing the doors of schools to them. Feminists of all shades were urged to step forward to 
‘save’ the Muslim woman from her plight” (Afshar, 2008, p. 420). Reducing the veil into a 
sign of pity or fear or plight is the central reason in “shaping government policies banning the 
scarf from the schools in France” (Afshar, 2008, p. 420). In fact, Satrapi insists on criticising 
the ‘system’, whether it is the French or the Iranian government. Although Satrapi’s 
background is of the “Westernised” middle-class women and she does not like wearing a veil, 
but “one can also hope that being part of one oppressed group may enable an individual to 
have a more sympathetic understanding of issues relating to another kind of oppression” 
(Narayan, 2004, p. 220). As discussed before, the imposition of the hejab by Iranian 
government is a sign of suppression to Satrapi and a number of feminists. Having experienced 
such oppression by the government, Satrapi is against any kind of oppression. She states that:  
The Western woman is so entranced by the idea that her emancipation comes 
from the miniskirt that she is convinced that if you have something on your head 
you are nothing. The women who are forced to wear the veil, and the women 
who are portrayed naked to sell everything from car tyres to orange juice, are 
both facing a form of oppression (Satrapi in The Guardian, 2003). 
As it is clear about Satrapi’s personal position towards the hejab, she has never been 
against those who mindfully chose to wear it. Moghissi argues, “as a matter of individual 
choice, it is, of course, perfectly fine to blend […] individual development and personal 
freedom with an equally strong sense of belonging to a community, wishing in this way to 
recover one’s culture and history” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 138).  Satrapi has also been sympathetic 
towards those who wear the veil. Her ‘humanism’ is in fact one resulting from her concerns 
with human rights, but at the same time it signals her natural disposition to privilege individual 
stances, personal identity and choice. Based on her intention and purpose in authoring her 
work, (which is against the stereotypical representations of all Iranian women as oppressed 
and veiled), it is easier and more likely for Satrapi “to have critical insights into conditions of 
[different sorts of oppressions] than it is for those who live outside these structures” (Narayan, 
2004, p. 220). Satrapi’s position on the veil is neither that of the “Western” feminists, nor that 
of the Islamic Republic but is closely linked to those who believe that human choice is the 
synonymous of freedom. Just like Satrapi, Afshar believes that the freedom of choice should 
be included in discussions of women’s rights. “Many forgot that if feminism is about anything 
it is about celebrating difference and respecting the choices that women make” (Afshar, 2008, 
p. 420).  
The self-determination and freedom of choice over the veil have been debated among 
many feminists. Leila Ahmed argues that “the moment in which Islamic law and scriptural 
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interpretations were elaborated and cast into the forms considered authoritative to our own 
ways was a singularly unpropitious one for women” (1992, p. 100). Therefore, the feminist 
exegesis of the Qur’an is supposed to be a means of achieving freedom of choice and opposing 
the oppression.169 It can be concluded that, ignoring the freedom of choice, as argued by the 
feminists, has increasingly marginalised the concept of the hejab according to the principles 
of Islamic piety and modesty and virtuous behaviour. It would be necessary to analyse the veil 
beyond a national signifier or a symbol of resistance. An appeal to understanding the coherence 
of the hejab with piety and modesty is neither to justify it, nor to argue its cultural relativism. 
It is, however, to take the necessary step toward explaining the religious consciousness and 
freedom of choice for women who wear it. The hejab, it is argued, can be a sign of virtue. 
According to Adil Hussein, the “veil is an expression of the principle of female modesty” and 
a symbol of morality and religious devoutness (as cited in Mahmood, 2011a, p. 52). As Minson 
argues, “morality is primarily a rational matter that entailed the exercise of the faculty of 
reason” (as cited in Mahmood, 2011a, p. 25). Morality can be realised through or manifest in 
“outward behavioural forms” i.e. the hejab (Kant as cited in Mahmood, 2011a, p. 25). 
According to Mahmood, many veiled women regard “outward bodily markers as an 
ineluctable means to the virtue of modesty” (2011a, p. 161). The act of veiling with no freedom 
of choice equals unreflective habit or custom and thus fails to apprehend its religious 
significance (Mahmood, 2011a, p. 54).   
Conclusion 
It is clear that Satrapi’s individualist claims against the social values in Iran illustrated 
the clash of ideals between her views and those of the Islamic Republic. Beyond the hejab, the 
general contribution of shari’ah to people’s (especially women’s) public life in Iran has 
multiplied Satrapi’s critical exposition. Her secular background, her childhood fondness for 
revolutionaries such as Ernesto Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, Gandhi, Atatürk, Fatemi (2004, 
pp. 12, 16, 20), and her humanist ideals hold deeply divergent directions from those of Shi’a 
Islam and the norms promoted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Satrapi’s position on the hejab 
is indicated throughout the book by means of personal narratives and the artistic rendering of 
the idea itself of veiling. She acknowledges that the socio-political reality in Iran is one 
featured by sharp contrasts. This is graphically and ideologically rendered by portraying the 
country during and after the revolution as a society marked by dichotomies. Her style seems 
to reinforce the orientalist paradigms in as much as it elaborates on the hejab as a sign of 
oppression, revealing Satrapi’s rebellious position towards it through embracing the 
                                               
169 According to Zine, “this approach seeks to use the politics of hermeneutics as a means to create 
alternative readings of religious texts that build a discursive and spiritual basis for more equitable gender 
based structure, systems, and practices” (2004, p. 186). 
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“Western” culture and her own design of the hejab. However, Satrapi’s dual position towards 
the hejab and her belief over the concepts of choice and empowerment for women opens a 
new window in analysing her intentio auctoris quite opposite to what has been publicised and 
advertised by intentio lectoris.  
A comparative study of other post-revolutionary memoirs with clearer feminist stances 
and purely critical position towards either the hejab or the Islamic Republic’s policies has 
shown that Satrapi’s case is different in terms of intentio auctoris. While Satrapi consciously 
and purposefully denies to be a feminist, contextualising her stance in feminist frameworks 
confirms her difference. As a woman who values individuality, Satrapi’s feminism is replaced 
with aggressive individualism and her belief in women’s agency. Her dis-identification with 
feminist circles is very much engaged with her Occidentalism as well as the predominant 
image of liberal secular feminism. Based on her intentio auctoris, Satrapi tries to make a 
balance between fast-frozen atemporal Islam which otherises the Occident and the secular 
liberal “Western” ideology which otherises the Orient.  In conclusion, Satrapi with her intentio 
auctoris cannot be boxed as either a feminist or a non-feminist. Although, her critical position 
towards the hejab might be misleading to categorise her as a liberal secular feminist, however, 
based on her message and public declarations, it became apparent that she is not against the 
hejab, but against the imposition of it. This confirms her critique towards the Islamic Republic 
with the policy of compulsory hejab. Finally, contextualising the hejab in its historical pre and 
post-revolutionary background renders the justification of the current sensitivity over the hejab 
in Iran. Being a national political signifier, the hejab in Iran goes beyond the borders of 
discussions of religion and religiosity. Therefore, it cannot be identified as a personal issue 
and is defined at a public level to be regulated by the government. In such a context and as a 
national law, there is no choice for an individual. Any opposition towards law would be 
considered as an orientalist or imperialist threat, hence, the accusation of Islam setizi.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
POST 2009 ELECTION EVENTS IN THE MIRROR OF PERSEPOLIS’ EPIGONES 
Introduction 
Thirty years after the formation of the Islamic Republic, the outcome of Iran’s 
presidential election is perceived as unfair and fraudulent. The post-election events in Iran in 
2009 have been the source of inspiration for other diaspora Iranians to produce Persepolis 2.0 
and Zahra’s Paradise after Satrapi’s book. These two graphic novels tell the story of the Green 
Movement in a way that is reminiscent of Satrapi’s Persepolis. Just like Satrapi’s work, 
Persepolis 2.0 and Zahra’s Paradise target primarily non-Iranians, i.e. “Western” readers to 
let them familiarise with the Iranian post-election situation. This is done by means of semi-
fictional narratives presented as autobiographic graphic novels. Being almost as successful as 
Persepolis, the epigones have been exposed (intentio lectoris) to the same tone of critique 
suffered by their predecessor and as a source of inspiration. They have been essentialized 
through their contribution to the rendition of violation of human rights and their 
representations of restrictive public policies in Iran.  
The discussion of a “fiction based on the real-life story” is evocative of Persepolis and 
its epigones, which have been discussed as semi-fictionalised autobiographies (Schroeder, 
2010, p. 6) that “challenge notions of objectivity, truth, and authenticity” (Hathaway, 2011, p. 
251). The author of Zahra’s Paradise stated in his interview with Jadaliyya that “nothing 
in Zahra’s Paradise was invented; it is a sort of collage made up of real-life events strung 
together to make sense of what can sometimes seem too absurd to be true” (Jadaliyya, 2011). 
In a similar way, the authors of Zahra’s Paradise –like Satrapi – have made their 
autobiography an eyewitness account of experiences they directly or indirectly went through. 
Accordingly, Hathaway believes that “a number of the most acclaimed and commercially 
successful ‘graphic novels’ of recent years have not been novels at all, but non-fiction memoirs 
in comic form, such as Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis” and its epigones in consequence (2011, 
p. 250). However, with regards to Satrapi and Amir’s representations of the situation of 
prisoners170 in Iran while they have never been one of them, it can be argued that their account 
is not truthful. In discussions of the aftermath of the 2009 elections, the crucial point seems to 
be why certain voices are given preference in “Western” academic and public discourse over 
                                               
170 Reflecting on the situation of prisoners in Iran, Amir Soltani, one of Zahra’s Paradise’s creators, 
says: “I had witnessed, first-hand, the stories of what was happening to people in Evin Prison. Those 
abominable crimes had gone unpunished. And so murder, rape, and many other grave violations taking 
place inside Evin were being equated with the fundamentals of my religion, culture, and tradition. And 
not just in 1979. Things were so bad, and remained so bad for so long, that Human Rights Watch called 
one of its reports about Iran ‘Like the Dead in their Coffins’” (Amir in Jadaliyya, 2011). 
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others (of which the two discussed works are an example), and how the depiction of prison 
torture in these works and their further reception either deliberately or inadvertently alludes to 
reinforcing the orientalist stereotypes.  
This chapter is intended to show and analyse some aspects of Persepolis and its epigones 
“which differs significantly from traditional modes of biography and oral history” (Hathaway, 
2011, p. 250). I will reflect on the way narratives are included in autobiographical memoirs, 
and how these are elaborated to offer a political account of the history and culture of Iran. My 
argument focuses on discussions of autobiography as a genre, in particular narratives of trauma 
to show that not full understanding of the autobiography as a dynamic concept is made to 
critique the reception of it as representing the history or culture of a nation. Following the 
discussions on the intentio auctoris and the intentio lectoris, one could, for example, discuss 
how these graphic novels are both de-contextualised and de-aestheticized in their reception to 
render orientalist characteristics.  
An introduction to Persepolis 2.0 and Zahra’s Paradise 
Since the release of Persepolis in 2003 and its banishment in Iran in 2007, two Iranian 
university students, Payman and Sina,171 used Satrapi’s style to have their voices heard all 
around the world. Persepolis in Election or Persepolis 2.0, a short ten-page long graphic story, 
is set against the backdrop of the June 2009 presidential election in Iran. The authors objected 
to the 2009 re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad raising doubts on its credibility. By 
reworking Satrapi’s graphic novel, Payman and Sina tried to depict the post-2009 election 
uprising and mass protests, claiming that the defeated opposition led by Mir Hossein 
Mousavi172 actually won the election. Payman and Sina’s Persepolis 2.0 describes their work 
as a critical letter to Mahmood Ahmadinejad and his victory on 13 June 2009. The criticism 
of the Iranian electoral commission was, they believe, their way of honouring a 26-year-old 
woman, Neda Agha Soltan, ‘who gave her blood in the way of liberty’.  
By borrowing Satrapi’s illustrations, Payman and Sina maintained the original 
storyboard, however, the text was edited to reflect the post-election events. Khalili confirmed 
                                               
171 Payman & Sina are two pen names of the authors of Persepolis 2.0, just like Amir and Khalil, the 
author and illustrator of Zahra’s Paradise. For safety reasons, they chose not to divulge their real names: 
“Are we scared for our personal safety and that of our loved ones? Is that why we’re hiding our true 
identities? Honestly, yes, and nobody should be surprised. The Iranian government has consistently 
shown its ruthlessness against those who dare to denounce it. The important thing is that, thanks to our 
anonymity, we have been entirely free to speak the truth without self-censoring in the least” (Amir in 
Jadaliyya, 2011). 
172 Mir Hossein Mousavi Khamene (b. 1942) was the main reformist challenger against Ahmadinejad 
“who served as Iran’s prime minister from 1981 to 1989, and ‘was given high ratings from running the 
country through almost all of the eight years of war with neighbouring Iraq’ (Muir, 2009)” (El-Nawawy, 
2010, p. 4).  
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that just like Persepolis reflected the events of the Islamic Revolution 30 years before, so 
Persepolis 2.0 is a mirror of the 2009 election.173 Satrapi, who had no role whatsoever in 
creating this story, “gave her consent through her publishers without hesitation” (Khalili, 
2009). As before, Payman and Sina’s outspoken rationale is to inform people throughout the 
world and provide support for freedom fighters in Iran, since “when Iran was in the media 
spotlight it gave people there so much motivation to keep fighting. External support really 
makes a difference” (Khalili, 2009).  
Four years later, in March 2013, Iran was on the verge of another presidential election. 
Just like Payman and Sina, Amir and Khalil borrowed Satrapi’s distinctive technique and 
style174 to reveal the story of a lost son in Zahra’s Paradise. The narrator, the blogger Hasan 
writing from Istanbul, lost his brother during the 2009 election protests in the streets of Tehran. 
Mehdi, Hasan’s lost brother, was later found dead. Zahra’s Paradise takes the audience into a 
labyrinth which leads to hospitals, jails, medico-legal institutions and morgues in Iran in a 
search for Mehdi. The search is conducted by Zahra, Hasan and Mehdi’s mother, and Maryam, 
a close friend. Later on, after the publication of the story, Zahra became a virtual candidate for 
president in Iran in 2013. She became a symbol of the pain suffered by all bereaved mothers 
who lost their children in the aftermath of the protests. She represented democratic and fair 
elections and made her voice heard against the injustice she suffered.  
The creators of Zahra ran an online campaign for her virtual candidacy and introduced 
her to the world. In the Vote4Zahra website,175 Zahra was nominated the representative of all 
women and mothers whose rights have been trampled by the Iranian government. They 
brought Zahra to the election scene to attract the world’s attention to the ‘anti-human rights’ 
situation of Iran. The character of Zahra used by Amir and Khalil to expose the election events, 
e.g. riots, demonstrations, political prisoners, human rights issues, and to open a new 
                                               
173 Payman, in The Guardian, declared that: “Persepolis is the most iconic work for my post-revolution 
generation”. He continued: “We wanted to find something that people who did not care about Iran would 
be interested in. So far we have had 50,000 views in 150 countries and we’re putting out translations in 
Spanish, French, Portuguese and Italian”. He further stated that Arabic and Farsi versions will be 
coming next (Khalili, 2009).  
174 Whilst Persepolis 2.0 used the same material of the original Persepolis, the creators of Zahra’s 
Paradise produced their own storyboard and text. There are indeed some similarities with Persepolis, 
such as for instance its graphic narrative technique, the intention of the authors, the intended readership, 
and its political concerns and aspirations. 
175 The “‘Vote4Zahra’ online campaign has been encouraging the masses to ‘symbolically’ pick the 
comic-strip character as president” (El-Shenawi, 2013). “The Zahra for President Campaign is a 
collaboration between United for Iran and Zahra’s Paradise, two human rights initiatives launched in 
the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections. The purpose of this virtual campaign is to create a 
collaborative space for the voice, vote and vision of the Iranian people” (Vote4Zahra.org, 2014).  
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discussion board on issues such as gender discrimination, oppression and human rights 
violations in Iran. 
Demonstrators were mostly from two or three generations after the 1979 
revolutionaries. They looked at Mir Hossein Mousavi with hope and enthusiasm, and most got 
involved with the campaigns.176 This wave of commitment was favoured by the new style of 
debates between the candidates that was broadcasted from Iranian TV channels.177 It was the 
first time in the Iranian public media that politicians clearly and with no hesitation insulted 
their opposition and even the previous politicians:178  
This general feeling deepened after a televised debate between the candidates 
served to intensify the electoral rivalry. The debater’s bold and public criticism 
of one another seemed to have lifted the dam of political censorship which 
usually prevented the people from saying what was truly on their mind. 
Society’s public atmosphere also became freer for the greater criticism and the 
expression of people’s true feelings. As a result, during the final month before 
the elections, every one living in Iran, particularly in the bigger cities, witnessed 
a public enthusiasm, energy and excitement. The people were constantly 
speaking of the change of circumstances (Michaelsen, 2011, p. 79). 
Public debates actually brought voters to the polls.179 The voting time was extended 
several times and some of the polling stations ran out of ballot cards before the closing hour. 
Besides this enthusiasm, early news reported the probable victory of Mousavi, thus arising his 
followers’ expectations. In fact, by the end of the next day, Ahmadinejad won with 63 per cent 
of the votes in the first round. Finally, on June 23rd, 2009, a mass demonstration was initiated 
in Tehran against the officially announced victory (“alleged re-election”, as CNN referred to 
it) of Ahmadinejad (Rollinson as cited in El-Nawawy, 2010, p. 9). The protesters rallied 
against the final results of the election with such slogans as “Where is my vote?”, “Give my 
vote back” or “My martyr brother, I will take your vote back”.180 Such spontaneous reaction 
                                               
176 “Newspapers, some with identified linkages to organized political parties, have editorialised in 
favour of their preferred candidates and in two key presidential elections -1997 and 2009 -television 
debates among candidates played a significant role in introducing challengers to the public and 
increasing voter turnout” (Farhi, 2012, p. 5).  
177 “According to the Research Centre of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, the tenth presidential 
debates were declared to be the most-watched programmes in Iran’s history of broadcasting. Drawing 
some 200 million viewers, the debate between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mir Hossein Mousavi (June 
3) gained the largest audience, 50 million of who were inside Iran while the other 150 million lived 
outside its borders” (Hosseini, 2010, pp. 88-89). 
178 “Ahmadinejad’s public charges of corruption against key figures of the Islamic Republic whom he 
identified as the real forces behind Mousavi’s candidacy also further buttressed the belief that the 
competition was real and consequential” (Farhi, 2012, p. 11).  
179 “Many undecided Iranians who had left their final voting decision to the outcome of the debates 
categorically acclaimed the president’s courage to quake the foundations of feudalism and unveil the 
corruption. It is believed that the president’s uncompromising stance in this interview won him a large 
number of votes throughout the country” (Ziabari, 2010, p. 84).  
180 Some of the slogans chanted by people in anti-government demonstrations in 2009 in Iran.  
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eventually erupted in the name of the “Green Movement”. 181 A number of Iranian officials, 
including the clergy, called the movement “fetneh 88”, the calamity of 2009, which- it was 
argued- was instigated mostly by the USA, Israel, UK and France. A number of alleged French 
and English spies were arrested as a result, and Mousavi, Karroubi (another one of the four 
candidates), some dissident figures and a number of journalists and supporters were labelled 
as instruments in the hands of foreigners. Some were under house arrest and some were jailed. 
Apart from this group, “[t]here were those among the opposition in and out of Iran - 
particularly those based in the US and aligned with Washington’s interest in ‘regime change’ 
in Iran - who thought it was geared to dismantle the ruling regime” (Dabashi, 2013). The 
protesters claimed that the election result was falsified. The situation was exacerbated by the 
supportive statement and congratulatory message of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 
Khamenei, after Ahmadinejad’s re-election.182 Upon the suppression of the movement by the 
Iranian government, dissident figures and human rights activists mostly opted to stay away 
from the unrest, and began writing publicly detailing human right abuses and civil right 
demands along with denouncing the illegitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Some took a step 
further and called the vali-ye faqih, Imam Khamenei, the big dictator. “The demonstrators 
rewarded him with the chant ‘marg bar dictator’ (death to the dictator). His position was 
weakened” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 407).  
The defeated remnants of the Shah’s regime and the unfulfilled members of MKO183 
also moved in to support the demonstrators, while they were trying to retrieve their former 
position in ruling Iran again even though they had nothing to share with revolutionary Iranian 
ideology.184 Apart from them, some members of the clergy, and ordinary Iranians from both 
                                               
181 The colour green is recognized by Shi’as as the colour of the family descendants of the Prophet.  
182 This event was enough for the biased media to elaborate on the manipulation of the vote results. For 
example, the Globe and Mail included several statements elaborating on the corruption of the state. 
Sebastian Abbot wrote “Ayatollah Khamenei is a hard-liner who has battled reformists in the past, and 
whose support helped Mr Ahmadinejad first get elected in 2005. But analysts say he is also a political 
realist, and in the past he has made concessions to ensure his main goals—his own survival and that of 
Iran’s cleric-run system (2009, June 16)” (Abbot as cited in Eid and Dakroury, 2010, p. 19).  
183 MKO is the short form of Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, an “Islamic urban guerrilla group” 
(Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 1994, p. 198), which “was the first Iranian organisation to 
develop systematically a modern revolutionary interpretation of Islam - an interpretation that differed 
sharply from both the old conservative Islam of the traditional clergy and the new populist version 
formulated in the 1970s by Ayatollah Khomeini and his disciples. Its ideas are in some way comparable 
to those of Catholic ‘liberation theology’” (Abrahamian, 1989, p. 1).  
184 A part of this group were, as Dabashi narrates, “The main body of expatriate Iranians remained 
committed to the democratic aspirations of their homeland but equally adamant and vocal in opposition 
to the crippling economic sanctions that Washington neocons, their Zionist contingency, in 
collaboration with their Iranian allies, were seeking to impose on Iranians - or even talk of military 
strike - as a kind of ‘humanitarian intervention’. […] Some of these dissidents joined intellectual US 
neocons operations and/or the pro-Israeli think-tanks to call for regime change in Iran. But the 
overwhelming majority of them opted for a full recognition of the dignified limits of what they could 
say or do from abroad and never joined the bandwagon of ‘regime changers’, or the treasonous path of 
plotting against their own homeland” (Dabashi, 2013). 
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inside and outside Iran criticised the totalitarianism of the Islamic government after the 
election of 2009. Payman and Sina, and Amir, among others, tried “to show how history was 
repeating itself in Iran” (Weaver, 2009).  
The story of Zahra 
One similarity between Persepolis and Zahra’s Paradise is that both Satrapi and Amir, 
as human rights activists, have tried to demonstrate the despotism and injustice of the Iranian 
government from the viewpoint of a woman. Satrapi’s message is not positioned from feminist 
stances, as she has noted on various occasions. It is a cry for humanity. Conversely, Amir, as 
a man, intentionally makes use of a mother to compound the impact of his story, a message 
conveyed by the son of a bereaved mother. Amir’s choice is significant.  
Firuzeh Mahmoudi, Amir’s colleague and an activist also used this female character to 
discuss the gender policies of the Islamic Republic. Zahra is the only (virtual) female candidate 
among eight male candidates. Bringing Zahra to the front promotes women’s rights for 
presidency in Iran. Zahra is described as the only candidate who runs for human rights because 
there is no other female among the male candidates to stand for human rights violations or 
democracy in Iran (Newzw, 2013). 
Zahra’s vision for the future is an open, inclusive, and verdant society. In a sea 
of crony candidates controlled by Iran’s supreme leader, Zahra is the only 
candidate running on a human rights and democracy platform, and the only 
candidate calling for full equality of all Iranian citizens before the law. It is the 
Iranian people’s right to determine their own destiny in fair and free elections, 
and Zahra demands it (Vote4Zahra.org, 2013). 
Amir and Khalil’s Zahra is more than bereaved mother. She is standing up for not only 
the bereaved of the 2009 post-election protests, but for every single Iranian citizen. Though a 
virtual candidate, Khodayari (2013) sees in Zahra all the characteristics of a real candidate. 
The designers of the Vote4Zahra website and the organisers of “United for Iran” were hoping 
to make their voices heard worldwide through Zahra’s candidacy, and tried to increase the 
number of votes for Zahra through the book and the website. They intended to show the world 
what was happening in Iran, just like Satrapi.  
According to Amir, the Zahra character is not entirely fictional. She is shaped after a 
real mother who lost her son - Sohrab - after the 2009 protests. Amir, in an interview with 
Andisheh TV, stated that: “one would be able to see the grief and sorrow of the whole Iranian 
nation in her face” (Khodayari, 2013). He believes that “no mother should lose her child 
because of partaking in an election” (Khodayari, 2013). The author of Zahra’s Paradise 
intended to show the public the sort of “sorrow and pain, which Iranians are suffering from” 
(Khodayari, 2013).  
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The graphic novel Zahra’s Paradise and the Vote4Zahra website have been paired with 
the intention to improve the domestic condition of Iran. A digital version of the book has been 
on the Vote4Zahra website since 2011. On the verge of the 2013 election, Zahra was presented 
as the best choice to run as a female candidate in view of her popularity and her motivations. 
The only discrepancy between Zahra’s Paradise and the website campaign is that the book 
was mostly engaged with “Zahra’s suffering under the Islamic government policies in Iran, 
whereas, the website is the story of hope” (Khodayari, 2013). According to Firuzeh 
Mahmoudi, Zahra becomes empowered through her experience and decides to build a bridge 
of hope. In one part of the campaign, she resolves to forget all her sorrow and tries to 
compensate for the future. Elsewhere Mahmoudi and her colleagues try to bring together all 
those who wish to “vote for human rights, vote for democracy and vote for a type of Iran which 
cannot be found in the views of present male candidates” (Khodayari, 2013). The symbol used 
during the campaign is very similar to the famous Zorro sign, thus suggesting Zahra may be 
some sort of a masked saviour of Iranian citizens. The whole story of Zahra eventually proves 
a movement designed to question the bases of the Islamic Republic.  
By presenting Zahra as a presidential candidate, Mahmoudi and her colleagues express 
criticism towards the legal constraints restricting women’s action in Iranian politics. Zahra is 
the only female candidate left, and, due to her fictionality, the only one who is safe from the 
Iranian Guardian Council’s disqualifications.185 According to Sadeghi (2012), the post-
election events “will come to be remembered as unique in that it was not only advanced by 
women, but also provided an opportunity for them, alongside men, to defy social attitudes 
toward gender, and patriarchal arbitrary rule over the country in unprecedented ways” (p. 135). 
The fact that “women cannot be president in Iran” is one adding considerable fuel to the public 
debate on Iran:  
A member of Iran’s constitutional watchdog group insists that women cannot 
be presidential candidates, a report said Thursday, effectively killing the largely 
symbolic bids by about 30 women seeking to run in the June 14 election. Even 
before the comments by Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, chances for a woman 
candidate in Iran’s presidential election were considered nearly impossible. 
Women also have registered as potential candidates in past presidential 
elections, but the group that vets hopefuls appears to follow interpretations of 
the constitution that suggest only a man may hold Iran’s highest elected office. 
                                               
185 “The Council of Guardians consists of twelve jurists, all of whom are required to have achieved 
sufficient training in religious jurisprudence. Six of the Council’s members are appointed by the 
Supreme Leader from among the clerical elite. While the remaining six are nominated by the judiciary 
and voted on by the Majlis. The Council of Guardians is responsible for interpreting the constitution 
and ensures that legislation passed by the Majlis is consistent with Islamic law and the Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic. In addition, the Council is responsible for approving any presidential, 
parliamentary, and Assembly of Experts nominees before their names can appear on the ballot” 
(Alexander and Hoenig, 2008, p. 17).  
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Women, however, are cleared to run for Iran’s parliament and have served as 
lawmakers (Huffington Post World, 2013).186 
The statement of Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, a member of the Guardian Council, is 
controversial. According to Axworthy, “in Western countries it is normal for people not to 
have very much reliable information about Iran, and yet for certain aspects of Iran to be 
familiar. There are things about Iran that are striking and memorable” (2013, p. xxii) such as 
the rights of women to become president or occupying any political position which is 
considered as a man-only job. Let us see what Iranian sources say. 
The Arabic word “rijal” is the plural of the noun ‘man’, a general term which also 
includes women and therefore best translated as “humanity”, “human beings”. This is used in 
official Farsi texts as well: “According to the laws, the president is chosen from the religious 
and political rijal”187 (Merh News Agency, 2013). The statement seems to reflect the 
Huffington Post World 2013 article. There are however important omissions. While there is a 
long tradition of tafasir that clearly state that women are not suitable for leadership positions, 
there is no reference in the Qur’an supporting this.188 Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini,189 a Shi’a 
scholar, in his An Introduction to the Rights and Duties of Women in Islam, wrote about 
women’s rights to participate in the legislative process. He believes that men and women have 
equal rights to live in a society governed by laws they both contributed to implement. No one 
can deprive women of their right to legislate because of their sex (Amini, 2011, p. 214).  
It is definite and certain that the society requires government. The prerequisite 
for enforcing laws is that there be a government that has the responsibility for 
bringing order to the society. Women and men alike, as citizens who have the 
                                               
186 I have used this source as one easily available to the general public.  
187 The original Farsi text is translated by the author: (Az meyan-e rijal-e mazhabi wa siasi, yek nafar ke 
wajede sharayete zir bashad, entekhab mishawad) (Mehr News Agency, 2013).  
188 There are many cases in which the Prophet of Islam took women to the battle and treated them as 
equal to men. Nusayba bint Kab was one of those women “who personally defended the Prophet in the 
Battle of Uhud but was not mandated to do so” (Amirebrahimi, 2012). Umm Ammarah was also another 
prominent example of a woman who played a major role during the Battle of Uhud.  She took the sword, 
fought the enemies and defended the Prophet. “The Prophet was reportedly saying that whichever 
direction he turned his face, he saw Umm Ammarah fighting the enemies” (Deris, 2013). What we see 
in these examples is that the women in the time of the Prophet took action, offered their abilities and 
skills and were proactive female companions to the Prophet. As stated in the Qur’an: “Surely the 
Muslim men and the Muslim women, and the believing men and the believing women, and the devout 
men and the devout women, and the truthful men and the truthful women, and the patiently persevering 
men and the patiently persevering women, and the humble men and the humble women, and the 
almsgiving men and the almsgiving women, and the fasting men and the fasting women, and the men 
who guard their chastity and the women who guard, and the men who remember Allah much and the 
women who remember – Allah has prepared for them forgiveness and a great reward” (33:35). 
189 Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini (b. 1925) is an Iranian-born Shi’a scholar and writer, Member and Vice-
President of the Assembly of Experts (Majlis-Khubrigan), Secretary General of the Office and 
Educational Research Centre of the Assembly of Experts, Member of the Academic Council of the 
Religious Learning Centre of Qom, and Chief of Cultural Affairs, Member of the Board of Trustees of 
the World Centre for Islamic Sciences, Member of the Board of Trustees of Imam al-Sadiq University 
in Tehran, and Member of the Supreme Council of World Assembly of Ahl al-Bayt (a.s). For more 
information, see http://www.ibrahImamini.com/en. 
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right to participate in choosing their futures, can have a part in the government 
and its determination. Naturally, presence in the prerequisites of this affair is 
also everyone’s right. Establishment of unions and political parties, 
participations in various groups, taking part in elections and other political 
activities are several of the rights of all people, including women.[…], if women 
think of these things also, they shall be much more successful. The useless 
rivalry and separation between men and women must not be provoked. While 
preserving religious and legal criteria, women must act in the interests of the 
whole society and all humans (Amini, 2011, pp. 214-215).  
While he does not say that women can become presidents, he notes the rights of women 
to participate in politics and hold governmental positions. If nothing in the Qur’an and Shi’ism 
prevents a woman to become president, why do the Iranian constitutional laws (which are 
claimed to be based on shari’ah) not allow this? Interpreters of the law have read rijal literally, 
i.e. “men”, “male human beings” as opposed to nisā, “women”, “female human beings”. 
Alternatively, they see presidency as governmental supreme authority, and not executive 
authority. In both case only rijal, and not nisā, can be presidents.  
Arabic terms such as rijal are used in official Farsi texts to show their Islamic 
disposition. If so, rijal in “its figurative and allegorical meaning refers to prominent and 
outstanding characteristics in religion and politics” (Shahed, 2011). This clearly means that all 
those figures who are religiously or politically proactive can become president, irrespective of 
their gender, as per article 115 of the Iranian constitutional laws: “The president should be 
from the religious and political rijal” (Shahed, 2011). As a matter of fact, if the legislators 
wished to close down the doors of misconception and misunderstanding, why did they not use 
the Farsi word mard (man) instead? At the time of issuing this law, a group of olama and 
foqaha, members of the constituent assembly, discussed both rijal and mard. Since mard was 
unambiguously referring to the male gender, they rejected it. The word rijal was used instead 
to leave the negotiation open for the future. By that time, since there was no suitable female 
candidate, the bill was defeated. This ratified decree in no way means that a woman does not 
have the right to become president in Iran; rather, it is accepted that upon demonstrating 
religious and political qualifications, the doors are open for women to take this responsibility 
(Shahed, 2011).  
In line with the orientalist critique, Zahra’s candidacy, Narayan believes, is 
communicating the oppressions of a culture and thus “reinforces, however unconsciously, 
Western prejudices about the ‘superiority’ of Western culture” (Narayan, 2004, p. 216). 
Therefore, one must take double precautions when being critical of a culture and religion in 
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that it might “conflict with their desire as members of once colonized cultures190 to affirm the 
value of the same culture and traditions” (Narayan, 2004, p. 216). As mentioned before, 
Muslim accounts are overwhelmingly quoted in reporting contexts when they are critical of 
their own culture and religion (Poole and Richardson, 2006, p. 115). Decentring “Western” 
hegemonic discourses will shift the focus of discussions on “Islamic fundamentalism” and 
women’s oppression under it.  
According to Sam Harris, the “West” does not seem to be at war with “fundamentalism” 
or terrorism in Islam, “but with ‘Islam itself’, with ‘the vision of life that is prescribed to all 
Muslims in the Koran’. The distinction between moderate and fundamentalist Muslim is 
irrelevant because most Muslims appear to be ‘fundamentalist’ in the Western sense of the 
word” (as cited in Nash, 2012, p. 9). Equating all forms of Islam with terrorism or 
fundamentalism is the provenance of orientalism. Orientalism, as Said points out, only 
provides a “reading of Others, especially Islam, as a list of ‘absences’- capitalism, cities, civil 
society, democracy etc. – and the transfer of the West’s anxieties of the Orient” (Nash, 2012, 
p. 16). According to Said, orientalism, in its dominant position, is capable of revealing the 
‘truth’ about the past and present of “Eastern” cultures more authentically than the 
“Easterners” themselves. The de-contextualisation of the “non-Western” religious politics not 
only helps the orientalists to justify their actions but it also “weakens the resistance of ‘the 
Other’ as they change the way in which ‘the Other’ views itself” (Said as cited in Marandi, 
2009, p. 5). Discussing the Islamic system of Iranian government strictly from the point of 
view of “Western” political standards is likely to open the gates of misunderstanding and 
skewed interpretation. According to Shariatmadari (2013): 
The revolution’s religious underpinning is hard for the secular West to 
comprehend. Islam is the wild card that puts Iran’s predicament beyond 
conventional analysis. Some claim that there is a tinge of irrationality in its 
decision making that makes it impossible to engage with in the usual way.  
In the process of de-contextualisation, what usually happens is that the truth is sacrificed 
through mentioning quickly or focusing on other issues. In Marandi’s words, “facts are 
sometimes stated and then buried in a mass of information, and at times misinformation” 
(2009, p. 6). Popular knowledge on the issue of women’s rights to run for political positions 
in Iran is thus affected by incomplete understanding, or misunderstanding, of the set of rules 
                                               
190 According to Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994), Iran has never been under direct 
colonisation. However, the “increasingly visible signs of economic and cultural dependency and a 
growing myth of foreign involvement were strong causal factors” for a revolution (p. xvii).  
 
  
141 
 
regulating Iran.191 According to Geaves (2004), “orientalism can be described as the corporate 
institution for dealing with the Muslim world- making statements about it, authorising views 
of it, describing it, settling it and ruling over it, either by force, economic power relations or 
intellectual ownership” (p. 66). After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the political and cultural 
tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in the “West” have been exacerbated. In 
subsequent years, as the crisis between “Islam and the West” seems to have risen up, the use 
of orientalist clichés has arguably intensified this crisis (Geaves et al., 2004). The most 
important reason behind skewed understanding of Islam or Iran is the lack of unbiased 
knowledge. Reports on Islam and Iran are mostly decontextualized, and are imbued with 
decades of anti-Iranian propaganda.  
Dabashi believes that “the Green Movement is not a revolution in the classic sense of 
the term - it is not violent, and it is not targeted to dismantle the ruling regime” (2013). The 
protesters were against both the current government policies and the former bankrupt 
profiteers of Iran. Furthermore, they highlighted a number of issues: 
The categorical instance on the territorial integrity of Iran; repeated insistence 
against economic sanctions crippling the daily lives of millions of Iranians; 
opposition to covert operations or military strikes against Iran; against separatist 
movements; adamant about its non-violent disposition; opposition to any 
measure or movement that endangers the well-being of Iranians; insistence on 
dialogue, on the cultivation of public reason, on cleansing the system (2013). 
In Dabashi’s words, the protesters were actually opposing the policies against Iran such 
as the international imposed sanctions and the war threats (2013). Disregarding the agenda of 
the Green Movement, “Western” media have portrayed the post-election events as a reaction 
and noted that “Iran’s 2009 ‘election’ fielded only regime-vetted candidates and was stolen, 
and that the reigning administration is ‘increasingly fascistic’” (Brown in The Guardian, 
2012).192 The conclusion it reaches is that the Iranian government had manipulated the results 
                                               
191 To clarify this point further, I would like to take an example from The Revolutionary Iran (2013) of 
Michael Axworthy. The cover of the book is designed in an attractive way that would catch every one’s 
eyes and attention. It is an image of a young woman with a not-properly-fixed hejab on. She is making 
the victory sign with her fingers while her face is half covered. The first perception of such an image 
seems to intensify the cliché of a Muslim veiled woman reacting to Islamic oppression. Particularly 
when it comes to Iran, the immediate message that comes to mind is the issue of compulsory veiling, 
violation of which carries a legal punishment. The picture of a young woman with her face half covered 
showing the sign of victory could simply imply the reform movement of Iranian women against the 
policies of the government. However, the picture was taken during the 2009 post-election events in Iran. 
Axworthy writes in the caption that: “this woman has covered the lower part of her face not for religious 
reasons, but to avoid identification by authorities and security forces. The hejab in Iran normally leaves 
the whole face open” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 346 & book cover). With such a simple explanation, 
Axworthy shatters initial preconceptions. 
192 In another example of such representation, The Times in 2009 wrote: “Within hours of the polls 
closing in Iran’s turbulent election, the clerical establishment declared President Ahmadinejad the 
winner - not just by a credible razor-thin majority but by an absurd and falsified two thirds of the vote. 
The attempt to impart a veneer of democratic legitimacy to a regime widely hated for its authoritarian 
intolerance, economic incompetence and corruption backfired (The Times, 2009).  
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to keep Ahmadinejad in his former position. The reality is more complex. The votes were 
divided by districts. According to El-Nawawy, “much of [Ahmadinejad’s] support comes from 
poorer and more religious sections of Iran’s rapidly growing population particularly outside 
Tehran (Who’s Who 2009)” (El-Nawawy, 2010, p. 3). Further to that, many religious Shi’as 
in Iran supported Ahmadinejad for his continuation of Khomeini’s “anti-Western”/anti-
imperialist policies. According to Axworthy (2013), “many Iranians supported his strong 
stance against the West and in favour of Iran’s right to a civil nuclear programme” (p. 404). 
To this one should add that most media reporters were based in Tehran and especially North 
Tehran, which hosts the more urbanised and “Westernised” population who were supporting 
Mousavi. The long queues of voters broadcasted by TV channels were from these areas 
mainly. The votes of the northern sectors of Tehran were counted first and, as expected, they 
showed an overwhelming support for Ahmadinejad’s opposition. 
Representations of Iranian prisons in Persepolis and epigones 
Many Iranian intellectuals have articulated a body of strong arguments against the 
current and previous situation of political prisoners. Satrapi too does so by telling the story of 
her uncle Anoosh, a prisoner under the Shah who was allegedly assassinated under the Islamic 
government.193 In the chapter “The Heroes”, Satrapi talks about Siamak Jari (b. 1945), her 
mother’s best friend’s husband, and Mohsen Shakiba (b. 1947) a revolutionary communist. 
Both were released in March 1979 and talked about their torture experiences194 in prison. In 
these vignettes, Satrapi (2003) details the situation in Iranian prisons and mentions the murders 
of various family friends: Ahmadi was tortured with a hot iron and after his death cut into 
pieces (p. 52); Mohsen was drown in his bathtub; Siamak could not be found and his sister 
was killed in his stead (p. 66). After Siamak and Mohsen, it was uncle Anoosh’s turn to be 
arrested and executed with the accusation of being a USSR spy (p. 70).  
Satrapi’s illustrations of the situation of Iranian prisoners and their destiny in prisons 
have been read as a form of orientalism by a number of Iranian officials and scholars. Marandi, 
for instance, states that because of the current market for such memoirs in the “West”, the 
prisoners’ situations were sensationalised and eroticised with baseless and self-referencing 
reports (2009, p. 35). According to Marandi (2009), “one indispensable ingredient of 
                                               
193 According to Matin-Asgari “during its first two years, the new regime executed 757 individuals, 
mostly charged with ‘sowing corruption on earth’. About two-thirds of these were political cases, mostly 
individuals tied to the old regime” (2006, p. 701).  
194 Satrapi’s uncle describes his prison experiences to his niece: “You remember the day they pulled out 
my nails? They have grown back since. Not in a normal way … but at least I have them.  Our torturers 
received special training from the C.I.A. - real scientists!!! They knew each part of the body. They knew 
where to hit! Look! On your soles there are nerves that lead directly to the brain. They whipped me with 
thick electric cables so much that this looks like anything but a foot. Not to mention putting out their 
cigarettes on our backs” (Satrapi, 2003, p. 51). 
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Orientalist discourse, old and new, is the eroticizing of the East” (p. 33). In his views, claims 
of rape and sexual abuses are quite ample in memoirs on Iran as a “sort of modernized version 
of the old Orientalist fantasies about the depraved East” (p. 35). In Persepolis, Satrapi’s mum 
talks about the destiny of virgin girls in Iranian prisons.  
You know what they do to the young girls they arrest? You know what 
happened to Niloufar? The girl you met at Khosro’s house? […] you know that 
it’s against the law to kill a virgin … so a guardian of the Revolution marries 
her … and takes her virginity before executing her. Do you understand what 
that means??? If someone so much as touches a hair on your head, I’ll kill him!” 
said Satrapi’s mother (Satrapi, 2003, p. 145).  
Her reasoning is that:  
Traditionally when a girl gets married, the husband is supposed to pay her a 
dowry. If the girl dies, the husband has to give the dowry to her family. That’s 
what happened with Niloufar. After she was executed, to make sure her awful 
fate was understood, they sent 500 Tumans to her parents. 500 Tumans for the 
life and virginity of an innocent girl” (Satrapi, 2003, p. 146).  
When Satrapi’s parents decide to send her abroad for the first time, her mother 
convinces young Marji that if she stays and continues arguing with her teachers, she could be 
jailed, an event which may lead to various forms of violence and the death of her daughter. In 
such a framework, the emphasis on such representations might be rooted in Satrapi’s Islam 
setizi (her belief in the separation of religion and the state) or simply in her being an outsider 
(due to her secular “Westernised” lifestyle).  
Illustrations of rape and violations of human rights are observable in Zahra’s Paradise 
(2011, p. 108). In chapter 9, “Kahrizak”, Amir portrays a similar vignette. When Ali, Mehdi’s 
friend from jail, is released, Hasan, Mehdi’s elder brother, comes to see him. At this time, 
(Mehdi was still alive in the prison) Ali tells Hasan that Mehdi has been tortured and raped, 
and explains the terrible situation of prisoners vis-à-vis the martyrs of Karbala.195 In this 
comparison, the prison guards are made to resemble Yazid’s soldiers. He describes how badly 
the prisoners were beaten and wounded, and when they asked for some water, either they were 
refused, or a glass of water was poured on the ground in front of their eyes (Amir & Khalil, 
2011, p. 102).  
In the above mentioned examples, information about the Iranian prisons is dramatized 
by the author. Marandi believes, “these texts work within a single Western Orientalist 
                                               
195 The toughest part of the Ashura tragedy was that the Imam, his family and followers were deprived 
of water until they were all martyred. Yazid’s soldiers did not even have mercy on the six-month-old 
baby of Hossain. He (Ali Asghar, son of Imam Hossain) was martyred while he was crying for milk in 
his father’s hands. Ali compared this scene in which he and other prisoners suffered from thirst and 
tiredness to that of Karbala. 
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discourse of demonization, where Iran is guilty until proven otherwise” (2009, p. 34). Based 
on second hand information, and other biased mal-documented claims, Satrapi and others have 
been accused of ‘eroticizing’ the Iranian prisons rather than reflecting the accurate events. This 
is one of the significant ingredients of the orientalist discourse according to Marandi (2009, p. 
33). Nash also shows that Nafisi196 in her Reading Lolita in Tehran angles her satire towards 
the same issue by stating that “it is a truth universally acknowledged that a Muslim man, 
regardless of his fortune, must be in want of a nine-year-old-virgin wife” (2012, p. 57). 
“Satrapi’s version of this ‘philosophy’ is somewhat [similar]. According to her, ‘it’s against 
the law to kill a virgin so a guardian of the revolution marries her and takes her virginity before 
executing her’” (Marandi, 2009, p. 34). In Marandi’s words, although there is no sound proof 
to this, it seems that this “does not decrease the authenticity of the ‘memoir’ in the eyes of 
many Western critics. She can make wild and often contradictory accusations and still seem 
authentic to much of her Western audience” (2009, p. 34). According to Nash, these 
autobiographers’ position, “avowed pro-Westernism” and “their wild fluctuations in response- 
from adoration to execration” (Nash, 2012, p. 57) – is to be situated within Iranian gharbzadeh 
– Westoxicated intellectuals who are considered “to be Iran’s intoxication with the West” 
(Lesevot, 2011, p. 120). As the result, Iran has been demonised and Satrapi and others’ 
narratives “depict a grim tragicomedy in which a succession of Muslim Malvolios blindly and 
contemptuously espouse and erect a regime of virtuous dogmatism with no regard for persons, 
place or time” (Nash, 2012, p. 57). 
Quite opposite to what Marandi and Nash argued regarding the position of Satrapi as an 
outsider or her mal-documented evidences, for many in the “West”, she is considered as an 
“insider” who supposedly knows more than her audiences about Iran, and is trusted and 
accepted as a reliable source of information. In discussions of Persepolis, Zahra’s Paradise 
and other memoirs, there is a tendency to regard the personal accounts of Satrapi and other 
autobiographers as experiences they never had before, and thus objecting to them as not 
reflecting eyewitness accounts. The challenge that autobiographies face is the process of 
innovation and structuration, which is an extension of the fact and fiction discussion. It is 
argued that “in an era when absolute truth claims are under assault”, how can an 
autobiographer make “a case for an essentially reciprocal relationship between the truth of 
what happened and the truth of how it is remembered”? (Hathaway, 2011, p. 251). Especially, 
Leigh warns us that one needs to pay double attention when encountering the literalizing report 
                                               
196 According to Nafisi, “it seems that all religious men, child abusers, sexually obsessed, ‘perverts’ and 
that their female counterparts are just as evil and carry out ‘sexual assaults’. In their religious 
ceremonies, Nafisi can feel ‘a wild, sexually flavoured frenzy in the air’ and when the millions of 
Iranians who took part in the funeral ceremony of Ayatollah Khomeini were sprayed at intervals with 
water to cool them off because of the extreme heat, Nafisi claims that ‘the effect made the scene oddly 
sexual’” (as cited in Marandi, 2009, p. 33).  
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“of sexual violence because sexual storytelling is a complicated process; it necessarily and 
appropriately combines fantasy with memory” (2001, p. 26). 
The study of autobiography has shown that there is no fixed definition for it as many 
critics have not often considered it as a genre at all. “Autobiography is a threshold genre. It 
traces and crosses boundaries between fact and fiction, memory and history, selves and others, 
images and texts-sometimes drawing these distinctions, but more often blurring them” 
(Doring, 2006, p. 72). Paul de Man for example, argued that “empirically as well as 
theoretically, autobiography lends itself poorly to generic definition” and also according to 
Avrom Fleishman “since autobiography is not generically distinguished by formal 
constituents, linguistic register, or audience effects, it therefore has no history as a genre” 
(Eakin, 1989, p. viii). Based on this discussion, one would address the principal limitations of 
it. According to Lejeune “autobiography is above all a narrative, which follows in time the 
story of an individual” (as cited in Eakin, 1989, p. xi). This can jeopardise the sense of 
authenticity in autobiographies. In fact, the relation of autobiography and fiction has never 
been an easy one. In a complementary function, Eakin believes “the narrative is us, our 
identities” (Eakin, 2008, p. 3). Eakin proposed a “dynamic relation between narrative and 
identity, for narrative is not only a literary form but part of the fabric of our lived experience” 
(2008, p. 2). “When it comes to our identities, narrative is not merely about self, but it is rather 
in some profound way a constituent part of self” (Eakin, 2008, p. 2). The most prominent 
debate in this regard is “the concept of sincerity, which is at once the sine qua non of 
autobiography as a genre and a sterile problematic” (Eakin, 1989, p. ix).  
According to Elliott, “postmemory is by its very nature a fantastic re-creation rather 
than an accurate reflection” (2003, p. 5). Imagining and witnessing are self-referential in an 
autobiography and “who is the arbiter of autobiographical truth?” (Eakin, 2008, p. 20). In his 
Maus, Art Spiegelman was “confronted with an assemblage of raw material and challenged to 
create a coherent text out of it” (Hathaway, 2011, p. 253). Maus is a complex combination of 
photographic facts and evidences that retells Spiegelman’s father’s account of the Holocaust 
in Poland with a fantastic postmemory recreation. The story is stated through the 
representation of human characters as animals. A set of recorded interviews with family 
photographs were used to present his father’s memories. These evidences were mixed with 
Spiegelman’s fantasies. Hathaway argues that all the process of constructing an autobiography 
with all the elisions, selections and compressions are quite necessary in shaping a piece of art. 
Spiegelman confirms that his work was not just a mere representation of what he heard or saw 
or found out, but his main concern was giving a shape to all his experiences. This shape giving 
can be risky as it might distort the authenticity and the underlying reality. “Perhaps the only 
honest way to present such material is to say: Here are all the documents I used… and here’s 
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like thousands of hours of tape recording, a bunch of photographs to look at. Now, go make 
yourself a Maus!” (Spiegelman, 2011, p. 34).  
Similarly, the feature of ‘interpreting’ the events cannot be detached from Persepolis 
due to the nature of fictionalised autobiography. Based on the discussions of ‘graphic 
narrative’ by Chute (2008), Satrapi’s images tend to interpret more than report. She uses the 
term “graphic narrative” instead of graphic novel to refer to her work as she believes that 
Satrapi’s Persepolis is claiming its own historicity- even as she works to “destabilize standard 
narratives of history” (Chute, 2008, p. 1). Chute’s argument is sound advice. Graphic novel or 
even graphic narrative as a generic label does not exactly fit Satrapi’s work. It is true that 
Persepolis is partly a fiction and based on Spiegelman’s declaration it is impossible to tell a 
story without any extra elements. However, the historical points raised by Satrapi “are 
concerned with depicting the complex relationships among personal histories and larger 
‘official’ histories” (Hathaway, 2011, p. 249). This shows how events shaped Satrapi’s story 
at the same time Satrapi tried to shape her story. Indeed, Persepolis literally illustrates how 
history and the public culture work through in a way which was out of Satrapi’s control. The 
author’s personal experiences are closely tied within larger historical and cultural contexts. 
Eakin believes that “autobiography is definitely a referential art: it self-consciously, usually 
explicitly, positions itself with reference to the world, and when it does so, it invites –at least 
potentially- the kind of scrutiny” (Eakin, 2008, p. 21).  
The controversy surrounding the situation of political prisoners as described by Amir in 
Zahra’s Paradise represents a breaking point in this discussion. As Amir declared in one of 
his interviews that, he had listened to stories of violence in Iranian prisons (Amir in Jadaliyya, 
2011), the reliability of his account in terms of eyewitness testimony becomes significant. 
Amir’s case could be compared to Spiegelman’s experience of the Holocaust. Spiegelman was 
born when his parents had already survived the Holocaust. By the time of authoring his work, 
Spiegelman has a collection of stories and images shared with him by different people over a 
long period of time. His case is similar to Amir’s, who is narrating the story of Hassan’s brother 
a few years later. Elliott believes that Maus had been partly created by Spiegelman as a “kind 
of identification with the victims of the Holocaust- to remember their stories and sympathise 
with them” (2003, p. 43). This process of identification is only manageable and possible with 
fictionality. With the emphasis on the difference between third person’s representation of the 
past from the first person recalling it, Elliot argues that fictionality would make it possible to 
depict the “unspeakable crimes while avoiding the voyeuristic exploitation of a more realistic 
mode of visual representation” (Elliott, 2003, p. 44). Consequently, the element of fictionality 
seems to be unavoidable in the genre of memoir and failure to properly comprehend this in 
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consideration of the form of a graphic novel or a genre of a literary memoir might cause a 
narrative to be read and interpreted in a fashion similar to a news report.   
Trauma fiction 
Autobiographers need readers to share their ‘losses’. Iranian memoirs post the Islamic 
Revolution subjectively engage with “a process of historical revision and a time of trauma and 
loss and cataclysmic social change” (Whitlock, 2008, p. 8). These memoirs take different 
forms, and due to their traumatic accounts of the revolution became highly popular in the 
“West”. Persepolis emerged in the highly critical moment that was a key watershed in the 
successful publication of the book.197 As mentioned above, Satrapi illustrates her traumatic 
life experience under the revolution and the subsequent war. In one of her interviews with 
Mother Jones (2008), she declares that: “the image that I have of Iran today is mixed so much 
with my melancholy and my nostalgia that I can’t have a fair point of view” (Satrapi in Walt, 
2008). Traumatic experiences are powerful motivators. According to Satrapi, “the depression 
is like a motor for creation. I need a little bit of depression, a bit of acid in my stomach, to be 
able to create. When I’m happy I just want to dance” (Satrapi as cited in Hattenstone, The 
Guardian, 2008). Accordingly, Whitlock argues, the melancholic mood of narratives raise 
important concerns about “the commodification of suffering, gendered discourses of trauma, 
the transmission of cultural memory across generations, and the circulation and authorisation 
of trauma story” (2008, p. 9).  
There are different arguments regarding traumatic autobiographies. Cathy Caruth in her 
Trauma: Explorations in Memory defines “the structure of trauma as a disruption of history or 
temporality” (Whitehead, 2004, p. 12). In her opinion, “the traumatic event is not experienced 
or assimilated fully at the time that it occurs, but only belatedly in its insistent and intrusive 
return, and hence is not available in the usual way to memory and interpretation” (Whitehead, 
                                               
197 “The political topicality of Persepolis played an important role in its success” (Barzegar 2012, p. 1). 
Its international success can be attributed to the fact that the story was based on the contemporary 
political history of Iran, that is to say in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Satrapi, in an 
interview with Weiss (n. d.) informed us of the reasons behind her mean of expression: “I made one 
film in animation, and the reason was because I thought it was the most appropriate form for Persepolis. 
Given the specific story of Persepolis, which had to do with the modern history of Iran, I think if I put 
it in a geographical place with some type of human being people would say, “Oh, this is a story of the 
Third World people, they’re far from us, we don’t get it,” and I thought there was something about the 
structure of the drawing that meant anyone could identify with it” (Satrapi in Weiss, n. d.). Just like 
Satrapi, Barzegar believes that one of the significant points of Persepolis is that, it provides its audiences 
with an “accurate time-table portrayal of the political events that took place from 1979 to 1984 - a 
chaotic and turbulent time in Iran’s modern history” (Barzegar, 2012, p. 1). Chute (2008) agrees that 
the book’s success should be placed in its “political topicality” (p. 108). In other words, although what 
has made Persepolis at the centre of world attention was the form of graphic novel and the child 
language narrative device, it was this ‘political topicality’ that has had wide appeal with worldwide 
audiences. The Iranian government too condemned the work as Islam setiz and anti-Iranian due to its 
‘political topicality’.  
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2004, p. 12). Therefore, according to Whitehead, there is no doubt that recounting everything 
from the very beginning to the end “is not straightforwardly referential” in a traumatic account 
(p. 13). This highlights the borders between fiction and fact as well as the subjectivity and 
objectivity of the account. The “fact” itself is an interpretative process both in reading and 
writing, so it seems more reasonable to use “faction” according to Lloyd Ridgeon to describe 
the genre of memoir.  
As far as traumatic literature is concerned, it is argued that the author’s memory is liable 
to decay and deterioration in trauma narrative. In other words, in discussions about fact and 
fiction, it is acknowledged that producing a fact is influenced by the debates about trauma and 
memory. This is confirmed by Leigh too. “The development of the traumatic memory impacts 
on self-representation” (Leigh, 2001, p. 25). Furthermore, according to Primo Levi, “human 
memory is a marvellous but a fallacious instrument, liable to deterioration and decay, 
especially in the wake of a catastrophic experience” (as cited in Whitehead, 2004, p. 30). 
However, despite the unreliability of the memory at the time of the trauma, many authors 
defend the accuracy of testimonies through justification of its nature. For example, Shoshana 
Felman and Dori Laub describe testimony as “fragmented and broken in form, composed of 
bits and pieces of a memory that has been overwhelmed by occurrences that have not settled 
into understanding or remembrance” (1992, p. 5). There is a joint reality between the 
empathetic listener and the traumatic story teller. “On the part of the listener, there is a 
necessary emotional investment in the testimony. The trauma returns in disjointed fragments 
and the role of the listener is to move quietly and decisively in bringing things together” 
(Whitehead, 2004, p. 34). Such a function is not riskless for the listener, who is modifying the 
trauma of the story teller. “The listener to trauma comes to be a participant and co-owner of 
the traumatic event: through his very listening, he comes to partially experience trauma in 
himself” (Felman and Dori, 1992, p. 57). Amir’s work, in my opinion, creates the process of 
testimony in the presence of a listener i.e. the story retold by Amir crafted to seek external 
support for improvement of human rights in Iran (Amir in Jadaliyya, 2011). Amir’s testimony 
might be fragmented or influenced by the trauma or memory defects. Moreover, the listeners’ 
participation would cause extra manipulation in reading and understanding his memoir. This 
largely reminds us, just like Satrapi’s case, that Amir wrote a genre of autobiography or a 
genre of interpretation which is different from reporting.  
Memory shortfall could be related to the use of a child’s narrative technique in 
autobiographies. Satrapi’s narrative technique acts as a powerful weapon to affect the reader. 
A child’s language with its simplicity, purity and innocence can “increases identification with 
the protagonist, because the reader is naturally inclined to feel more sympathy for the 
experiences of a young child” (Whitehead, 2004, p. 38). Readers can see the loss and 
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disorientation of the author in the mirror of child’s perspective. Mostly, they have the same 
feelings and reflections towards the event being mirrored by the child. A child’s perspective 
can familiarise a strange event and would also be able to defamiliarise the familiar “because a 
child is liable to notice details and is not always able to interpret what is going on around him”, 
therefore, he is just purely reporting the events as they happened before his eyes (Whitehead, 
2004, p. 38). This way of reporting is matter-of-factly very trustable, as the child might not 
really understand what was going on. Satrapi’s autobiography is the story of a childhood. By 
using little Marji as the narrator of Persepolis in the first part of the book, “the reader is meant 
to feel her emotions in order to understand her story” (Meier, 2009). Speaking like a child 
favours a critical tone, hyperboles, exaggeration, the deployment of a Manichean logic,198 and 
provokes condoning reactions. When Marji talks about the tortures of Siamak Jari and other 
family friends, she elaborates on the use of iron as a tool of torture. “I have never imagined 
that you could use that appliance for torture” (Satrapi, 2003, p. 51). In another vignette, Satrapi 
uses hyperbole in representing a man cut into pieces. Satrapi’s visualising of this scene is a 
“moment of defamiliarization (a child’s image of torture) in which one recognizes not only the 
inadequacy of any representation to such traumatic history, but also, more significant, the 
simultaneous power of the radically inadequate (the child’s naïve confusion)” (Chute, 2008, 
p. 4). In Chute’s words, Persepolis simultaneously comments on “the insufficiency of any 
representation to fully represent trauma and also harness the power of the visual to represent 
an important emotional landscape, which is moving paradoxically because of its distance from 
and proximity to the realities it references” (Chute, 2008, p. 4). Little Marji in Persepolis, 
sometimes, simplifies the situation due to her childish point of view. “This shows the complex 
emotions and reactions Satrapi wants the reader to have through a child’s perspective” (Meier, 
2009). In another vignette, she says: “at the age of six, I was already sure I was the last prophet. 
This was a few years before the revolution” (Satrapi, 2003, p. 6). This is also an emotion-
evoking tone of a child that is unavoidable. Therefore, because of this overly simplistic 
technique – a child’s perspective – the story does not seem to accord to “fact but reflects an 
inner or subjective truth” (Whitehead, 2004, p. 32). In other words, Persepolis teaches us that 
retracing and representing a traumatic event does not need to be necessarily traumatic. 
Through using a child as a protagonist, “Satrapi shows us that certain modes of representation 
depict historical trauma more effectively, and more horrifically, that does realism (in part 
                                               
198 Manicheanism was founded by the Persian prophet Mani in the Sasanian epoch (216-276 CE). 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2013). According to Baker-Brian (2011), Manicheanism is “a simplistic 
state of affairs, in which two opposing agendas are set against one another” (p. 1). “The Manichean 
dichotomy, seeing things in black and white, is always dogmatic and intolerant –in short, reactionary -
- whereas he who avoids set figure, who recognizes nuances and distinctions and who admits 
contradictions is democratic” (Eco, 1979, p. 162). There are also some elements of Otherisation and 
racism in Manicheanism based on the theories of Fanon. See Gibson, 1999, pp. 337-364.  
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because they are able to do justice to the self-consciousness that traumatic representation 
demands)” (Chute, 2008, p. 4). This is the reason that Persepolis can be “read as a historical 
testimony” referring to its technique in using a child’s perspective (Whitehead, 2004, p. 40).   
Based on Whitehead’s argument, representing the emotion-evoking childhood and 
confusing traumatic moments can be filled with lies, hiding the truth or changing a part of it. 
If the reader has a feeling that “the autobiographer hides or alters a part of the truth, s/he might 
think that he is lying” (Signes in Miller, 2007, p. 539). Other trauma theorists have similar 
views. They differentiate between identification with traumatic experience and empathy 
towards it. In the latter instance, the response to trauma “is combined with cognition, argument 
and critical judgement” while in the former, there is no “critical or emotional distance” 
(Whitehead, 2004, p. 35). In another word, in the process of identification, there is always this 
hazard of losing the critical eye. Eakin (1989) believes that the narration of a child needs going 
beyond the verisimilitude of autobiography and enter the realm of fiction (p. 53). In this case, 
the role of memory is less significant than reconstructing the child’s perspective. The 
autobiographer is so much concerned with the artistic construction of a child’s perspective that 
he forgets about the experiences. Also, the major problem of a child’s narrative technique is 
the naturally “biased, one-sided portrayals” of different personalities and his relationship with 
them (Hathaway, 2011, p. 252). For example, in the case of Persepolis, little Marji, can be 
argued, to have failed to portray the revolutionary guards impartially. However, Dave Eggers 
argues that “the author doesn’t have the energy or, more important, skill, to fib about this being 
anything other than him telling you about things, and is not a good enough liar to do it in any 
competently sublimated narrative way” (Eggers, 2001, p. xix-xx). In general, fiction draws 
upon the child narrator because the child’s voice is seen as ‘pure’ or ‘uncontaminated’ from 
social conditioning processes – innocent.  Accordingly, Meier believes that “Satrapi’s purpose 
is not to show the reader the whole truth, nor is it to lie to the reader. The purpose was merely 
to shift the paradigms, if only temporarily, by which Iran is judged” (Meier, 2009). 
Interestingly, in framing Satrapi’s work as a traumatic memoir, based on the above 
discussions, Persepolis breaks what has been termed as “trauma” (2004, p. 7). The language 
of Persepolis is therefore that of humour and sarcasm. According to Chambers (2013), actually 
it is “its humour that would sell the memoir, rather than the serious discussion of Islam and 
multiculturalism” (p. 8); e.g. Marji calls her mum a “Dictator!” She continues: “You are the 
guardian of the revolution of this house!” (Satrapi, 2003, p. 113).  
Basically, all additional support to provide evidence in an autobiography from 
interviewing, recording, photographing or transcribing can “only at best create a ‘partial truth’ 
both in and from their fieldwork, the most ethical thing to do is to acknowledge and continually 
point out the subjectivity of the entire process” (Hathaway, 2011, p. 255). Persepolis and other 
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works discussed so far “continue to baffle those who need to find one generic pigeonhole for 
it, but that elusiveness is also the source of its continued narrative power” (Hathaway, 2011, 
p. 256). In approaching autobiographies in general, one must move beyond the borders of the 
“true/false-dichotomy in semantic analysis” (Doring, 2006, p. 71). According to Hathaway, 
this suggests that a label like novel or autobiography or fiction cannot do justice in defining 
the story of individuals. In Doring’s words, “autobiographies, in this perspective, are primarily 
performative texts: they are not just descriptive, but productive; in other words, they do things 
with words. What they are doing can be characterised as self-formation by self-formulation” 
(2006, p. 71). According to Doring, the autobiographers turn into the author of their own selves 
by telling their stories. “Autobiography has always offered people a means of turning from 
being the subjects of discourse to being the subjects in discourse” (Doring, 2006, p. 72). 
Regarding the elements of fiction, it would be safer to approach works of Satrapi and others 
as a ‘self-reflexive autobiography’.  
Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the analysis of autobiographical narratives, 
looking at different stereotypes i.e. fictional, semi-fictional and non-fictional, and the views 
of various autobiographers. The focus of the chapter was on the uniqueness of the 
autobiography as a threshold genre to include discussions of fact/fiction, memory/history, 
selves/others and images/texts. Through a correct understanding of the fluid and dynamic 
nature of autobiography rather than a fixed personal and subjective framework, one would be 
able to disengage the intentio lectoris from the dogmatism and fallacy of clichés and partial 
tendencies of orientalist or occidentalist representations of autobiographies. In a comparative 
study of Art Spiegelman’s Maus with those of Satrapi’s Persepolis and its epigones in 
consequence, it is reasonably safe to assert that these works cannot be boxed as either fact or 
fiction.  
The autobiographies discussed so far received more negative criticisms concerning the 
issues of authenticity and sincerity. The concept of sincerity is argued to be the sin qua non of 
autobiographies, however, a complex combination of re-creation and reflection is inevitable 
for photographic facts and evidences to be reconstructed with elisions and selections. 
Recounting memories of a father who survived the Holocaust, and the traumatic situation of 
prisoners without being one is a dynamic process of identification with the victims through 
fictionality. This is unavoidable in the genre of the memoir and failure to considering it devoid 
of fictionality might cause confusion with media representations or news reports.   
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CONCLUSION 
Persepolis has been accused of Islam setizi (hostility against Islam) by Iranian officials 
and simultaneously it has been acclaimed by many scholars and celebrated by world media 
and publishing industries. In fact, it looks like Satrapi and Persepolis are caught in between 
an ideological, political, economic, anthropological and theological war between the “West”, 
chiefly USA and its allies, and Iran. The problem, however, is the debate on Persepolis itself 
and the lack of informed knowledge surrounding it. I have addressed this divergent reception 
by investigating Marjane Satrapi’s intentio auctoris and the message behind authoring 
Persepolis. This was done in the context of the investigation of Satrapi’s epigones as well as 
a number of selected post-revolutionary memoirs. As discussed, Satrapi’s main concerns in 
Persepolis are shared by other post-revolutionary authors. As Afary & Anderson (2005) in 
Foucault and the Iranian Revolution state: “they have been demanding a more liberal reading 
of the Islamic law; new civil liberties that clearly demarcate the boundaries between religion, 
state, and the individual; a more egalitarian concept of gender relations” (p. 172). They actually 
used a “humanist hermeneutic” (Nash, 2012, p. 63) to project the “Western” individuality and 
democracy as a weapon by which to expose the Islamic Republic’s enforcement of Islamic 
rules on citizens, practicing gender discrimination and its relationship with the phenomenon 
of modernity, and outside world. The comparative study of different post-revolutionary 
memoirs suggests a nuanced understanding of Satrapi’s intention and message -which is 
clearly dissimilar to that of other mentioned autobiographers- as well as the genre of memoir, 
and the existing debates about the boundaries between ‘factual’ and ‘fictional’ accounts. 
 Satrapi appears to be more aware than other autobiographers of the implications of 
falling into the language game of binaries. “The construction of fallacious images of Iran 
within Western minds has led Satrapi to suggest that Iran’s overwhelming image within 
Western media is of ‘women in chadors and guys with guns’”199 (Goldin as cited in McIntosh, 
2013, p. 3). Therefore, rather than encouraging the stereotypical presentations of her ‘beloved’ 
country, Satrapi de-centres such issues as men and women, Islam and feminism, “East” and 
“West”. Satrapi’s Persepolis has been authored, according to Leservot, to undermine the 
binary discourses of the “East” and the “West”. While she criticises the imposition of Islamic 
rules by ayatollahs in Iran, she also demonstrates an insight into the destructive effects of 
                                               
199 Satrapi declares in one of her interviews: “when I arrived in France, I met many people who expected 
me to speak Arabic. So many Europeans do not know the difference between Arabs and Iranians. They 
don’t know anything of our centuries-old culture. They seem to think Iran has always been a country of 
religious fundamentalists. Iranian women either have no place in our society or that they are hysterical 
black crows. In fact, Iranian women are not downtrodden weeds” (Satrapi in Kutschera, 2002).  
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stereotypical and biased representations of her country and culture in the world media.200 She 
condemns the revolutionary government in Iran for using and applying the religion as an 
instrument to legitimise their power, and therefore calls for the separation of individual and 
political lives as well as the religion from politics. Based on the hybrid identity of Satrapi 
discussed so far, her main concern is to differentiate between the identities of Iranian citizens 
from the Islamic Republic’s government. This kind of social interactions and hybridity is 
evident in most of the Middle Eastern autobiographies, especially those which are on Iran 
(Chambers, 2013, p. 4). Jill Ker Conway believes “an autobiography is inspired by a myriad 
of factors including cultural, historical, political and personal influences and issues” (Conway, 
2011). Persepolis is not an exception. In fact, Persepolis narrates Satrapi’s childhood 
experiences and stories of coming of age, however, the story is inextricably linked with the 
social, religious and political transformations of Iran.  
Apart from Satrapi’s personal identity in her work, her intentio auctoris gives voice to 
her main concern which is the individual identity in Iran and social identity beyond Iran. The 
former refers to the collective socio-cultural and religious identity within Iran, i.e. lack of 
individuality in group identities (a “Westerner” in Iran, Satrapi, 2003, p. 274). While, the latter 
deals with the perception of Iran in the “West”, i.e. nation of “fundamentalism” or terrorism 
or axis of evil (an Iranian in the “West”, Satrapi, 2003, p. 274). Interestingly, McIntosh 
believes “Persepolis’ purpose is heavily linked to identity” (2013, p. 1). Satrapi has 
consciously employed her identity along with that of her family and her country in service of 
her intentio auctoris, i.e. wiping off the misconceptions about her country by removing the 
gap between cultures (McIntosh, 2013, p. 1).201 The rationale for writing Persepolis (according 
to Satrapi) was to show that Iran has a rich culture and heritage, and has a lot more to offer the 
world. This, however, is not what emerges from propagandistic media renditions of Iran. In 
fact, Satrapi’s memoir is a collective identity. In other words, “Satrapi’s identity is very much 
entwined within her relationship with others” (McIntosh, 2013, p. 1). She did not write her 
autobiography in a vacuum. 
                                               
200 In one of her interviews, Satrapi noted that: “our perceptions of other countries and cultures are still 
largely formed by what we see in the media. In a time when more and more media outlets are being 
controlled by fewer people, these perceptions are often one-dimensional and rarely accurate” (Satrapi 
in Clarke, 2003). 
201 The concern is poignant, yet convincing, one. Iran is mostly discussed as a rogue country – as part 
of the axis of evil- to retain George W. Bush’s infamous words. In one of her interviews with Powells 
(2006), she declared that her Persepolis is a new look at Iran, quite contrary to some other post-
revolutionary memoirs that have only intensified the biased narrative on Iran: “I’d heard so many 
stupidities about my country since I left Iran. People had watched this stupid movie Not Without My 
Daughter [in which Sally Field plays an American who rescues her daughter from her estranged in-laws 
in Iran]; I heard so many things like that. I did not make Persepolis for Iranians. It was my answer to 
the rest of the world, to say, ‘Let me give you another point of view’” (Satrapi in Dave, 2006).  
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According to Trinh T. Minh-ha, a group of autobiographers “want their words to be 
cries, life, capable of touching (other live things and beings) and being touched (being touched 
by the reader)” (1991, p. 140). As such, they try to overspill the borders between themselves 
and others “circulating within and being interpenetrated by broader social experiences” 
(Chambers, 2013, p. 4). In other words, in Susan Stanford Friedman’s words, there is no 
absolute or separate individualism. She believes “autobiographers who are women and 
members of minorities can’t help knowing that they also intimately share in a ‘collective 
identity’” (as cited in Miller, 2007, p. 544). This type of collective identity equals 
understanding oneself in relation to others such as one’s family, friends and relatives. “In an 
autobiography the relational is not optional. Autobiography’s story is about the web of 
entanglement in which we find ourselves, one that we sometimes choose” (Miller, 2007, p. 
544). Therefore, Satrapi’s intentio auctoris ought to be understood in relation with her identity 
at public level within the Iranian society, its culture and history.  
Apart from what was discussed so far regarding the personal and collective identities in 
Persepolis, it is interesting to know that Satrapi develops her own process of individual 
identity in order to make an effective critique to respond to the “Western” perceptions of 
Iranian identity (Madella, 2012, p. 4). In Iran, for example, she highlights her individual 
preferences in contrast with the public spheres of Iranian lifestyle. “Documenting parties with 
alcohol (p. 106), flirtatious looks (p. 294), and pre-marital sex (p. 305) in comparison to the 
public life in which she had to refrain from hugging her boyfriend for fear of persecution 
(Satrapi, 2003, p. 284)”, are good examples of constructing an individual identity against what 
society imposed on her. Specifically, as illusterated in the second chapter, in the case of the 
hejab, she decides to rebel against it and construct her own identity and agency in a way totally 
opposite to public rules. Persepolis is the actualisation of such rebellion.202 Satrapi’s rebellious 
position is due to her promotion of individualism. Not only does she speak as an individual 
vis-à-vis the community of believers, she does go a “step further by actually writing and 
illustrating a memoir – and this story has her doing all she can [like designing her own way of 
the hejab] to take control of her life even in the face of social upheaval” (Sarria, 2012, 
[emphasis added]). The anti hejab position of Satrapi, in fact, is rooted in the “removal of her 
individuality” (Hwink, 2012). The hejab means sameness for her, and this lack of identity and 
uniqueness causes her rejection of the veil. Subsequently, to reject the political notions in 
                                               
202 According to Satrapi: “the fact is, when you are adolescent, if you are told you cannot do something, 
you will surely do it. So it could become a fashion - worse, a symbol of rebellion. If wearing a veil 
becomes your symbol of rebellion, then you certainly know about irony!” (Satrapi in The Guardian, 
2003).  
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introducing the Iranian woman to the world, Satrapi defines Iran beyond the borders of the 
Islamic Republic. 
In spite of her intentio auctoris, for which Satrapi is well arguing the shari’atising of 
the publicity of social rules in Iran, the intentio lectoris seems to impose a new different 
meaning on Persepolis. On the whole, the criticism of orientalism raised against Persepolis 
can also be said about the book that Satrapi, also, implicitly recognizes the dehumanising 
effects of secularisation on French women alike. It might be contended that through 
representing herself in a sympathetic way, she is condemning both the Islamic shari’ah and 
the imposed secularism as deficient in so far as the human rights and freedom of choice are 
concerned. In other words, as indicated in the second chapter of this research, by showing 
some feminist agendas, Satrapi confirms her position against the Islamic fundamentalism 
rather than undermining the credibility of the hejab. Her narrative, however, raised sympathy 
for the plight of Iranian women under the Islamic ideology in particular. By referring to the 
hejab as an oppressive cage and Satrapi’s rebellious position towards it, many feminists 
essentialized Satrapi’s rendition of it; while she is equally concerned about both banning the 
hejab in a secular context like France, as well as the compulsory hejab in the Islamic Republic.    
In short, Satrapi’s agenda as an individual has been translated “primarily in terms of 
resistance to the regularizing impetus of structures of normativity” (Mahmood, 2011a, p. 23). 
This means that Satrapi’s activities and behaviours are not products of her independent will; 
rather, the hejab rules were structural forces that undermined her agency. This is, however, far 
from Satrapi’s definition of agency. This kind of agency does not belong to Satrapi herself, 
but is a product of the political and social situation in which she is located. According to 
Mahmood, “it is best not to propose a theory of agency but to analyse agency in terms of the 
different modalities it takes and grammar of concepts in which its particular affect, meaning, 
and form resides” (2011a, p. 188). Accordingly, Satrapi argues that her agency is no different 
than any other human beings. She opposes the veil and its imposition but not the idea of veiling 
or virtue of modesty. For Satrapi, the ‘freedom of choice’ is at the core of the proper realization 
of the hejab discourses. Satrapi’s objection to the compulsory veiling politics as symbolic of 
the lack of individual liberty in Iran is one built on the notion of separation of religion and 
state. Her attempts to grapple with the political and cultural gendered citizenship in Iran has 
led the feminist circles or “Western” media to identify her with the disempowered subaltern 
women rising against the Islamic patriarchy in Iran. However, the analysis of Satrapi’s intentio 
auctoris has demonstrated her disjunction from the current stereotypes. Through the message 
of love and humanity, Satrapi suggests a critical reflection upon the influence of politics on 
Islam and secularism alike. Her dual position articulates a unique look at approaching a unified 
identity for humanity beyond the borders of the Islam and secularism. Satrapi’s objection to 
  
156 
 
the Islamic Republic policies is interpreted as the objection of an individualist against Islam; 
hence, the accusation of Islam setizi and orientalism.   
  Satrapi’s text, as argued by the orientalist critics, reinforces the “Western” hegemonic 
agendas out of hatred for the form of Islamism which she accuses of robbing her individuality 
and freedom of choice. Elaborating on the hejab as a sign of oppression, as argued by the 
critics, is the projection of secular and individual “Western” values on Muslim cultures, hence 
unconvincing. Basically, Satrapi reveals her positioning within the “Western” educated, 
upper-class elites. Accordingly, in this, she occludes the majority of Iranian women whose 
social class has never passed up the opportunity to condemn or criticise the Islamic 
government for applying religion at public level. Her class politics and her “Westernized” 
background with respect to Iranian religious and cultural history is not able to envisage a new 
image of women within Iranian society. Absent from her work, according to Iranian officials, 
are references to the national, anthropological, cultural and religious complicity in sustaining 
Islam in power for purposes of defence, resistance and independence from foreign powers. As 
argued, purposeful elisions and omissions are redeeming characteristics of orientalist works 
and post-revolutionary memoirs are often deliberately incorporating occasional elisions and 
silences in their accounts. Therefore, her text remains markedly “partial” in its foregrounding 
issues relating to Iranian identity. However, needless to mention that, Satrapi’s account is 
partial and personal - simply another [emphasis added] picture of Iran and the way it informs 
the Iranian system. This should not be mistaken with the picture of Iran. It is only a different 
account from that of the “Western” media or the Islamic Republic.  
Accusations of orientalism are identifiable not only in terms of the hejab, but also in 
discussions of fact/fiction in autobiographies. As illusterated in chapter 3, an analysis of 
intentio lectoris clearly showed that de-contextualising the genre of autobiography in its 
reception can present it as either a “fictional narrative” or a “true account of events”. 
Discussions of Persepolis and its epigones within the framework of orientalism tend to regard 
these autobiographies as experiences their authors have never had, objecting to them as not a 
reliable source of information or mal-documented evidences. The challenge in discussions of 
fact and fiction is the process of innovation and restructuring rather than reflecting and 
reporting. This is even more conspicuous in autobiographies with child language or those 
which are combining fantasy with memory. The child narrative technique or the postmemory 
reflection can be risky as they might distort the authenticity and the underlying reality which 
are the sin qua non of an autobiography as a genre. Indeed, Persepolis with its account of the 
war or the Islamic Revolution has a collection of evidences that are either experienced directly 
by Satrapi or shared with her indirectly over a long period of time. This is quite similar to that 
of Art Spiegelman’s Maus narrating the story of those who survived the Holocaust. Although 
  
157 
 
Maus is a collection of stories and images, the elements of fictionality seem to be unavoidable 
in the process of identification and in retelling their stories. Consequently, it is impossible to 
narrate a story without any extra elements. This represents a breaking point in the discussions 
on autobiography to be read and interpreted differently from media or news reports. In short, 
Persepolis and other memoirs, discussed so far in this research, break what has been termed 
as “conventional autobiography”. Being referential arts, they can only best create partial truth 
based on the subjectivity of the entire process. As the result, it would be much safer to consider 
Persepolis and similar works as postmodern autobiographies beyond the borders of generic, 
fixed and boxed conventional autobiographies. Approaching Persepolis as a postmodern 
autobiographical genre with a personal, subjective and partial interpretation of a woman whose 
intentio auctoris is giving voice to wiping off the notions of xenophobia, and spreading 
humanity could be conducive to a surprisingly different understanding, and representation of 
it. While investigating the specifics of intentio lectoris as different interpretations of Satrapi’s 
intentio auctoris, this research analyses the cultural, political, social and religious agendas 
behind them. Iran, just like any other country (including secular “Western” governments), 
cannot be discussed without considering its religious substratum. Shi’a Islam and the history 
of Iran’s relations with the world especially the “West” should be seriously included in any 
discourses on Iran. Explaining the basis of the Iranian political system is an exercise that 
requires not just familiarity with the 1979 revolution, but also with the events that are 
associated with the birth and rise of Shi’ism. The role of religion in Iranian politics and public 
life as well as the internal struggle between clerics and rulers as understood within Iran 
contextualises the “anti-Western” orientations of Iranian policies before and after the 
revolution; hence, explaining the accusation of Islam setizi. The issues of post-election events 
in 2009, for example, as discussed in Persepolis’ epigones in the third chapter showed the 
necessity of the historical and religious background in understanding the anti-imperialist and 
anti-orientalist positions of the Islamic Republic. Following the 2009 post-election unrests, the 
officials claimed that their act had foiled a “Western” attempt to topple the Islamic Republic. 
The Iranian officials believed that the US and Britain had a hand in post-election protests just 
like the Velvet Revolution of Czechoslovakia in 1989, the Rose Revolution of Georgia in 2003 
and the Orange Revolution of Ukraine in 2004.203 Ayatollah Khamenei in a gathering of 
university students in Tehran said: “there is no doubt that the events were planned in advance 
of the election” (Mackey in The New York Times, 2009). According to Mackey, the Iranian 
                                               
203 According to Mackey, 2009: “the comparison is extremely unflattering to those in power. After the 
fall of the Berlin wall, the Czechoslovak Communist regime was so unpopular that it crumbled in a 
matter of days when it became clear that enforcing its will through violence against peaceful 
demonstrators was no longer an option” (The New York Times, 2009). 
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government tried to convince the people that the country was coping with a plot orchestrated 
by “Western” countries. 
With the emergence of the Green Movement in the aftermath of the 2009 
presidential elections, hopes for democratic change are again threatened by 
growing US–Israeli talk of bombing or invasion, on the pretext of Iran’s 
supposed work on nuclear weapons. US-led Western antagonism to Iran has 
effectively boosted the hardliners in government and enabled them to silence 
the internal voices of reform and dissent (Mir-Hosseini, 2011, p. 9).  
  Mousavi, the alternative to Ahmadinejad, and a number of clerics204 and his supporters 
were accused of following “Western” inspired agendas. Casting doubts on the body of Islamic 
legitimacy, a number of Shi’a clerics confronted the regime’s conduct following the election. 
Important figures such as former presidents, Rafsanjani and Khatami, who were backing 
Mousavi, openly criticised the government’s crackdown on the protesters. In addition to that, 
some dissident olama started to comment and criticise the government’s actions. For example, 
Ayatollah Montazeri commented, “what we have is not Islamic republic, but military republic” 
(Daragahi in Los Angeles Times, 2009).205 Overall, the 2009 election raised concerns among 
different groups among them human rights activists and feminists. Fatemeh Sadeghi (2012) in 
The Green Movement: A Struggle against Islamist Patriarchy wrote that the largest event 
regarding the gender discrimination policies in Iran since the 1979 is the Green Movement. 
An example of Neda Agha Soltan206 shows the humiliating policies of Ahmadinejad’s 
government against women (p. 126). Similarly, Mir-Hosseini describes the Green movement 
as an organic action towards civil rights rather than merely a critique of the fraudulent election 
(2011, pp. 10-11). Later on, the post-election crisis cast doubts over the legitimacy of the 
government (Axworthy, 2013, p. 415). According to Axworthy, “when [in Iran] innocents are 
beaten up, tortured and shot for asking what has happened to their vote, and when peaceful 
funerals are broken up by club-wielding thugs” the political system of Iran is believed to be 
anti-democratic (Axworthy, 2013, p. 410).  
                                               
204 “One complication the Green Movement faces is that, while its leaders consist of individuals who 
have played a central role in the shaping of the Islamic Republic in the early years, they have not only 
been marginalised, in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections, but have also been accused of 
constituting a ‘fifth column’ and of organizing sedition against the system” (Adelkhani, 2012, p. 23).  
205 Along with Montazeri, there were some other clerics in the opposition in the aftermath of 12 June. 
Among those, Yusef Sanei, a reformist marja’ for some Shi’as had denounced the policies of the Islamic 
Republic as illegitimate. “Regime-oriented clerics attempted to begin proceedings to remove his status 
as marja-e taqlid […] but others resisted them on his behalf” (Axworthy, 2013, p. 408-409). 
206 “Neda Agha Soltan, was reportedly shot to death by a plainclothes Basiji in Amir-Abad Street during 
one of the huge post electoral street protests in Tehran. […] Neda represented women of the younger 
generation. Her death was, therefore, very challenging for the conservative establishment and it was for 
this very reason that the government did its best to manipulate it. Claiming the video to have been 
fabricated, the state media concertedly attributed it to foreign agents and oppositional groups. Despite 
these efforts, Neda became a strong icon of the Green Movement” (Sadeghi, 2012, p. 124).  
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The opposition of clerics to the principles and policies of the Islamic government in Iran 
is not limited to the post-election events. This dates back to well before the “Westernisation” 
of the country under the Pahlavi dynasty. When Persia was ruled by the Qajar dynasty, an 
absolute monarchy, sovereignty was embodied in the person of the monarch. Obedience to his 
decrees was an unconditional duty and all Persians were subjects of the Shah. Unhappy with 
the situation, political leaders and people promoted the Constitutional Revolution (1906) 
which tried to limit the power of the ruler (Shah) with a series of constitutional laws. These 
were later suspended by the Pahlavi dynasty. Reza Khan and his son enforced their decrees. 
In this regard, Ayatollah Khomeini established a new way of governance, one defined by 
Islamism, not nationalism. The seventy year old constitution was abolished. The idea of 
establishing an Islamic government based on velayat-e faqih (governance of the jurist) was 
fundamental, according to Ayatollah Khomeini. This idea, though discussed from many angles 
of fiqh (Islamic law) by various learned foqaha (jurists), finds no general consensus. As 
mentioned in the first chapter, Khomeini’s interpretation of the principle of the “governance 
of the jurists” was quite innovative, and had generated much controversy ever since. The 
majority of olama, in fact, reject this politicised reading, and hold the view that religion and 
politics should cooperate but remain two distinct spheres.  
After the revolution and with the establishment of theocracy, the clerics in Iran 
attempted to apply a vision of Islam at the state level. The political system of Ayatollah 
Khomeini privileges the collective over individual discourse. The amalgamation of religious 
obligations with citizenship defined sacred responsibility for both the nation and the state. The 
newly defined collective religious institution, according to Khomeini, is “capable of contesting 
Western cultural and political hegemony” (Mahmood, 2011a, p. 62). The principle of 
Khomeini’s institution is “amr bil ma’ruf wal-nahi ‘an al-monkar (to enjoin others in the doing 
of good or right, and the forbidding of evil or wrong)”, around which many of the state policies 
have been elaborated (Mahmood, 2011a, p. 58). According to Mahmood, enjoining others to 
piety can sometimes extend beyond the “encouragement to the use of force in prohibiting 
undesirable conduct (as suggested by the second part of the injunction” (2011a, p. 60). In Iran, 
forbidding the wrong or evil is sometimes understood through the use of violence and 
compulsion to bring about piety and morality, as discussed in the case of the hejab. According 
to Ayatollah Khomeini’s foundation, the Islamic state is primarily responsible for the correct 
implementation of shari’ah in the context of society. Consequently, many Iranian men and 
women have found “Western” individualist alternatives to challenge the state’s claim on amr 
bil maruf. The struggle of many women to achieve equality and emancipation from mandatory 
dress code policies of the revolutionary government is therefore engaged with the formation 
of feminist movements using the media and the orientalist tropes “familiar in the West to talk 
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about subjectivity, identity and power” (Moallem, 2005, p. 120). The formation of Islamic 
feminism within the realm of Islamic jurisprudence was a solution to address the issues 
affecting women in the Islamic Republic. In this sense, women and men alike started 
identifying themselves with a form of Islam beyond the borders of the Islamic Republic. The 
foundation of velayat-e faqih in Iran is quite dissimilar to the form of Islamic governments in 
other Muslim countries due to its communal and pluralist conception of civil society. The 
convergence of the politics and religion in post-revolutionary Iran has inspired the call to 
define Islam at an individual global level, or to save Islam from the state authority.  
As discussed in the first chapter, a wide spectrum of opinions are at play in the debate 
about the interpretation of Islamic democracy and the foundational approach, i.e. Khomeini’s 
velayat-e faqih. Menashri identifies democracy as “the participation of people in power and 
decision making” which is desired in a democratic system, while obedience to the power of 
vali-ye faqih in Iran is nationally and politically desired (Menashri, 2001, p. 37). Guardianship 
is thus equated to dictatorship. In the case of velayat-e faqih as it was propounded by Ayatollah 
Khomeini, some scholars believe that its incompatibility with democracy is even more far-
fetched. As “the legitimacy of all decisions and acts in the public domain depends on the 
approval and authorization of the supreme jurist as the vali-ye amr”, democracy is meaningless 
(Kadivar, 2011). Kadivar believes that, Islam is not an obstacle in a democratic management 
per se and Islamic societies can keep democracy while committed to their ethical values, 
however, the problem with velayat-e faqih is a serious one in democratic debates. Kadivar 
states that velayat-e faqih is not Islamic in base. He distinguishes no difference between the 
monarchical system of the former Shah of Iran and the current system of velayat-e faqih. 
Therefore, equality (especially between men and women) cannot be achieved in the Islamic 
Republic, the base of which is velayat-e faqih. Based on the idea of equality, “the humanity of 
an individual has priority over his belief, unlike religious principles in which equality is based 
on the faith of people” (Menashri, 2001, p. 37). Adversaries of the velayat-e faqih criticise its 
foundation as opposed to individual autonomy and freedom of choice. Surpassing the religion, 
government policies in Iran provoked the fight for democracy and human rights. Many reform 
movements have been formed as a result, emphasising on a more conservative interpretation 
of state policies. The emphasis in these movements were “toward the individualization of 
moral responsibility so characteristic of modern Islam” (Mahmood, 2011a, p. 64). By modern 
Islam, the intellectuals mean to create a religious realm that is separated from the political, 
religious and economic realms. These debates created a gap between politicians and 
intellectuals as well as clerics.  
Last but not least, Satrapi’s individualist orientations and her advocation of the universal 
liberal concept of human rights seems to be in contradiction with her intentio auctoris on this 
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particular occasion. Along with her intentio auctoris, she clearly confirmed her critical 
position towards the biased representations of her country by journalists and “Western” media, 
and showed her opposition to French secular feminist circles for their exclusive tendencies for 
“otherising” the Muslim women. However, her support for universal and individual definition 
of human rights seems to ignore pluralist religious identities. As argued by Namli in the first 
chapter of this thesis, any discussions of human rights must be contextualised within the 
national, cultural and religious ideologies and any violent enforcement of liberalism and 
individualism must be seen as self-contradiction (2013, p. 140).   
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